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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines arguments within religion and ecology, particularly within the
ecospiritual movement and methodology called the new cosmology, that humans should cultivate
and sustain emotional relationships with nature by caring for nonhuman others as our
evolutionary kin. Focusing on the U.S. Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, and
the British Petroleum oil spill, I argue that new cosmology affords few opportunities to think
about intimacies with severely damaged and toxic environments. I consider how to rethink
common themes in religion and ecology, like sacrality, kinship, and hope, within the context of
encounters with toxic creatures and damaged ecosystems. I argue that cultivating affinity and
attachment with/in ecological destruction requires thinking through how so-called “negative”
affects like fear, disgust, revulsion, melancholy, shame, and despair can be an important part of
ecological theory and activism. Furthermore, I contend there are other avenues for theorizing
desire and kinship at the theoretical intersections of social marginalization and environmental
decline that are more helpful for speaking to intimacies with and in damaged environments.
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Introduction

Late April 2010, another “storm” is brewing in the Gulf of Mexico. Still in recovery from
the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Gulf residents painfully returned to the national
spotlight as reports slowly revealed that a British Petroleum (BP) drilling rig, Deepwater
Horizon, exploded killing eleven workers and leaving a sea-floor oil gusher. BP’s public
relations quickly jumped on the offensive claiming they had the plans and resources to stop the
spill. But, as days passed, it became frustratingly evident that no such plans and protections were
in place. Live feed cameras placed near the destroyed wellhead depicted in real time what looked
like a volcanic eruption spewing clouds of ash. This eruption was an estimated 53,000 barrels of
crude oil per day gushing from the well. Despite numerous attempts to cap the wellhead, and
mounting anger and frustration at the seeming inability of anyone to stop the spill, it was not
until July 15th, 2010 that the wellhead was capped. Media reports depicted tar ball littered
beaches, rainbow-slick seas, gasping wildlife, struggling residents, and transnational
corporations juggling the blame in an endless loop. The nearly five million barrels of crude oil
spilling into the waters, plus the approximately 1.07 million gallons of toxic Corexit dispersants
used to sink the oil, continues to result in extensive damage to marine habitats, marine industries,
and the health of Gulf-residents, human and non-human.
At the time of the spill my days were spent in a neonatal intensive care unit in southeast
Texas. I'd given birth to a "micro preemie," a child so small and underdeveloped he looked more
like a piece of overripe fruit than a human. He could not breathe or eat on his own. Some
surgeries removed pieces of his anatomy and others added synthetic solutions. He was sustained
by machines and donated breast milk from a facility. The crisis in the Gulf formed a strange
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backdrop for the crisis unfolding in our NICU room with its incessant alarms, dry air, and
pressing panic. While the unstoppable gush of oil garnered palpable local anxiety, it remained as
background to the hourly pressures of the NICU. The spill seemed too close and too far— an
overwhelming disaster that fashioned a certain lingering sourness. My partner and I were just
beginning to learn all that could harm our son in that hospital and glimpses into the risks outside
its protective walls seemed cruel. Two years later, feeling more confident in mothering my
remarkable son and starting my graduate research, I came across the Aljazeera anniversary
special report on sea life impacted by the BP disaster. In these interviews marine scientists
Darryl Felder, Jim Cowan, and Andrew Whitehead detailed a list of disturbing after-effects
including: crabs lacking claws and dying from within, fish with oozing sores and without eye
sockets, and shrimp without eyes, with large tumors, and with their dead young still attached to
their bodies.1 Even now, seeing the accompanying images of these mutations I feel an unsettling
mix of what I can best describe as horror, revulsion, dread, and grief. I feel empathy for these
tiny creatures that is difficult to articulate. They haunt me.
It is risky to begin a project with personal experience. As a feminist, I recognize that
while the personal may be political it is also easily dismissed as irrational, arbitrary, unscholarly,
confessional. Nevertheless, this project originated from and is shaped by unexpected personal
encounters—namely my evolving relationships with the daily entanglements of living on an
environmentally precarious coastline while mothering a disabled child. My response to the
images of ill and disabled sea life is, in part, a desire for conversations that do not yet exist on the
intersections of social difference, particularly race, sexuality, illness, and disability, within the
field of religion and ecology. Religion and ecology affords few resources for thinking about our
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Dahr Jamail, “Gulf Seafood Deformities Alarm Scientists,” Al Jazeera, April 20th, 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/201241682318260912.html.
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relationships with and to gravely damaged environments and their inhabitants. Exploring our
attraction and attachment to nonhuman others is the core of not only much of religious ecotheory
but also other trajectories of environmental theory. But damaged environments and their ill,
wounded, deformed, dispossessed, and exiled inhabitants are rarely granted presence except,
perhaps, as distant warnings or apocalyptic tropes. What kinds of futures are we hoping for and
which creatures, human and nonhuman, have access to these futures? In response to their
weighty absence, the labor of this dissertation is cultivating vital intellectual and political
resources at the intersections of social marginalization and environmental decline.
The Gulf Coast region, that these creatures and I call home, is a devastated landscape—
an area marked by ecological destruction and the anticipation of rapid environmental decline.
While “devastated landscape” can arguably be applied to much of the planet, I use it in this
project to illuminate places experiencing significant crisis fatigue, with the expectation of
persistently perilous futures, and where environmental conditions also wring traumatic emotional
and material costs. Following the BP spill and the destruction of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Harvey, for many the Gulf landscape is unclean, disturbingly damaged, a bad investment,
beyond repair. This region, particularly the Louisiana coast, is what geographer and urban
ecologist Joshua Lewis calls an “ecological chokepoint;” or sites “where human intervention
inhibits or eliminates critical forms of ecological connectivity.”2 Coastal ecosystems “like those
of the Mississippi River Delta,” Lewis writes, “depend on the river’s capacity to transport and
circulate fresh water, millions of tons of sediment and sand, seeds, and billions of animal eggs
and larvae. A sustainable delta requires multiple pathways to distribute water, nutrients, and
sediments into its alluvial plain. When these circulation patterns break down, ecosystems

2

Joshua Lewis, “Ecological Chokepoints,” limn 10 (2018),
https://limn.it/articles/ecological-chokepoints/.
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undergo dramatic changes and the delta’s landmass itself rapidly erodes. This catastrophe is
currently unfolding in coastal Louisiana, placing its communities, its infrastructure, and its
ecological bounty at risk.”3
Louisiana’s environmental precarity is not merely geological or topographical, however.
This dissertation forwards the conviction that we cannot examine environmental injustice
separate from social injustice and argues not only that the Gulf region should be read both as an
ecological choke point and a racial one, but also that these concerns are fundamentally
intertwined. By weaving environmental decline into the historical and present social exclusions,
erosions, deprivations, and abandonments that make the Gulf region particularly precarious for
marginalized humans, I will demonstrate how histories of environmental racism and its political
and economic implications set the scene for disaster and degradation along the coast by pressing
social exclusions into the very landscape of this region. “Devastation” not only describes the
environmental destruction itself but also the traumatic emotional and material tolls exacted on
the bodies that call this coast home by histories of environmental racism and the uneven impacts
of toxicity. The argument that to address environmental problems we have to take-on social
injustice is in no way new. It is the long standing and ongoing reminder from powerful
environmental justice movements, but this dissertation emphasizes how the field of religion and
ecology, which I will define shortly, still sidelines or completely ignores these concerns and, in
response, demonstrates what we might accomplish by investing in efforts to resist white
supremacy, compulsory heterosexuality, able-bodied, and able-mindedness, and by heeding both
the material and affective circuits that complexly prevent and promise environmental and social
healing.

3

Lewis, “Ecological Chokepoints.”
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At its core, this project considers how “best to love” after ecological collapse. In 1989
Donna Haraway asked:
how are love, power, and science intertwined in the constructions of nature in the late
twentieth century? What may count as nature for late industrial people? What forms does
love of nature take in particular historical contexts? For whom and at what cost? In what
specific places, out of which social and intellectual histories, and with what tools is
nature constructed as an object of erotic and intellectual desire? How do the terrible
marks of gender and race enable and constrain love and knowledge in particular cultural
traditions, including the modern natural sciences? Who may contest for what the body of
nature will be?4
These questions have only grown in power as “how should we love in a time of extinction,”
Matthew Chrulew rightfully contends, is now “one of the central ethical questions of our time.”5
Frustratingly, Haraway’s attention to the intersections of nature with social exclusions also
remains salient particularly for religion and ecology that still tends to ignore how nature is
shaped by conceptions of race, gender, sexuality, and ability. This dissertation takes up the
problematic absence of social/environmental degradation within religion and ecology by asking:
what does it mean to love life in devastated landscapes? When so much has been lost, when
critical damage has already been done, is the love gone as well? When places we call(ed) home
are no longer places of desire, what kind of love is required for sustaining affinities in precarious
environments? First, I look at current trajectories of affinity and attachment charted by religion
and ecology and then suggest different avenues, what I will call queer detours, which might
better prepare us for the future. Reading devastated landscapes as affective landscapes, for
example, opens inquiry to the range of emotional bonds with these environments that could be
love, but also constellations of shame, fear, melancholy, and apathy. I argue that cultivating
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Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern
Science (New York: Routledge, 1989), 1.
5

Matthew Chrulew, “Managing Love and Death at the Zoo: The Biopolitics of
Endangered Species Preservation” Australian Humanities Review 50 (2011): 139.
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affinity and attachment within ecological destruction will require thinking through the often
unsettling, possibly terrifying, quotidian intimacies in areas of ecological collapse. Furthermore,
taking on long histories of racial and environmental injustice in America as an occasion to speak
to the larger part they must play in religious ecotheory, I contend we must better understand the
so-called “negative” affects like disgust, revulsion, melancholy, shame, and despair that stick to
communities shouldering the uneven burdens of toxicity by demonstrating that they must
become a critical part of how we do ecological theory and activism. Finally, I argue that
reevaluating our conceptions of “nature,” “human,” “intimacy,” and “futurity” from the
perspectives and encounters of bodies (human and nonhuman) in degrading environments
fundamentally unsettles common themes in religion and ecology, like sacrality, kinship, and
hope, that are implicitly drawn upon but in need of further reflection.

Religion and Ecology
The field of religion and ecology includes multi-disciplinary methods from anthropology,
theology, philosophy, ethics, and the sciences to consider human interactions with the “natural
world” as well as examine how religion and culture shape conceptions of “nature.” I use
“religion and ecology” here as a broad umbrella of inquiry that could include work that dwells in
the overlap of ecological/environmental and religious studies concerns. Various iterations of this
umbrella are “religious environmental ethics,” “religion and nature,” and “religious
environmentalism.” These projects could include: spiritual/religious dimensions of
environmental thought/practice, environmental practices established by particular religious
communities, study of the reemergence of nature religions, and theoretical work on

7
environmental problems “so complex, terrifying, and significant that they require a religious
register for understanding and responding to them.”6
In 1989 and 1991 professor of Buddhism and Environmental Studies David Barnhill,
theologians Eugene Bianchi and Jay McDaniel, and Buddhist scholar and deep ecologist
Stephanie Kaza proposed an initiative at the American Academy of Religion to form a group to
“focus scholarly attention on the religion variable in human/ecosystem interactions.”7 Religion
and Ecology has remained a group at AAR since 1993. While some scholars consider any
material working on ecological and religious questions within the big umbrella of religion and
ecology, others make distinctions between “Religion and Ecology” (associated with the Yale
Forum on Religion and the publications/conferences hosted by the Center for the Study of World
Religions at Harvard University) and “Religion and Nature” (associated with the graduate
program at the University of Florida and the International Society for the Study of Religion,
Nature, and Culture.)8 Those who identify with the category “religion and nature” argue “the
religion and ecology framework excludes a good deal of nature-related religiosity not associated
with established religions,” is “sometimes more sanguine about the environmental potential of
the world’s predominate religions than is warranted,” and that religion and ecology too easily
assumes without genuine critique that our environmental crisis “is the result of defective
religious worldviews.”9 While I find these to be reasonable critiques, I intentionally resist
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Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New
York: Oxford, 2008), 8.
7

Bron Taylor, “Religious Studies and Environmental Concern,” in Encyclopedia of
Religion and Nature Vol. II, ed. Bron Taylor (New York: Continuum, 2005), 1373.
8

Lisa Sideris, “On Letting a Thousand Flowers Bloom: Religious Scholarship in a Time
of Crisis,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 83, no. 2 (2015): 366.
9

Sideris, 367.
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advocating for one approach as remedy for the sins of another. I see merits as well as limitations
within their various approaches. Many of the challenges to common themes in religion and
ecology that I believe devastated landscapes stimulate span this literature regardless of internal
tensions. This project is primarily concerned with arguments about/for cultivating emotional
connections with nonhuman others and scholars in both camps articulate investment in these
attachments. I am compelled, however, by arguments from Tim Morton, Whitney Bauman, and
others that conceptions of nature (particularly those that nostalgically conceptualize “nature” as
pristine10) can actually inhibit generative ecological thought. I also remain sensitive to
ecofeminist critiques of anthropocentricism and androcentrism within many western
environmental activist and philosophical frameworks. Consequently, my terminological
preference (however imperfect) is “religion and ecology.”
Keeping in mind these internal tensions, religion and ecology as a broad academic field
demonstrates three tendencies that readers should anticipate. One, the element that binds all this
diversity together is a commitment to contending that religion, in its many definitions,
expressions, and practices, is an important part of ecological theory/activism. Whether taking an
apologetic, reparative, or analytic stance, most of this scholarship insists that the “broad
intellectual traditions of religions” and the “everyday reality of religion on the ground” are
complementary and are relevant to concerns about environmental degradation.11 Thus,
methodologies in religion and ecology frustrate attempts to conceptualize intellectual traditions
and lived religions as separate enterprises. Two, religion and ecology as a multidisciplinary and

10

Whitney A. Bauman, Richard R. Bohannon II, and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Introduction” in
Grounding Religion: A Field Guide to the Study of Religion and Ecology (New York: Routledge,
2011), 6.
11

Bauman, et. al., 6.
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constantly evolving conversation includes activists and theorists (many of whom consider
themselves to be both/and), theologians and laity, so speaking into this conversation requires
openness toward challenging differences in training and investment. Scholars who approach
religious studies from the argument that “the task of the discipline is properly to analyze religion
rather than to defend or engage in it” find much of this work inappropriate at best, leading some
to argue that the Religion and Ecology AAR group is “more engaged in green religion and
‘missionary’ work than in scholarly analysis."12 Finally, as Whitney Bauman, Richard
Bohannon, and Kevin O’Brien suggest, scholarship in the field of religion and ecology helps
“people to think critically about how religion has been shaped by the natural world and can be
shaped by environmental degradation, and to imaginatively consider how religion and/or the
study of religion might positively impact the future of our species and our planet.”13
Consequently, the third tendency to keep in mind is that in most cases work in religion and
ecology is ethically prescriptive even if only in the broadest sense of contending that humans
ought to change their behaviors/conceptions, whatever the highlighted issues might be, for more
sustainable futures.
While not an unimportant conversation, I tend to find definitions of the field are not as
compelling as the gaps and limitations within the field. Religion and ecology’s tendencies, while
frustrating at times, resonate in some ways with feminist epistemologies that contend that
“objectivity”, or separating oneself from one’s “study,” is impossible. Recognizing the diversity
within the field, I intend to make my connections and generalizations as fair as possible
accepting that consolidating this diversity inevitably leads to discomfort and acknowledging that
tensions remain amongst and within different approaches. I imagine this project less as a critique

12

Taylor, 1374.

13

Bauman, et. al., 8.
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of religion and ecology and more a writhing within the field, pushing at its limitations/horizons
by considering how roily evolutions in the Gulf challenge our theory. By highlighting aversion to
non-ideal lands/creatures and through advocating for a (re)investment in these
spaces/relationships, this project is both practical and speculative. On one level, I want to open a
practical conversation about developing language that ecological theorists and activists can
access to talk about the truly complex material and affective investments necessitated by
cultivating relationships with gravely damaged environments. On another level, this project is
inescapably speculative as it aims at the definitively unanswerable questions of: what does it
mean to be human and how should we humans live, love, and hope in the midst of ecological
destruction?

Dark Green Religions
In his helpful framing of the past few decades of work in religion and ecology broadly
defined, Bron Taylor organizes the bulk of scholarship into four trajectories. One path is to
illuminate various obstacles within the world’s religions that prove to be stumbling blocks for
ecological projects. The second is the extraction of resources within religious traditions/practices
that may prove to be generative for ecological thinking and ecoethical action. The third includes
practical projects in which religious, spiritual, and theological work is deployed to hopefully
promulgate ecologically ethical behaviors. The fourth, perhaps more experimental course, is the
constructive cultivation of “green religions/religion of nature/dark green religions” whether
through encouraging mainstream religions to “go green,” by rekindling/inventing nature
spiritualties, or suggesting contemporary ways of reading the earth itself as “sacred text” that
may not easily fall into the borders of normative religions.14 All of these trajectories,

14

Bron Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion?” Futures 36 (2004): 995.
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understandably, bleed into one another but, Taylor suggests, they all seem to work from an
agreement that “nature is sacred (in some way); and this conviction appears to be tethered to
ethical concern about the environmental decline.”15 It is this fourth avenue’s emphasis on reading
the sacrality of the earth itself and interest in ecoreligiosity on the horizons of normative
religious practice that is most relevant to this project’s search for ethical trajectories more
conducive to loving devastated landscapes.
The conversations I engage here, including exchanges between well-known religion
scholars like Thomas Berry and Mary Evelyn Tucker and scholars in the sciences like E. O.
Wilson and Ursula Goodenough, fall under what Taylor has come to term “dark green religion.”
While green religions posit that “environmentally friendly behavior is a religious obligation”
dark green religions, Taylor argues, are “deeply ecological, biocentric, or ecocentric, considering
all species to be intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable apart from their usefulness to human
beings.”16 This approach to religion and ecology is based on a “felt kinship with the rest of life,
often derived from a Darwinian understanding that all forms of life have evolved from a
common ancestor and are therefore related.”17 As a value system rooted in affective kinship,
Taylor contends that dark green religion is “accompanied by feelings of humility and a
corresponding critique of human moral superiority, often inspired or reinforced by a sciencebased cosmology that reveals how tiny human beings are in the universe.”18 Taylor gestures

15

Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion?” 995.
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Bron Taylor, Dark Green Religions: Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 10-13.
17

Taylor, Dark Green Religions, 13.
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toward sacred natures and kinship ethics as important orientations in paganism and indigenous
religions, and the growing academic interest in these orientations, but he also highlights the
curious development of a “kind of civic planetary earth religion” evolving without any
“concomitant confession of supernatural beliefs” yet nevertheless claims “religious fidelity to the
biosphere.”19 This form of dark green religion, Taylor argues, is surprisingly present in the
supposedly secular work of prominent scientists Stephen Jay Gould, Wilson, and Carl Sagan
who utilize “metaphors of the sacred to express their awe at the wonders of the universe and
reverence for life.”20
Significantly influenced by the work of religion scholars Berry, Tucker, Loyal Rue, and
John Grim and in conversation with scientists Goodenough, Wilson, Brian Swimme, and
Stephen Kellert, this vein of scholarship understands “scientific worldviews not as a leading
cause of nature’s disenchantment but as a primary vehicle for restoring enchantment, wonder,
meaning, and value to the natural world.”21 In this dissertation, I track this particular route in
religion and ecology whereby “scientific narratives are sacralized and the diversity of life is
accorded reverence” to inquire how these theorists approach affinity and attachment with/to
nonhuman others.22 In chapter one, I will address this work in detail but it is significant to note
here that this vein is read both as a methodology within religion and ecology and a science-based

19

Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion?” 991-1000.
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Ibid., 998.
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Lisa Sideris, “Science as Sacred Myth? Ecospirituality in the Anthropocene Age”
Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 9.2 (2015), 137.
22

Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion?” 999.

13
ecospirituality movement that Lisa Sideris terms “New Genesis” or “new cosmology.”23 Taylor
notes an interesting aspect of new cosmology spirituality is that it stands “alone as something of
a new religious movement” as a way of expressing “deep, driving feelings” toward biodiversity
and it is also often “grafted onto liberal forms of already-existing religions” interested in
exploring ecological questions.24 Nurturing these “feelings” or “emotions,” this scholarship
advocates, could prove fertile for ethical investment. As Ursula Goodenough contends, “it seems
likely that the emotional circuits invoked when we contemplate our deep evolutionary affinity
with other creatures, and when we are infused with compassion, will turn out to map closely onto
the circuits that drive our parental instincts, emotions that generate such feelings as tenderness
and warmth and protectiveness. These same emotions extend to our understanding that the Earth
must be nurtured, an understanding embedded in many religious traditions.”25 With hope that
these affective circuits will lead the way, I read new cosmology’s main ethical argument as
insisting that for the future, we must love nonhuman others as our sacred evolutionary kin.
Taylor argues that this “affectively grounded spirituality of connection” in which “people
feel awe and reverence toward the earth’s living systems and even feel themselves as connected
and belonging to these systems” might not “retain anything we would recognize in today’s more
common supernaturalistic metaphysics, but it might nevertheless require religious terminology to
verbally capture the feelings.”26 While I will defer to other scholarship within religion and

23

Sideris (2013) terms this religiopoeisis project “New Genesis” but it is also recognized
in religion and ecology as “The Epic of Evolution,” “Big History,” “The New Story,” or “The
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Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion?” 999.
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Ursula Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 128.
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Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion,” 1002.
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ecology that saliently critiques the uses of “science” and “religion” in sacred natures discourse,
my project is concerned with the unexplored affective resonances in this work. What do we mean
by “religious emotions”? Why are feelings and emotions important to religion and ecology? Are
awe, wonder, and reverence our primary religious emotions? How do these feelings relate to
ethical action? Furthermore, what if our encounters and connections with/to nonhuman others
stir up other feelings? What happens to our “natural” attraction and attachment to nonhuman
others in devastated landscapes? My project contends that this vein of religion and ecology
functions as scholarly and affective process in which particular experiences of affinity and
attachment are normalized, policed, and celebrated. I am primarily interested in tracking what
happens to the keywords and normative values of religion and ecology when they are made to
address the complicated crisis contexts of devastated landscapes. The persistent focus on awestruck and benevolent relationships in new cosmology, I argue, encourages us to ignore and/or
hide the affective intimacies that shape degrading environments and leads us away from
developing the politics and contexts we need for a world in crisis.

Affects
While affect theory may be underutilized in religion and ecology, and celebrations of the
“affective turn” tend to speak of affect as novel, the translations of affect that resonate in this
project are not new but rather a continuation of a “long tradition of feminist scholarship on
emotional life,”27 what Lauren Berlant calls the “unfinished business of sentimentality,”28 that

27

Ben Anderson, Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2014), 6.
28

Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in
American Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).
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considers “‘the personal is the political’ as it has shaped theoretical and political practice and
their relation to everyday life.”29 This work in feminist, queer, critical race, and disability studies
fashions affect as the “social energy through which subjects, meanings, and cultures are
produced, organized, and undone.”30 To make some sense of the emotional atmospheres of
devastated landscapes, I appeal to two entwined modalities of affect. First, affect as economy or
collective condition “that mediates how life is lived and thought”31 considers capacities to affect
and be affected as “always mediated in and through encounters . . . shifting attention from the
personal to the transpersonal whilst at the same time attending to the formation of subjectivity.”32
Significantly in the work of Sara Ahmed, Lawrence Grossberg, and Ben Anderson, this
translation of affect considers how emotions “align individuals with communities—or bodily
space with social space—through the very intensity of their attachments.”33 This scholarship,
particularly Ahmed’s sobering work on race and nation, pays attention to space, place, and
embodiment by asking how the circulation of affects “shapes the materialization of collective
bodies” and how individuals might be aligned, or out-of-step, with these collectives.34 Second,
the similarly invested Public Feelings project with conversation companions Lauren Berlant,
Ann Cvetkovich, and José Muñoz, takes “feelings as both subject and method” to bring
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“emotional sensibilities to bear” on intellectual and political projects continuing to “craft new
forms of feminist intellectual politics that are still lacking in the public sphere.”35 Implementing
queer theories’ emphasis on “identities and public cultures that cultivate non-normative affects,”
like the transformative possibilities of negative affects (failure, grief, rage, melancholy, shame,
and depression) and “rethinking categories such as utopia, hope, and happiness,” Public Feelings
side-steps conceptions of emotion as solely personal/private to “address histories of trauma that
have not yet been overcome.”36
The Gulf of Mexico after BP and Katrina joins a “series of spectacular toxic catastrophes
with single-name recognition: Bhopal, Minamata, Love Canal, Chernobyl,” 37 Flint, where
specificities of racial and social inequality, gross injustices, and complex sedimented histories of
neglect are often glossed over in an amalgamation of revulsion. In this project I will trace
numerous ways that “notions of human and social difference” are “projected onto the nonhuman
world”38 and consider how “nonnormative bodies and minds can reframe what it means to be an
environmentalist or ‘nature lover,’”39 by advocating for the cultivation of religious
environmental theory that can speak to the numerous intersections of species, race, class, gender,
and ability within an increasingly toxic world. Keeping in mind these translations of affect and
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their framing of the human as immersed environmentally, historically, and culturally helps me in
this dissertation to work through some troubling questions: why might encounters in devastated
landscapes seem out-of-step with the affective modeling in new cosmology? Are the affectiveethical visions of new cosmology tenable or do they necessarily disavow many everyday
encounters? What sorts of spaces, places, and encounters does religion and ecology bind itself to
through its affective investments? By beginning and remaining with encounters in devastated
landscapes, I will shift the conversation to address the deep complexities and frustrations in
cultivating and sustaining emotional investments with and in crisis environments and contend
that lingering with so-called negative affects illuminates overlooked social and environmental
inequalities as well as opens new possibilities for ecological activism.

Negotiating Methodologies
It is no small task to examine post-disaster affinity and attachment while keeping a finger
on the pulse of questions relating to sacrality, kinship, futurity, emotion, and ethics. Any number
of intellectual trajectories could speak to the questions I am asking in this project about a region
comprised of diverse ethnic and religious communities negotiating legacies of slavery, racism,
poverty, entrenched yet volatile energy economies, and rapidly depleting coastal habitats.
Significantly, work in feminist and critical geography, cultural memory, spatial theory, energy
humanities, environmental justice and health equity movements, ecocriticism, and geography of
religion all provide rich methodologies that are helpful for sifting through these complexities. To
better understand and convey emotional life on the coast, I will draw, in part, from these
disciplines (particularly scholarship in environmental justice, critical geographies,
feminist/queer/critical race work on affect and cultural memory) but my framing does not allow
for the extended meditations that many of these authors unfold. One of the limitations of this
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project is that it is not work in sociology of religion or ethnography that could afford richer
accounts through collaboration. Compelling narratives of particular religious communities
encountering these disasters can be found in Brenda Phillips’ (2015) Mennonite Disaster
Service: Building a Therapeutic Community After the Gulf Storms, Richard Turner’s (2016) Jazz
Religion, the Second Line, and Black New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina, Katherine Michell
Elvey’s (2010) “God Talk: Shifting Religious Rhetoric in Post-Katrina New Orleans, and Ellen
Blue’s (2016) In Case of Katrina: Reinventing the Church in Post-Katrina New Orleans.
What I do hope, however, is that this dissertation will serve as a model for deep
commitments to interdisciplinary thinking and careful attention to the requirements
interdisciplinary conversations can entail. While I will expand much more on this material in
forthcoming chapters, one of the shaping elements of new cosmologist thought, particularly in
Loyal Rue and others’ resonances with E. O. Wilson’s ideas, is a commitment to consilience.
While consilience can mean a bringing together of diverse ideas to negotiate complex theories, it
often reads here as an uncritical privileging of scientific thought, particularly for those scientists
new cosmology venerates but does not contextualize or challenge. Consilience for Wilson,
“entails that all enterprises of culture—a huge category—will eventually be explained when we
attain complete knowledge of the human brain.”40 In its most troubling forms, “consilience is not
simply” an “argument for a more creative or lively exchange between the sciences and
humanities. Wilson’s more controversial claim is that the sciences will ultimately absorb
territory currently occupied, and inadequately explained” (they argue) “by the humanities.”41
Consilience, Lisa Sideris surmises in critique, “assumes that what can be grasped dimly by one
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discipline can be better known—known with greater precision and certainty—by science.”42
Surely troubling for many of us in the humanities that already recognize dwindling investments
in the humanities within academia and wider culture, consilient commitments also frame a very
particular conception of interdisciplinary work—one where new cosmologists pull from other
disciplines what is useful to support their arguments while remaining impervious to critiques
either within the sciences or without. Furthermore, this agenda does not recognize any of the
politics of knowledge production thus it does not question the ethical implications of dwindling
material support for the humanities nor does it recognize the work in the humanities taken on by
critical race, queer, feminist, decolonial, and disability studies to speak with marginalized
epistemologies. Consequently, it frames these conversations as low risk— easily maneuvered by
the certainty that commitment to the benefits of teaching and celebrating the new scientific
narrative will persuasively outweigh discrepancies, disagreements, and power struggles between
religion and science, the sciences and humanities, and all the inequalities that fuel critical
inquiry.
One could respond to this certainty in numerous ways including tempering their
confidence with more critical perspectives from the sciences. I view this dissertation, in part, as a
resistance to consilience projects via my insistence that potent interdisciplinary projects are those
that welcome vulnerability by allowing the voices we bring into conversation to shake up our
fundamental disciplinary values and practices. To resist consilience agendas, I side with
complexity and context by maneuvering the normative universal ethics of new cosmology into
conversation with everyday material and emotional challenges. For source material throughout
these chapters I weave in diverse narratives, particularly memoir, poetry, and news media,
written in response to these disasters and their aftermath—emotional responses to life on the
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Gulf Coast that include, but are not limited to, deep empathy, grief, disgust, anger, frustration,
disorientation, confusion, solidarity, and tentative hope. My intention here is drawn from affect
studies; it is to convey affective impressions by surrounding my text with voices that are
attempting to make sense of disastrous and traumatic events, even while I insist that their affects
are neither exhaustive nor final.
To be fair, questions about landscapes and territory, space and place, sacred and profane,
lived religion and embodiment, persistently occupy not only religion and ecology but also much
of the study of American religion. To render this slice more manageable, I focus on thinking
about humans in relationship with nonhuman creatures/environments and why emotional
orientations in these relationships are particularly important. Despite working hard to “keep pace
with globalization’s growing complexities” and the richness it lends to questions of sacrality,
liminality, belonging, ritual, diaspora, displacement, etc., many scholars in American religious
studies still, as Kevin Lewis O’Neill argues, “either treat space as a kind of neutral grid upon
which religion happens or they remain focused on meaning” operating under an “uncontestable
observation that religion makes space meaningful” sustaining lingering divisions between sacred
and profane, local and global, North and South.43 My questions for new cosmology and the
future of religion and ecology add to the scholarship hoping to unsettle this refrain by insisting
that the historical particularity of environments, legacies of environmental and social
abuse/abandonment, make all the difference for how we read, recognize, and advocate for
emotional attachments to land and its human and nonhuman inhabitants. Neutral grids,
ahistorical locales, and apolitical bodies are convenient theoretical fantasies.
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Chapters
Each approach to studying the confluences of religion and ecology has its own
compelling elements and particular shortcomings. Since Lynn White’s 1967 essay, “The
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” religion theorists have worked to uncover and
address the various obstacles within religious traditions, practices, and thought that prove to be
stumbling blocks for ecological projects and to carve out trajectories that hopefully
address/transcend those obstacles. This dissertation responds to a prominent discourse within
religion and ecology—new cosmology— that chooses evolutionary kinship and its potential to
spark deep affinities with biodiversity as its hopeful course. In order to address shortcomings
within this discourse, I will challenge its core ethical argument (for the future, we must love
nonhuman others as our sacred evolutionary kin) by breaking it into parts. First, I focus on the
overlooked affective implications of new cosmology’s commitment to the cultivation of a
universal orienting narrative via “expert” scientific knowledge. Then I highlight diverse
narratives/methodologies that offer better alternatives, perspectives, and opportunities to help us
prepare for complicated futures. In chapter one, I outline the development of religion and
ecology and then turn toward the work of Thomas Berry, Mary Evelyn Tucker, John Grim,
Connie Barlow, Brian Thomas Swimme, Ursula Goodenough, Edward O. Wilson, and Stephen
Kellert to frame their approach toward affiliation and attachment with/to nonhuman nature.
Concluding the chapter, I lay out the troubling questions that arise from what remains shadowed
by this approach that the rest of the dissertation will unpack and address.
In chapter two, I begin to unsettle new cosmology’s universal ethical argument by
relocating it within a very particular context. Tracing the environmental history leading up to the
“unnatural” disasters named Katrina, Rita, and BP, I challenge religion and ecology to better
prepare for precarious futures by learning to address the swirling tensions of power, privilege,
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and exclusion (long histories of particular investments) that shape everyday encounters along the
Gulf. In two, I argue new cosmology’s conception of sacred works best when it is dis-located
from everyday materiality. Working with material in critical geographies and sacred space/place
to underline the political implications of how “the sacred” is defined, produced, reproduced, and
protected, I draw attention to the places, communities, and creatures occluded, excluded, and
abandoned by new cosmology’s conceptions of the sacred. Is the collective body of devastated
landscapes, implicated together in crisis and attached to one another through toxicity, disgust,
and aversion, no longer sacred? Are these creatures, habitats, and communities acceptable
losses? Or are they the ethical quandary at the core of the kinship intimacies with nonhumans
dark green religions desire to explore? What kind of investments illuminate material “left
behind” — those unloved others still living lives?
While new cosmologists hope to inspire affective renewal, in chapters three and four I
argue that habitual investments in the awe and wonder of encounters with nonhuman nature have
left new cosmology with few resources to speak to affiliation with degraded lands, damaged
environments, toxic creatures, and the human communities that intimately encounter these
quotidian complexities. Experiences within areas like our opening scene might not solely elicit
affects like awe, wonder, or reverence. When we encounter toxic materials and their effects we
are affected differently. For some, this precarity galvanizes a response in an attempt to care for
these lives. For others, this ecological pain may elicit overwhelming shame or apathy. Some may
see these creatures and their habitats as contagions themselves, monsters of our own creation that
should be avoided, visibly witnessing to all that we have poured into the waters. Encounters with
toxicity in Gulf communities are unfolding but some of these affects might coalesce into what
we would call disgust, revulsion, dread, panic, horror. We do not gravitate toward these places.
Life in devastated landscapes does not draw us near. How do we address the repulsive pulse of
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the Gulf— the queasy unease that sticks to devastated environments? By trading only in awe,
wonder, and reverence, I contend that the affective economies of new cosmology bind
themselves solely to places and creatures that engender those experiences. Pulling at the frayed
edges of this discourse post-destruction, in chapters three and four I argue that new cosmology’s
onto-ethical project (we must love nonhuman others) refuses to address what it truly
champions—namely a very particular conception of what it means to be human and to love
nonhuman others that does not address race, racialization, and the historical connections between
environmentalism and white supremacy in the United States that very much continue to shape
which bodies, communities, and habitats are valued/loveable. I question the ahistorical, rational,
enclosed, and sovereign subject at the heart of new cosmology’s onto-ethical project by
contending its impermeability and affective certainty makes it incredibly difficult to map new
cosmology’s onto-ethical commitments onto degraded environments. In conversation with
scholarship in feminist materialisms and feminist genealogies of affect theory, in chapter three I
argue that human bodies are always already materially and affectively intimate with their
environments and since environmental degradation and its unequal impact on the poor is a daily
reality for much of the planet, religion and ecology can no longer assume a “healthy” or
historically neutral subject. Consequently, we must grapple with our proximity to toxic exposure
and its uneven seepage into bodies and communities. In chapter four, by examining how fear
shapes devastated landscapes, I draw material feminisms, affect theory, and religion and ecology
into conversation by thinking about embodied affects along the Gulf Coast. I argue that the
intertwined concerns of environmental degradation and environmental racism impact our
affective orientations. In a queer response to E. O. Wilson’s encouragement that we examine the
circumstances and occasions on which we love and protect life, I inquire after the affective
structure of disposability arguing that ecotheorists must contend with: race and racialization,
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long histories of white supremacy, and troubling toxicity in order to shape affective projects in
this devastated landscape.
In chapters five, six, and seven, I examine the kinship of the declaration that we must love
nonhuman others as sacred evolutionary kin. I find kinship models to continue to be ripe with
tremendous possibility but instead of walking the path of sacralized science, I advocate for
detouring toward more plastic conceptions of kinship. In chapter five, I highlight the limitations
in new cosmology’s conceptions of kinship that make it very difficult to map its visions of
affinity, attachment, and care onto a racially and environmentally toxic landscape. Many new
cosmologists recognize that environmental degradation is an impending threat and prescribe
deepening kinship intimacies with nonhuman others as a reciprocal solution for environmental
concerns and a correction to unhealthy habits holding us back from our full humanity. But, I
contend, these voices have not questioned if environmental degradation fundamentally alters
what we mean by affinity, attachment, intimacy, and reciprocity. What does it mean, for
example, to care for toxic habitats, ill creatures, and precarious communities as kin? Kinship in
new cosmology asserts a biological connection with all life but does not consider any radically
altering notions of intimacy. New cosmology kinship, I argue, works best when we pretend that
all we inherit is positive evolutionary tendencies, ignoring how social histories, embodied
differences, and declining environmental conditions can all shape us materially and affectively.
In five, I argue kinship is not just biological but also performative. Drawing from queer and
critical race critiques of kinship studies, I contend that new cosmology kinships do not resonate
in devastated environments because they do not recognize that normative conceptions of kinship
always limit which bodies, communities, histories, and legacies can count as beloved kin.
Insisting that we cannot disconnect complacency with the disposability of the Gulf Coast
from other projects of disposability, namely disregard for the bodies, lives, and losses of queer,
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disabled, and black communities, in chapters six and seven I argue we need models for kinship in
religion and ecology that are more affectively attuned to racial trauma and abject desire. An
ethics of love for devastated landscapes, I contend, must desire to dwell with the presence of
troubling legacies of environmental racism, toxic impacts, and uncertain futures. Paying attention
to other inheritances besides evolutionary affective tendencies, I cultivate resources for
expanding the boundaries of kinship within religion and ecology by turning to critical intimacy
scholarship that can help us think about the intersections of embodied difference and
environmental decline. I construct two visions of what kin-love for devastated landscapes might
look like. The first, in what I call a kinship of remainders, chapter six thinks with “remaining” in
different ways: communities that remain after disaster negotiating environmental decline, bodies
considered to be remainders by normative conceptions of kinship (residual, left-over,
disposable,) and remaining-with (to endure, prevail, persist) environmental trouble to develop
affinities and attachments forged not through awe, wonder, and reverence but perhaps grief and
fear. To cultivate a kinship of remainders, I argue, requires religion and ecology to understand
that kinship is an ongoing affective process that must address environmental trauma, loss, and
mourning in order to speak to our environmental crisis.
The second, in what I call queer eco-crip affinities, chapter seven draws from critical
disability studies and queer ecologies to argue that one of the reasons new cosmology kinship
does not map onto devastated environments is its deep discomfort with the persistence of abject
bodies. Unsettling new cosmology’s ethical commitment for the future, I ask what kinds of
futures are we imagining and which bodies/communities/creatures/habitats are included in these
futures? The absence of ill, disabled, and mutating bodies/habitats/creatures within new
cosmology ethics holds us back, I argue, from imagining affiliation and attachment with
embodied difference and the changes toxicity brings to environments. Concluding this
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dissertation, chapter seven cultivates improper affinities by considering the ways devastated
landscapes are positioned as undesirable, beyond hope, without future, and insists that we refuse
conceptions of desire, hope, and futurity that absent ill/disabled bodies and environments.
Drawing from Mel Chen’s suggestion that the queerness of queer ecologies describes “social and
cultural formations of ‘improper affiliation,’ so that queerness might well describe an array of
subjectivities, intimacies, beings, and spaces located outside of the heteronormative,” I advocate
for encouraging impropriety in our kin care.44 Recognizing that desire always overflows the
contours meant to contain it, queer eco-crip affinities might ask: what does it mean to desire
nature when this “nature” is devastated? And, what does this “nature” desire? Relying on awe,
wonder, and reverence in encounters with nonhuman kin, new cosmology is interested in
intimacy-with and futurity-for less unruly cousins, more perfect lovers, than devastated
landscapes afford. Here, I end by imagining what future avenues might open for religion and
ecology by claiming and sustaining wounded, ill, and mutating bodies, creatures, and
communities as our desired beloveds.
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Chapter One
Sacred Evolutionary Epics: Awe, Reverence, Kinship
“We cannot win this battle to save species and environments without forging an emotional bond
between ourselves and nature as well—for we will not fight to save what we do not love.” 45
Stephen Jay Gould, “Enchanted Evening”
Since Lynn White’s (1967) germinal essay, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic
Crisis,” theorists studying the confluence of religion and ecology have considered the
implications of religious world-views for environmental health and degradation. White argues
that western Christian dogma and thought, particularly its dominant anthropocentrism, “made it
possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects.”46 Perhaps
more galvanizing for the legacy of scholarship to follow, White concludes: “since the roots of
our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we
call it that or not. We must rethink and refeel our nature and destiny.”47 This essay and its
numerous responses (apologetic, reparative, and alternative) advanced interdisciplinary
environmental studies and birthed the field of religion and ecology. Itself a multidisciplinary
endeavor, religion and ecology utilizes a variety of methodological approaches toward not only
discussing the culpability of religious thought/practice but also toward developing new ethical
models for human/nonhuman relationships, illuminating the religious roots of environmentalism,
and examining the “influence of religion in shaping the environmental imagination.”48
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Environmental degradation is a staggering problem in its enormity and complexity. Thus, as
human understanding of this complexity deepens, so too do approaches within religion and
ecology that make sense of and address our environmental decline. This chapter traces a
prominent conversation within religion and ecology that chooses evolutionary kinship and its
affective possibilities, actualized and deployed through what they identify are religious emotions,
as the path forward.
This onto-ethical trajectory within religion and ecology seeks to relocate conceptions of
what it means to be human within evolutionary history characterizing humanity as but a small
speck of the wonder that is our complex universe. Wary of Jewish and Christian cosmologies
they regard as significantly devaluing the material world, these theorists advocate for reorienting
these myths through teaching evolutionary sciences as giving rise to sacred cosmologies.49
Rethinking the human within this universe story, these scholars contend, would generate an
emotional shift in our theory and ethics toward humble respect and caring practices for
nonhuman others. From this perspective, investment in the sciences could be the enchantment
that leads humans to love nonhuman others as we begin to understand the very matter of the
universe, what some might call “nature,” is sacred. Addressing White’s call to “rethink and
refeel our nature and destiny,” this discourse sees possibilities for nurturing ecological sentiment
by advocating a new sacred mythos of how our universe came to be and how humans should
relate to its wonder.
In this chapter, I consider some of the work of cultural historian Thomas Berry; religion
scholars Mary Evelyn Tucker, John Grim, and Loyal Rue; science writer Connie Barlow;
cosmologist Brian Thomas Swimme; biologist Ursula Goodenough; and evolutionary biologist
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Edward O. Wilson. This group of scholars has sustained a growing conversation within religious
ecotheory that Lisa Sideris calls the “new cosmology movement.” I trace their approaches
toward affiliation with nonhuman nature and their particular investment in the ideal of loving
nonhuman others as sacred kin. Grouping such diversity together, not without significant
controversy,50 is precarious but Sideris argues that these voices form a “recognizable
constellation, an ideal type”51 that proffers a “new, common creation story based upon our
understanding of cosmogenesis,” and all are “engaged in a process of religiopoeisis, of crafting a
new religion, grounded in a myth that explains our origins and destiny.”52 Later, I will unfold
what is compelling about Sideris’s perspective as well as resistance to her arguments. But what I
find unites these writers, why they are relevant for this project, is their appeal to the affective
potential of scientific enchantment to engender ethical action. In what follows, I will map out
this form of sacred natures discourse to survey their conceptions of evolutionary affinity with
nonhuman others, how they believe evolutionary affinity leads to emotional attachment, and
finally how this emotional attachment can result in ethical action. Like any methodology, every
approach to studying the intersections of religion and ecology has particular political
implications. Concluding the chapter, I will gesture toward some of the implications of this
approach, explored in more depth in chapter two, by drawing attention to the places and
creatures possibly occluded, excluded, and abandoned by these sacred kinships.
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Evolutionary Epics
The new mythology constellation that Sideris terms “new cosmology” has two
progenitors: E. O. Wilson and Thomas Berry. The “Epic of Evolution” originated in Edward O.
Wilson’s writings and is cultivated by Connie Barlow, Loyal Rue, and Ursula Goodenough. 53 A
Harvard biologist with a particular affinity for ant behavior, E. O. Wilson is largely responsible
for popularizing the terms “biodiversity,” “evolutionary biology,” “the evolutionary epic,” and
“biophilia,” as well as influential in shaping contemporary conservation ethics and biodiversity
studies. Of interest for this project: Wilson’s 1971 text The Insect Societies introduced his
concept for sociobiology—a new discipline, with some controversy on his analysis on the origins
of human behavior,54 to study the biological basis of social behavior in all organisms including
humans. Responding to criticisms of his perspectives on the evolutionary origins of our social
behavior, Wilson’s On Human Nature (1978) and Genes, Mind, and Culture (1983) further
explore the role of biology in human ontology. His perhaps most enduring texts, Biophilia
(1983), The Diversity of Life (1992), and The Future of Life (2002) study human attraction to the
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natural environment with the argument that humans have an evolutionarily inherent need,
threatened by the impending impoverishment of the environment, to preserve biodiversity in
order to flourish as a species. Finally (though not his final text), of interest here is Wilson’s 1998
work Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge which returns to what he sees are the original ideals
of the Enlightenment. Consilience, also advocated by Goodenough and Rue, advocates for
closing the gaps between the physical universe and humanity by reorganizing scholarship
(including university curriculum) around an enchanting integration of both the sciences and
humanities as they work together to establish a secular ground for ethics. Keeping these texts in
mind, scholars interested in the confluences of religion and ecology understandably gravitate
toward numerous themes in his writing. Wilson’s poetic style, olive-branch extension to the
humanities, and interest in cosmology/mythology resonate with commitments in religion and
ecology to maintain the importance of religious studies within larger conversations of
environmental concern.
One of the lasting themes of Wilson’s writing, Barlow argues, is the concept that humans
can satisfy their evolutionary innate longing for “religious grounding,” “spiritual allurement and
atonement,” and aptitude for reverence through a “cultural explanation derived from science . . .
based on the evolutionary epic.”55 Through this grand and inspiring narrative, Wilson assures
that humans can continue to “revisit questions of ultimate meaning and value” while dedicating a
“good portion of our religious zeal to reverence for the vast diversity of life produced by nearly
four billion years of struggle and symbiosis on Earth.”56 In a 1996 interview with Barlow,
Wilson argued, “I believe that humanity must have an epic— must have its epics, plural . . . An
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epic is a grand narrative usually in poetic form, that utilizes archetypes in explaining a theme that
engages all of the nation or all of humanity.”57 Advocating for its potential to captivate, Wilson
writes, “the evolutionary epic is probably the best myth we will ever have.”58 Through a deft
storyteller like Wilson, Barlow contends, scientific history of the universe “becomes our shared
story, our creation story, our sacred story.”59
The power of the epic myth, Barlow emphasizes, is its ability to orient “people with a
placement in time— a meaningful placement that celebrates extraordinary moments of a shared
heritage. Those of us who have not only learned but embraced the scientific story of our roots
know ourselves to be reworked stardust, biological beings with a multi-billion-year pedigree . . .
For us, the history of life and the universe as told by science becomes more than a sequence of
strange and arresting events.”60 Wilson deliberately invokes the epic form in numerous texts, he
argues, because of the archetypes it offers including “cataclysm, rebirth, the summoning of
heroes.”61 Wilson believes “that science offers humankind not only an awareness of the
biodiversity crisis and the tools for saving species but also a story that can charge our very souls
to take on the task.”62 In The Diversity of Life, Robert May argues, Wilson offers up the
Environmental Ethic as “nothing less than a new religion” by side-stepping seemingly
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anthropocentric religions to offer a vision for seeing the human “as one among many species,
with our only special responsibility being to respect and conserve the biological riches we have
inherited.”63 Concluding Diversity, Wilson argues that he ends the text with “what, among the
Methodists, is known as the altar call. The altar call is that moment at the end of the sermon
when the pastor calls all believers who wish to declare themselves for Jesus or to reaffirm their
faith to do so by coming forward, to the altar or to the prayer rail, while hymns are sung.”64
Humans can become the heroes of this sacred narrative if they answer the call to protect
biodiversity. While Connie Barlow concedes that Wilson has never “explicitly told his version of
the evolutionary story in flat-out epic form” others have made such attempts including our
second progenitor of new cosmology, Thomas Berry.65
The “Universe Story”66 is an intellectual project with similar affinities originating in
Thomas Berry’s writings and continued by Mary Evelyn Tucker, John Grim, and Brian
Swimme.67 Trained in western history and history of religions, Berry’s prolific scholarship spans
interest in Asian traditions, the philosophy of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and cosmology of
religion.68 In his 1978 essay for Teilhard Studies, “The New Story: Comments on The Origin,
Identification and Transmission of Values,” Berry first articulates that humans need a new
orienting mythos in order to meet contemporary social and ecological concerns:
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It’s all a question of story. We are in trouble just now because we do not have
a good story. We are in between stories. The Old Story—the account of how the world
came to be and how we fit into it—is not functioning properly, and we have not learned
the New Story. The Old Story sustained us for a long period of time. It shaped our
emotional attitudes, provided us with life purpose, energized action. It consecrated
suffering, integrated knowledge, guided education. We awoke in the morning and knew
where we were . . . Today, however, our traditional story is nonfunctional in its larger
social dimensions even though some persons believe it firmly and act according to its
dictates . . . When we look outside the traditional believing community we see a society
that is also dysfunctional. Even with advanced science and technology, with superb
techniques in manufacturing and commerce, in communications and computation, our
secular society remains without satisfactory meaning or capacity to restrain the violence
of its own members. Our miracle machines serve ephemeral purposes. So we begin to
talk about values. Where do we begin? My suggestion is that we begin where everything
begins in human affairs, with the basic story, the account of how things came to be at all,
how they came to be as they are, and how the future life of man can be given some
satisfying direction. We need a story that will educate man, heal him, guide him.69
The new orienting narrative Berry proposes, one that shapes us emotionally and ethically, is a
negotiation of the impasse he sees between dysfunctional Christian cosmology and the spiritually
detached scientific cosmology inherited from Charles Darwin.70 The difficulty of redemptive
Christian cosmology, he writes, “is that it presents the world as an ordered complex of beings
that are ontologically related as an image of the divine; it does not present the world as a
continuing process of emergence in which there is an inner organic bond of descent of each
reality from an earlier reality . . . Christian redemptive mystique is little concerned with any
cosmological order or process since the essential thing is redemption out of the world through a
personal Saviour relationship that transcends all such concerns.”71 While Berry recognizes the
invaluable knowledge derived from scientific cosmology and evolutionary biology, he argues
that this scientific story in its “commitment to the realm of the physical to the exclusion of the
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spiritual” results in a “lack of meaning. It is not an integral story.”72 Berry draws from the work
of Teilhard de Chardin to propose “The Story of the Universe,” a scientific cosmology that
would provide an account of our shared universe. The Story, he argues, is infused with spiritual
resonances appealing to “both scientist and believer” through images of creativity, communion,
and intimacy.73 The New Story, he writes, decenters what it means to be human by arguing that
the universe is a “web of relationships” and through a “more intense communion within the
material world” life emerges into being. 74 For Berry, the New Story establishes “a new paradigm
of the human,” one that views humanity as a small but remarkable part of this “cosmic-earth
process.”75 Becoming sensitized to their part in this grand narrative, humans can have
“confidence in the future” that “awaits the human venture.”76
Berry’s later works build from these sentiments by focusing on his concern for the
“effects of rapid industrialization on the ecosystems of the planet and the lack of response of the
religions to this growing crisis.”77 Berry’s essays on religion and ecological healing encourage
both interreligious dialogue and dialogue between science and religion. Berry calls for
engagement of all the world’s religions in recovering their “cosmological sensibilities, to see the
human as a microcosm as profoundly related to the universe as a macrocosm.”78 In 1992, with
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cosmologist Brian Swimme, Berry wrote The Universe Story: From the Primordial Flaring
Forth to the Ecozoic Era—A Celebration of the Unfolding Cosmos. Similar to Wilson’s rich
narrative telling of the Epic of Evolution, The Universe Story describes evolutionary history with
similar grandeur. Universe Story combines contemporary science with the “world’s great
wisdom traditions” to explore “humanity’s place in the evolving cosmos and our ecological
imperative.”79
Thomas Berry’s students Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim continue his sacred
cosmology work through the Journey of the Universe project which includes a film, a book by
Swimme and Tucker, “20 conversations with scientists, historians, and environmentalists,”
conferences, colloquia, and teaching curriculum that all narrates the “14 billion-years story of the
universe’s development, from the great flaring forth of the universe” to the evolution of
“planetary life of greater complexity and consciousness.”80 Tucker describes Journey as a
“functional cosmology” that combines astronomy and physics, chemistry and geology, biology,
botany, anthropology and the humanities together to “trace the rise of humans” in a way that
“allows for a comprehensive sense of mystery and awe to arise.” 81 Described as capable of
capturing the human spirit and dependent upon a “profound appreciation of humans experiencing
nature,” Journey continues Berry’s legacy of guiding “humans into the next period of humanEarth relations” by conveying the role of humans as “critical to the further flourishing of the
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Earth community.” 82 In book form, Swimme and Tucker argue that Journey:
evokes wonder from scientists and nonscientists alike. And it challenges some religious
traditions to rethink or expand their worldviews . . . Journey of the Universe is intended not
to over-ride or ignore these other stories, but rather to bring into focus the challenge of
creating a shared future. The great opportunity before us today is to tell this new universe
story in a way that will serve to orient humans with respect to our pressing questions:
Where did we come from? Why are we here? How should we live together? How can the
Earth community flourish?”83
Echoing her mentor, Tucker writes “humans are the microcosm of the macrocosm—they are the
mind and heart of the vast, evolving universe” and the Journey project hopes to capture hearts and
minds for a new mission of earth healing.84
While there is little evidence Wilson and Berry exchanged ideas (though Berry does cite
Wilson in numerous texts) through those inspired by their work like Barlow, Rue, Goodenough,
Tucker and Grimm, these conversations have intermingled via “spiritualizing and aestheticizing
science”85 into a “commitment to mythopoeic science”86 as both a possibility for the
development of secular ecological ethics and as a way for religions with various
traditions/practices/beliefs to come together to promote sustainable futures. While one of the
shared criticisms of Sideris’s collection of these voices under “new cosmology” is that she
conflates diverse perspectives too easily,87 I am nevertheless compelled by their references of
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one another that they do recognize affinities between The Epic of Evolution and the Universe
Story.88 Loyal Rue writes that the Epic of Evolution is synonymous with “cosmic evolution” and
“the universe story,”89 and Connie Barlow’s text Green Space, Green Time includes interviews
with/conversations between Wilson, Goodenough, Tucker, Grim, and Swimme. Furthermore,
Tucker’s criticism that Sideris, “has lumped together a group of thinkers with quite different
specializations and trainings and with widely divergent publications and teaching
commitments”90 rings with a bit of irony since this criticism seems to echo in many ways much
of what the Journey of the Universe project, Berry’s Universe Story, and Wilson’s Epic of
Evolution claim to accomplish— a path for divergent specializations and perspectives to come
together guided by a new orienting vision. Universe Story and Epic of Evolution both offer a
shared orienting narrative, one that scientifically details our beginnings with moving rhetorical
power, as a way to position the human within a shared evolutionary history and hopefully to
encourage respect for that history. This shared sacred history, they argue, cannot be contained by
academic discipline or religious affiliation and it offers the opportunity for theorists and
believers to galvanize one another. Neither Berry nor Wilson sees these evolutionary epics as
necessary replacements for all other cosmologies or religions but they do offer what Barlow
calls, a “planetary ethic,” that makes “no claim to supplant existing traditions but would seek to
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coexist with them, informing our global concerns while we continue to orient our daily lives in
our cultural and religious contexts.”91 Keeping this commitment to universal appeal and
planetary relevance in mind, for the rest of the chapter I will continue to speak about Epic of
Evolution and Universe Story advocates interchangeably as a constellation that promotes the
retelling of grand scientific cosmologies as sacred orientations meant to awaken humans to new
ways of thinking about meaning, value, belonging, and purpose.

Sacred Natures
“The stream of stars blinking on, blinking off, and the living stream of organisms coming
into existence, going out of existence,” Barlow writes, “is beyond judgment of good and evil. It
is, rather, magnificent. It is sublime, precious, and exceedingly worthy of reverence.”92 One of
the defining features of the new cosmology constellation is the work these authors undertake to
“awaken” others to the specialness of our universe and its profound complexity. “Reverence,”
Goodenough writes in The Sacred Depths of Nature, “is the religious emotion elicited when we
perceive the sacred” and we “are called to revere the whole enterprise of planetary existence, the
whole and all of its myriad parts as they catalyze and secrete and replicate and mutate and
evolve.”93 For new cosmology authors, planetary existence is sacred. Nature, from cell to forest,
ant to ocean, is sacred. Strangely, though, in much of this work what the author means by sacred
is not discussed. It is the case that within religious studies that sacred/the sacred/sacrality is so
ubiquitous that many feel it does not need the pause for explanation. But it is curious that all of

91

Goodenough, xv-xvi.

92

Barlow, 28.

93

Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature, 170.

40
these authors, particularly those who argue that they do not find fulfillment to questions of
meaning and value within the world’s religions, use “sacred” and its affective resonances (awe,
wonder, reverence) to describe their relationships with/to the natural world. Their use of “sacred”
deserves pause, I argue, because this uncritical use sidesteps particular questions, like which
creatures, bodies, environments, and encounters actually count as “sacred,” that can unsettle new
cosmology’s seemingly straightforward care for the whole cosmos. For my purposes in this
chapter I will leave the term speculatively open and dwell briefly with three familiar articulations
in religious studies to think more about how they might resonate with new cosmology material.
For sociologist and philosopher Émile Durkheim, the sacred is something set apart from
our quotidian realities and attributed with “some kind of divine or transcendent characteristic,
power or significance” that is essential for religious experience.94 Sacred things, Durkheim
argues, “should not be taken to mean simply those personal beings we call gods or spirits. A
rock, a tree, a spring, a stone, a piece of wood, a house, in other words anything at all, can be
sacred,” but, he emphasizes, our “notion of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from
[our] notion of the profane” its opposite, “by a sort of logical gulf between the two, the mind
radically rejects any mingling or even contact between the things that correspond to these
realms.”95 For Durkheim, any material could be sacred but he maintains a dichotomy between
sacred materials and profane materials. The sacrality of material, he contends, is not inherent.
Rather, “sacredness sets in by contagion . . . A special emotion gives it reality; it is attached to an
object because this emotion has encountered that object on its path. Therefore it is natural that it
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should spread from that object to all those it finds in proximity.”96 Durkheim’s affirmation that
any material could be sacred and that this sacredness is affectively contagious, so that attraction
to certain material could lead to proximally related material being caught-up in this specialness,
is potentially galvanizing for new cosmology but his insistence on a sacred/profane dichotomy is
more dubious for movements that use sacrality to argue all material is intrinsically valuable.
Historian of religion Mircea Eliade, weaving Durkheim’s conception of the sacred with
Rudolph Otto’s experience of the Holy, similarly envisioned distinctions between sacred and
profane. Our profane world, for Eliade, is suffused with the sacred, that which is wholly other
awe-inspiring mystery, via revelatory phenomena Eliade calls “hierophanies” or acts of
manifestation where the sacred “shows itself” to humans.97 At times, Eliade’s conception of the
sacred sounds much like the trajectory of dark green religion98 when he writes, “the cosmos as a
whole is an organism at once real, living, and sacred.”99 But he seems more ambiguous about
whether the natural world, nonhuman material, can itself be sacred. “Nature,” he argues, “always
expresses something that transcends it... a sacred stone is venerated because it is sacred, not
because it is a stone; it is the sacrality manifested through the mode of being of the stone that
reveals its true essence.”100 Any material could potentially be the occasion of a hierophany yet,
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he writes, the hierophany “transforms the place where it occurs: hitherto profane, it is
thenceforward a sacred area.”101 Like Durkheim’s sacred potential in all material, Eliade’s
conception of the sacred could prove ecologically fruitful. Though, his insistence that the sacred
value of material “is always due to that something or that somewhere” of the hierophany toward
which the sacred space or material directs, but “never to its own actual existence,” should be a
stumbling block for theorists trying to articulate that every fiber of the unfolding mysterious
universe is, in itself, sacred.102
Social anthropologist Kay Milton’s articulation of “sacred,” I suspect, is the friendliest to
new cosmology when she suggests the term sacred can be “applied to anything whose value is
not based on reason, but is experienced directly, through the senses, and, when necessary,
asserted dogmatically. Sacredness is thus linked to aesthetics, to affective experience.”103 For
Milton, sacredness describes, “what matters most to people . . . What is sacred to someone is
simply what they value most highly, be it their mother’s memory, their religious traditions, the
mountain scenery near their home . . . What this understanding of sacredness depends on very
heavily is emotion and feeling.”104 But Milton cautions that this conception of sacred, as
affective attachment, is susceptible to bifurcations like the sacred/profane dichotomy. She makes
the compelling argument that many people in the global north, particularly conservationists,
already view the material world as “sacred” in this way, but this material is sacred only in so far
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as it is set apart from humans—a pristine nature.105 For many people, she claims, “nature
untouched by human hand is worth conserving, whereas nature that has been influenced by
human activity is less valuable,” highlighting that “‘nature’ is an ambiguous term, used
sometimes to include and sometimes exclude humanity.”106 For some environmental
perspectives, Milton writes, this nature/culture dichotomy is too important and cannot be
abandoned as the sacredness of certain material (places, creatures, landscapes) relies on the
maintenance of clear boundaries between humanity and the natural world.107
While I will question in chapters two and three if new cosmology is able to welcome
environmentally devastated material and toxic bodies as sacred, I believe Goodenough’s call to
revere “the whole enterprise of planetary existence, the whole and all of its myriad parts as they
catalyze and secrete and replicate and mutate and evolve” generally reflects the sentiments of
new cosmology— the universe in all its complicated existence, known and unknown, massive
and miniscule in scale and perspective, is sacred not because a religious tradition has deemed it
so but in the sense that Milton suggests.108 It is sacred as affective experience and intrinsically
valuable for those humans who are able to tap into this consciousness. This depth, complexity,
and sacrality can be anyone’s experience if they desire to have an intimate connection with the
more-than-human universe. The intensity of emotions that bubble-up when humans spend
sincere time contemplating this richness or experiencing elements of it, new cosmology argues,
is similar to other human religious experiences. From Wilson’s perspective, human capacity for
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awe, wonder, and reverence for the natural world may be evolutionarily innate but needs to be
reawakened in order for this life-process to provide ultimate meaning to the big questions of who
we are. “Building the evolutionary epic, telling the story,” he tells Barlow, “this is our best way
to reanimate the deep emotions that are innate to the human mind, having evolved over
thousands of generations of religious context. The self-assembly of complex systems, the
evolutionary process: this is the epic we can create by exploring the material world. And there’s
so much left to explore. It is of such profound and Olympian magnitude.”109
Wilson and Goodenough argue that the epic of evolution, nurtured through deep driving
emotional connections with the existence it details, has the potential to convey meaning, purpose,
and shared morality to seeking humans. “Religions have come to serve many roles,”
Goodenough writes, “addressing what we can call the Big Questions: What is the meaning of
life? What is my life for? In Western faith traditions, the explanations offered are framed in the
context of a creating, interested God who has both a purpose and a plan. The disciplines of
science also seek to provide explanation, and although they do not directly take on the Big
Questions, they offer up a worldview which is not obviously dictated by a personal God
concerned with human beings.”110 Goodenough argues that science, particularly what we’ve
come to understand in the evolutionary epic, “allows us to experience cognitive affinity as well
as spiritual affinity with the rest of nature” and we can seek “guidance from nature as we
articulate religious principles.”111 “The collective planetary enterprise of meaning, value, and
purpose,” she writes, “is a sacred enterprise” and its “existence can serve” to provide “guidance
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and spiritual resources for human existence and global resolutions.”112 Goodenough structures
her text The Sacred Depths of Nature as a beautifully lyric daily devotional with short stories
narrating biology followed by a meditation. The stories unfold out through The Epic of
Evolution like a guiding light. For example, after a story on the origins of the Earth she
evocatively unfurls the following:
The realization that I needn’t have answers to the Big Questions, needn’t seek answers to
the Big Questions, has served as an epiphany. I lie on my back under the stars and the
unseen galaxies and I let their enormity wash over me. I assimilate the vastness of the
distances, the impermanence, the fact of it all. I go all the way out and then I go all the
way down, to the fact of the photons without mass and gauge bosons that become
massless at high temperatures. I take in the abstractions about forces and symmetries and
they caress me, like Gregorian chants, the meaning of the words not mattering because
the words are so haunting. Mystery generates wonder, and wonder generates awe. The
gasp can terrify or the gasp can emancipate. As I allow myself to experience cosmic and
quantum Mystery, I join the saints and the visionaries in their experience of what they
called the Divine.113
What is important, what has the value and meaning humans seek, are the life processes
themselves and their very existence. The fact they exist at all, she relates, fills her with such awe
and wonder that she borrows from Christian mysticism in order to attempt to articulate these
feelings. Concluding the text, Goodenough writes that the evolutionary epic story, “our story,”
tells us of the sacredness of life, of the astonishing complexity of cells and organisms, of
the vast lengths of time it took to generate their splendid diversity, of the enormous
improbability that any of it happened at all . . . And so, I profess my Faith. For me, the
existence of all this complexity and awareness and intent and beauty, and my ability to
apprehend it, serves as the ultimate meaning and the ultimate value. The continuation of
life reaches around, grabs its own tail, and forms a sacred circle that requires no further
justification, no Creator, no superordinate meaning of meaning, no purpose other than the
continuation continue until the sun collapses or the final meteor collides. I confess a
credo of continuation. And in so doing, I confess as well a credo of human continuation.
We may be the only questioners in the universe, the only ones who have come to
understand the astonishing dynamics of cosmic evolution. If we are not, if there are
others who Know, it is unlikely that we will ever encounter one another. We are also,
whether we like it or not, the dominant species and the stewards of this planet. If we can
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revere how things are, and can find a way to express gratitude for our existence, then we
should be able to figure out, with a great deal of work and good will, how to share the
Earth with one another and with other creatures, how to restore and preserve its elegance
and grace, and how to commit ourselves to love and joy and laughter and hope . . . The
Epic of Evolution is our warp, destined to endure, commanding our universal gratitude
and reverence and commitment . . . Humans need stories—grand, compelling stories—
that help to orient us in our lives and in the cosmos.114
The continuation of it all, being part of this history long before her that is also a part of every
creature in every corner of the planet, is the bottomless spiritual well that provides not only
orienting mythos, but sustaining emotion, value, and purpose. “The contemplation of all this
continuation, all this connection, all this enormous effort to reach our present level of diversity,”
she writes, “is for me a deep spiritual resource. I care about having it continue. Its continuation is
a commandment.”115 Contemplation of the intricacy of the universe infuses us with awe in the
presence of its splendor. Filled with awe, Barlow and Goodenough contend, humans can come to
understand their place as a small but pivotal speck of this shared wonder and will begin to
respond with reverent care for the sacred planet.
While Wilson, Barlow, and Goodenough detail how the evolutionary epic can provide
orientation, meaning, belonging, and purpose for anyone including those who are less attracted to
religious cosmologies, Berry and Tucker speak primarily to the world’s religious traditions
arguing that the powerful religious imagination can only be strengthened by re-awakening a
sacred connection with the material world that has been lost. They call out to religions to fold
their stories and histories into the mystery of the universe asking what an “ecological phase” for
the Earth’s religions might look like. Part of what religions can be, Mary Evelyn Tucker
suggests, is “vessels for nurturing the sense of the sacred” and as religions enter their ecological

114

Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature, 170-74.

115

Goodenough, “The Religious Dimensions of the Biological Narrative,” 616.

47
phase their challenge is to reinvigorate a “sense of awe and reverence for the Earth” in all its
dynamic intricacy “as a numinous matrix of mystery.”116 Berry, perhaps in response to Eliade,
contends that “the universe is the supreme manifestation of the sacred”117 and he argues that the
world religions should come to appreciate that the sacred is this wondrous mystery we can barely
comprehend:
the communion that comes through these experiences of the wild where we sense
something present and daunting, stunning in its beauty, is beyond comprehension in its
reality, but it points to the holy, the sacred . . . This notion is fundamental to establishing
a cosmos, an intelligible manner of understanding the universe or even any part of the
universe . . . We must remember that it is not only the human world that is held securely
in this sacred enfoldment but the entire planet. We need this security, this presence
throughout our lives. The sacred is that which evokes the depths of wonder. We may
know some things, but really we know only the shadow of things.118
Experiences in nature, enriched by expert scientific knowledge about the workings of life, Berry
writes, should move humans (particularly those who feel moved by religious traditions) to
understand there is still wonder here on this planet, a wilderness of spiritual riches left to be
explored. However, Berry urges, our impending ecological concerns should fill us with a sense
of urgency because of the devastation that we are causing to the natural world. “We will recover
our sense of wonder and our sense of the sacred,” he writes, “only if we appreciate the universe
beyond ourselves as a revelatory experience of that numinous presence whence all things come
into being. Indeed, the universe is the primary sacred reality. We become sacred by our
participation in this more sublime dimension of the world about us.”119 Integrating human stories
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of meaning and purpose into the Universe story, being moved by this grand narrative, reorienting
ourselves in reverent respect for the planet are, Berry believes, the future for religious studies.
“We are moving,” he writes:
from a theology of religion and an anthropology of religion to a cosmology of religion.
This is the direction where, I think, religious studies will inevitably go in the future . . . In
the immediate future, our religious concerns will, I believe, be more cosmological. They
will be much more sensitive to the universe as the primary religious mode of being and to
ourselves being religious through our participation in the religion of the universe. There
will, I believe, be an emphasis on the planet Earth and on the universe itself as a single
sacred community. The natural world will once again become scriptural text. The story is
written not in any verbal text but in the very structure of the universe the galaxies of the
heavens and in the forms of the Earth. . . This will require an immense shift in
orientation, one that recognizes our emergence out of the long evolution of the universe
and the Earth.120
Rethinking the human as no longer the center of the universe but rather one part of one immense
sacred community brings up questions of how humans should relate to others within this
community. New cosmology teaches that humans should not only feel awe, wonder, and
reverence as universe dwellers but should also act to protect and sustain each other as universe
family.

Evolutionary Kinship
What does it mean to be a part of one endless sacred community? What does it mean to
live life planetarily? Who are my ecological kin and how do I learn to give them reverent care?
Another defining feature of new cosmology is their argument that regarding nonhuman others as
our evolutionary kin, all related to one another and all a part of the same matter that makes up the
cosmos can encourage ethical action. “A recovery of the sublime meaning of the universe,”
Berry writes, “could lead both to a greater intimacy of the human with the manifestation of the
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divine in the natural world and to a greater intimacy of the different religions among themselves.
It becomes increasingly clear that humans have a common origin and a common destiny with
every other component of the Earth community. We live on the same planet. We breathe the
same air. We drink the same water. We share the same sunlight. We are nourished by the same
soil.”121 Here, Berry speaks of intimacy on different levels. One, being part of one immense
sacred community, Berry believes, offers opportunities for religious traditions to recognize their
intimate connections with one another rather than differences—a closeness offered by sharing
this Earth space and its resources. From a planetary perspective, we share the same table, food,
drink, and shelter. Two, Berry recognizes deep intimacy between humans and all other material
on Earth as one immense sacred family sharing the same heritage, essence, and genealogy. From
a planetary perspective, we are all extended kin. While in chapters two and three I speculate
about how new cosmology might react to unwelcome family members, untidy houseguests, toxic
lovers, and threatening neighbors, this kinship language has significant affective power. As my
opening epigraph from Stephen Jay Gould captures, humans (ideally) protect their beloveds.
Bonds of intimacy and affiliation galvanize us to protect and care for each other. Feelings of
awe, wonder, and reverence, new cosmology argues, awaken humans to rethink their orientation
in the universe. Affects of intimacy and attraction, feelings we might call love, that new
cosmology contends work similarly to spark change. “We now have the wonder,” Berry and
Swimme write, “not merely that we are related to and intimate with everything about us, but that
we have a cousin relationship with every being in the universe, especially with the living beings
of the planet Earth. We have not descended to a lower level; they have, as it were, been
recognized at a higher level. Both their lives and ours are infinitely expanded by this intimate
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presence to each other.”122 What does it mean to be in intimate presence with planetary others?
What is required of humans who recognize these relationships?
E. O. Wilson’s work on biophilia, while speculative, is influential for not only new
cosmology authors in expressing these kinship intimacies but also broader conversations in
religious environmental ethics on the inexhaustible question of human/nonhuman attraction and
relationship. “Biophilia,” Wilson writes:
if it exists, and I believe it exists, is the innately emotional affiliation of human beings to
other living organisms. Innate means hereditary and hence part of ultimate human nature.
Biophilia, like other patterns of complex behavior, is likely to be mediated by rules of
prepared and counterprepared learning—the tendency to learn to or to resist learning
certain responses as opposed to others. From the scant evidence concerning its nature,
biophilia is not a single instinct but a complex of learning rules that can be teased apart
and analyzed individually. The feelings molded by learning rules fall along several
emotional spectra: from attraction to aversion, from awe to indifference, from
peacefulness to fear-driven anxiety. The biophilia hypothesis goes on to hold that the
multiple strands of emotional response are woven into symbols composing a large part of
culture. It suggests that when human beings remove themselves from the natural
environment, the biophilic learning rules are not replaced by modern versions equally
well adapted to artifacts. Instead, they persist from generation to generation, atrophied
and fitfully manifested in the artificial new environments into which technology has
catapulted humanity. For the indefinite future more children and adults will continue, as
they do now, to visit zoos than attend all major professional sports combined (at least this
is so in the United States and Canada), the wealthy will continue to seek dwellings on
prominences above water amidst parkland, and urban dwellers will go on dreaming of
snakes for reasons they cannot explain . . . The significance of biophilia in human biology
is potentially profound, even if it exists solely as weak learning rules. It is relevant to our
thinking about nature, about the landscape, the arts, and mythopoeia, and it invites us to
take a new look at environmental ethics.123
While there is no direct evidence for biophilia and whatever biophilic tendencies we have may
have atrophied, Wilson contends that what we do know about evolutionary history would lead us
to the logical understanding that since we evolved alongside other creatures they play a
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tremendous role in what it means to be human not just in practical knowledge of our
environments (what is food, what are possible tools, what to fear) but also as a resource for
metaphor and myth. Coupled with the innate tendency Wilson sees in our species an ability to
“translate emotional feelings into myriad dreams and narratives,” art and religious belief, poverty
of biodiversity must impact the human psyche.124 Stephen Kellert expands further arguing that
the biophilia hypothesis proclaims absolute “human dependence on nature” and extends much
beyond basic sustenance to encompass “the human craving for aesthetic, intellectual, cognitive,
and even spiritual meaning and satisfaction.”125 Wilson’s daring assertion, Kellert writes, also
“reaches beyond the poetic and philosophical articulation of nature’s capacity to inspire and
morally inform to a scientific claim of a human need, fired in the crucible of evolutionary
development, for deep and intimate association with the natural environment, particularly its
living biota.”126 The notion of biophilia should compel us to, in Wilson’s terms, “look to the very
roots of motivation and understand why, in what circumstances and on which occasions, we
cherish and protect life.”127
Wilson’s understanding of biophilia manifests as an onto-affective attunement, one that
again sits in the realm of interest of both religion and science, toward life in all its forms.
“Humanity,” Wilson writes, “is exalted not because we are so far above other living creatures,
but because knowing them well elevates the very concept of life.”128 Learning more about our
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affiliation and nurturing our attraction to nonhuman others, Wilson argues, leads us toward
protecting biodiversity and our capacity for biophilia, he suggests, is crucial for preservation and
ecological activism. To the degree that humans are fascinated by and strive to understand this
wilderness all around, Wilson argues, “we will place a greater value on them, and on
ourselves.”129 Here, Wilson suggests, in this “innately emotional affiliation of human beings to
other living organisms,” is the “spirit” of environmental ethics since humans need, he contends,
endless biodiversity to be fully human.130 “Other species are our kin,” Wilson writes:
this perception is literally true in evolutionary time. All higher eukaryotic organisms,
from flowering plants to insects to humanity itself, are thought to have descended from a
single ancestral population that lived about 1.8 billion years ago. Single-celled eukaryotes
and bacteria are linked by still more remote ancestors. All this distant kinship is stamped
by a common genetic code and elementary features of cell structure. Humanity did not
soft-land into the teeming biosphere like an alien from another planet. We arose from
other organisms already here, whose great diversity, conducting experiment upon
experiment in the production of new life-forms, eventually hit up the human species.131
What we are as humans is also what the planet is, a swarm of related life living together.
Attraction to certain landscapes, the notice of creature movement around us, yearning for
connection with Earth-others may all be the lingering remnants of what were more active
affinities.
In later chapters I will return to biophilia but here I want to highlight the tendency in new
cosmology readings of biophilia to rely only on affects of love and delight despite Wilson and
Kellert framing biophilia more as an “array of affective qualities”132 that include awe and wonder
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but also aversion, indifference, and anxiety. 133 Biophilia is exciting in this context because it
hypothesizes why nonhuman others fascinate us so and suggests that to be human is to live
respectfully within this tremendous diversity providing a pathway for action. The planet needs
care, the planet needs love, these Earth-others are our kin and need our protection because we
also have always needed them in return. “The diversity of life, past and present,” Barlow writes,
“contributes all the characters for the Earth episodes of this epic. Plants, animals, fungi,
protoctists and bacteria alive today are the current players in a multi-billion-year, continuing
saga. This pageant of life embeds our species in something far more magnificent than the
comings and goings of cultures and kings. The diversity of life here today is our extended family,
and the very epic that reveals our wide kinship can also help us re-story those beings.”134 The restorying Barlow describes reorients humans into a tale of “honor for those who came before,”
and responsibility for all those who come after for even the loss of one species is a loss to “the
universe of a particular way of perceiving a part of the cosmos,” our understanding of who we
are, and our purpose for how we should live.135 “It is by way of this story,” Barlow writes, “that
one’s very being can expand and fill with a passionate caring for the vast diversity of life- past,
present, and future.”136 When we begin to truly understand “the universe as a communion of
subjects, not a collection of objects,” Berry argues:
we hear the voices of all the living creatures. We recognize, understand, and respond to
the voices of the crickets in the fields, the flowers in the meadows, the trees in the
woodlands, and the birds all about us; all these voices resound within us in a universal
chorus of delight in existence. In their work Biophilia, E. O. Wilson and Stephen Kellert
133
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have emphasized the feeling of humans with the larger array of living beings . . . New
religious sensitivities emerge as we understand better the story of the universe, which is
now available to us through scientific inquiry into the structure of the universe and the
sequence of transformations that have brought the universe, the planet Earth, and all its
living creatures into being. The new scientific story of the universe has a mythic,
narrative dimension that lifts the story out of a prosaic study of data to a holistic spiritual
vision. This new creation narrative enables us to enter into the deep mystery of creation
with a new depth of understanding. It is our human version of the story that is told by
every leaf on every tree . . . Through this story we understand with new insight how every
component of the universe is integrated with every other member of the universe
community. To be is to contribute something so precious that nothing before or afterword
will ever contribute that special glory to the created world.137
Through these sacred kinships new cosmology authors offer an ethics of reorientation for
humans. Reconceptualizing our home in the universe, who our evolutionary kindred are, and
how we are called to protect our mutual home engenders a humbling new perspective, new
cosmology contends, one that traces deep emotional investment coupled with scientific
understanding as the path into better futures.

Affective Investments
Concluding this chapter, I will briefly synthesize some of the critiques of new cosmology
scholarship and then move on to the core questions that will drive the rest of this project. Much
of the criticism of new cosmology scholarship circulates around the significant concern of
whether “scientific worldviews provide sufficient information and motivation to galvanize
widespread action on environmental issues.”138 From the perspective of new cosmology,
investing science with “mythic, revelatory power; far from disenchanting our world,” offers a
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global cosmology as “primary vehicle for restoring wonder, meaning, and value.”139 But some
scholars are less convinced about its universal appeal and are wary of its overlooked assumptions
and its impact on other environment-related beliefs, practices, and ethics. In a 2015 response
forum in The Immanent Frame, six religion scholars gave brief responses to these questions on
cosmology and the environment. Bron Taylor and Lucas Johnston responded positively toward
new cosmology material suggesting it offers opportunities for meaning and value for those
experiencing “increasing disaffection” with “traditional institutionalized religions.”140 Taylor
argues that given religions “penchant for setting up categories of inclusion and exclusion, purity
and defilement,” “science-based worldviews are far less likely to have such effects than the
world’s predominant religions.”141 Furthermore, the kinship ethics new cosmology promotes,
Taylor argues, “erode supremacist ideologies, whether racist or anthropocentric.”142
Whitney Bauman, Willis Jenkins, Mary-Jane Rubenstein, and Lisa Sideris, however,
expressed more hesitancy toward the promise of new cosmology. Bauman contends it must be
recognized that these stories “are not without their own socio-historical locations. No narrative,
religious or scientific, can skirt its ‘locatedness.’”143 Furthermore, he argues that while “we as
humans will find many common grounds in the emerging planetary story . . . this doesn’t mean it
is a story that can be The One Story,” and “polydoxy of meanings and interpretations of the
multiplicity of life” is a more appropriate reflection of our diversity.144 Jenkins argues that it is
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unclear “what we can expect big stories to do for our practical arguments” about how we should
live in a rapidly warming world.145 Jenkins contends that he does not find cosmologies morally
irrelevant but finds little reason to think “that any cosmology will go far in practically specifying
how humans should meet planetary challenges.”146 While Mary-Jane Rubenstein says new
cosmology is a tempting proposal, “if only everyone believed the transcultural truth of our
having crawled from the same primal ooze, or burst from the same cosmic blast, we might heed
the convulsive warnings of our planetary home,” she worries this “fantasy is misguided,
dangerous, and self-sabotaging.”147 Rubenstein warns that hidden perspectives “often encode
anti-ecological values into scientific stories: the reproductive warfare of some linear biologies,
for example; or the anthropocentricism of many emergence theories; or the disposable worlds of
most multiverse cosmologies.”148 Furthermore, she points out with guidance from Nietzsche,
“the fantasy of a scientific triumph over religion is self-sabotaging because belief in a single,
objective truth is arguably the legacy of monotheism in the first place.”149 Like Bauman,
Rubenstein recognizes valuing earth diversity is more appropriate through “multiple accounts of
that multiplicity.”150
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Finally Lisa Sideris, who has offered sustained critiques of the constellation she calls new
cosmology for some time,151 argues that if “wonder is present in these narratives, it appears in
disappointingly familiar forms—wonder at humans as the consciousness, heart, or mind of a
self-organizing, ever-complexifying universe in which the emergence of our species was implicit
from the beginning: wonder at the modern human subject knowledgeable enough to have
‘discovered’ cosmic patterns and processes that were opaque to all previous, unenlightened
generations.”152 Sideris suggests new cosmology efforts to decenter, or at least reorient, the
human might not be as successful as their authors intend. The generally “anthropic and
anthropocentric flavor of the new cosmology,” she argues, “constitutes no marked improvement
over the human-centeredness that is assumed to taint and disqualify traditional religions as
sources of environmental values.”153 Compellingly, Sideris contends, in a strange way new
cosmology’s attempts at resisting anthropocentrism within certain religious traditions have the
potential to solely offer up one exceptional human for another. Humans need not look toward a
deity for their design and destiny but can marvel at the intricate workings of evolutionary
existence that led to marvelous appearance of humanity. Regardless, as Sideris highlights,
humans are afforded exceptional status in their ability to make meaning about the universe
around them and this exceptionalism affords little opportunity for humility. I find that new
cosmology spends so much time focusing on reorienting the human within this grand scientific
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narrative, it has missed opportunities to dig deeper into what it even means by “the human” and
which humans serve as its ideal.
One of Sideris’ most compelling critiques, and often overlooked by her detractors, is that
“as a whole these movements discourage sensory, experience-infused forms of engagement with
nature that are less dependent upon and mediated by expert knowledge.”154 While Sideris
recognizes that new cosmology authors are careful to say their evolutionary epics do not
supersede or wholly replace religious cosmologies, they do conflate “all that is real with
whatever is scientifically known or knowable” and this conflation:
encourages a disparagement of human-level, lived experience of the natural world as
unreal. It asks us to look behind the scenes, beyond the senses, to what is assumed to be a
more fundamental domain of reality. The result is a displacement of primary
experience—encounters with a more directly sensed world— with a secondary and, for
the most part, abstract and vicarious experience in the form of information dictated by
experts. I accept that it is problematic to assert that our sensory experiences constitute an
unmediated encounter with nature; nevertheless, science is not the same thing as nature,
and to study the former is not to experience the latter. Nor is the study of the former
necessarily conducive to seeking out experiences of the latter. . . This radical privileging
of scientific reality puts environmental values on shaky ground. It estranges us from what
we experience as real, meaningful, and beautiful. Why attach ourselves to this world of
illusion?155
Sideris weaves in David Abram’s work on ordinary experience in nature to suggest “relegating
ordinary experience of the world to a secondary, derivative realm increases our reliance on
experts to inform us of what is real and true about the world, what is worthy of our wondering
response.”156 Additionally, while new cosmology authors argue that humans “grapple with a
sense of alienation, that we do not feel sufficiently ‘at home’ in nature,” and evolutionary epics
can offer a reoriented sense of the Earth as our shared home, Sideris expresses skepticism of new
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cosmology’s ability, with its “almost unfathomably broad sweep of cosmic events,” to be able to
“elicit or encourage positive responses to particular local places.”157 Granting their diagnosis of
alienation as correct for the sake of argument, Sideris contends, “it is not altogether clear how
exposure to the grand narrative of the universe will rectify the situation. Ultimately, this story
situates us not so much in place as in space. There is something distinctly dislocating about the
story’s all-encompassing scope. The sheer scale and remoteness of the universe vis-à-vis
everyday life and lived experience may interfere with rather than foster a sense of being
meaningfully connected and emplaced in our natural environments.”158 I am compelled to agree
with Sideris’ assessments but with the caveat that it is not so much the case that new cosmology
is adverse to sensory experience, I would argue, or human attraction and attachment to affective
encounters with nature. Rather, new cosmology material is resistant to affective encounters
outside the realm of awe, wonder, and reverence. New cosmology authors want us to feel, and to
connect deeply via those feelings, but they want us to feel within in a particular context and
toward a particular outcome. What happens when our encounters with “nature” stir up other
feelings?
Any discourse that attempts to traverse the rocky territory between religion and the
sciences (or the humanities and sciences) will meet critiques about the uses and abuses of both
science and religion in this material. Sideris and her interlocutors have lengthy exchanges on
whether or not new cosmology trades in scientism. My interests for this project, however, are in
what new cosmology authors have to say about affinity and attachment with/to nonhuman others,
a conversation that is obviously apt for this context and of interest to religion and ecology in a
broader sense but can also hold relevance for other trajectories in environmental ethics. In much

157

Sideris, “Science as Sacred Myth,” 157.

158

Ibid.

60
of this material I find myself questioning if this discussion is really about what science can lend
to religious ecologies or if it is even about science at all. Rather, I find new cosmology and the
repetitive retelling of the evocative evolutionary narratives to be about normative ethical framing
through habitual emotional orientation. We ought to be awed by these truths and then act
accordingly. To not do so is counter to what new cosmology believes is human destiny—our
ontological purpose.
In his article “Telling the Facts of Life: Cosmology and the Epic of Evolution,” science
writer Jon Turney characterizes new cosmology work, particularly Barlow’s Green Space, Green
Time, as part of a larger resurgence in popular science writing that “while offering interpretations
of how things are in the natural world, becomes another arena for disputing about the human
future,” and ultimately promotes “one particular set of values.”159 Picking up on Barlow’s
language describing the evolutionary epic as the pageant of life in which all beings throughout
space and time have a role, Turney argues that in order for all this history to have coherence as a
set of values, it needs a moral. New cosmology authors tell the story as a grand spectacular
display, one that “places the observer in relation to past events,” and can answer questions about
how the world came into being but answering questions of “meaning and purpose requires
further work by authors appropriating answers figured in technical terms for their own diverse
ends.”160 For Barlow, and others, the ends are investment in the potential of affective encounters,
through contemplation and direct experience, with the natural world to offer ethical guidance. It
is unclear, though, how we directly experience the spectacular universe Berry, Tucker, and
Swimme spend so much time detailing other than through the narratives of “expert” knowledge.
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The problem with spectacular displays is that their brilliance and orchestration can blind one to
overlooked cracks and corners. I continue to wonder if there are misfits at the borders of the
pageant procession that are out-of-step with this affective modeling. What kinds of affective
experiences does new cosmology normalize and what places, spaces, and creatures do they
obscure by doing so?
“The way we speak about the natural world is not a transparent window,” Brendon
Larson writes, “because it reflects the culture in which we live and its priorities and values. In
the discourse about sustainability, for example, we look to environmental science for the facts,
often neglecting the value-laden language in which they are communicated . . . they represent a
complex way of human knowing.”161 While Larson is primarily concerned with ecolinguistics,
addressing whether the language used in environmental science really promotes the sustainability
outcomes scientists hope for, his observations about the sociocultural locatedness of language
reverberates here for questions of religion, ecology, and emotion. The words we use matter and it
is curious that repeatedly in both materials affiliated with the Epic of Evolution and the Universe
Story, authors rely on awe, wonder, and reverence to convey meaning, value, and purpose. Why
these emotions and only these? Are these emotions our only religious emotions? Are these
emotions the only ones that lead to ethical action?
This work in sacred evolutionary kinships expresses fear about the rapid decline of
biodiversity, sadness over lost species, and anxiety about what the future will hold but
descriptions of encounters with nonhumans are very often descriptions of ideal ecological
systems expressing wonder at their intricacy and reverence for being a part of their sacred
lineage. In cases where the language tends toward the cosmic, particularly I find in Berry and
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Tucker’s work, “nature” can actually seem quite removed from many quotidian concerns. While
I would imagine that individually these authors would express concern for damaged
environments and ill creatures, the challenges of communities recovering from disaster or
negotiating environmental decline are not present at our immense shared table. Their stories are
not folded into the New Story. This absence is a problem because it begs the question if these
evolutionary epics and their ethics of reorientation are truly able to speak to contemporary
ecological concerns. What does it mean to cultivate relationships in critically damaged
environments? What does affinity and attachment look/feel like after ecological disaster? Are ill,
damaged, disabled, and mutated creatures/habitats a part of our one sacred family? Given that
new cosmology makes no mention of toxic or damaged environments, disabled or ill creatures,
new cosmology is less resistant to categories of purity/defilement as Bron Taylor claims. The
absence weighs here, I contend, as presence of discomfort and disillusionment with quotidian
environmental realities. Furthermore, as I will trace in detail in the next chapter, since the burden
of ecological devastation and decline (historically and presently) is disproportionately shouldered
by poor communities of color, the refusal to engage environmental destruction in new cosmology
visions seems to do little, counter to Taylor’s hopes, to “erode supremacist ideologies, whether
racist or anthropocentric.”162
In chapters two and three, in conversation with affect studies and feminist materialisms, I
consider these questions in the midst of everyday encounters post-disaster. Touching the land
and creatures in these environments, engaging in restoration projects, consuming their bodies as
food, taking in the air and waters of the Gulf all present humans with an unsettling experience of
vulnerability as these interactions take a toll on not just our physical health but also our
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emotional wellbeing and, perhaps, our confidence that we could control our relationships with
nonhuman others. While all humans live in enmeshed environments, in devastated landscapes it
is more difficult to deny our entanglements. In these encounters, human and nonhuman others
form disconcerting zones of proximity in which scenes of devastation tug at the onto-ethical
cohesion of new cosmology that expects certain affective orientations. When the fallout of
ecological disaster results in broken, damaged, wounded, deformed, and absented biodiversity,
what do humans love and how do we love it? If these places, spaces, and creatures become no
longer desirable as model habitats, what happens to these unloved others? What might a robust
conception of biophilia that is able to speak to the ethical complexities of loving the “unloved
others” of devastated landscapes look like? 163
Thinking with common conceptions of “sacred” we have articulations of sacred as special
material, set apart from other material, that moves us as we experience it through feelings we
might call awe, wonder, or reverence. But when the material landscapes we live in are not
pristine (as much of the planet is not) and these spaces, creatures, and material are decidedly not
separate from humans (in fact at times terrifyingly close) what do we think about our
relationships with material impacted by pollution and disaster? Can these spaces be sacred? Can
contaminates be enfolded within the contagious sacred? Can toxic bodies be our ultimate
concern? In what follows, I will return to these questions and trace how toxic materials and toxic
relationships prove to be tricky for religion and ecology as they slip beyond dichotomies like
sacred/profane, subject/object, nature/culture, human/nonhuman. Furthermore, the changes
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wrought by disaster and toxic exposure provoke emotional responses but, I suggest, responses
that may disrupt the awe, wonder, and reverence sacred natures are expected to evoke.164
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A note on wonder—as we will find with new cosmology’s use of “sacred” and
“kinship,” often the keywords used by new cosmology have rich and lengthy theoretical
engagements that new cosmology almost completely ignores. Beyond their select dialogues with
science authors, new cosmology does not wrestle with the genealogies that have explored the
nuances of wonder. Consequently, I have not included affective engagements with wonder,
particularly wonder’s more monstrous forms or where wonder is a fascination with the grotesque
or anomalous, that would be particularly helpful for puzzling through devastated landscapes in
favor of dealing with the habitual positivity in new cosmology’s affective project. Sideris calls
these “diminished accounts of wonder” and their “elevation of abstract, expert knowledge above
our lived experience of the world,” distorted, deracinated wonder that is rooted in “hubristic,
quasi-authoritarian, and intolerant attitudes toward the nonexpert, nonscientist, and members of
other faith communities” (2017, 3; 8-12). New cosmology wonder is always positive and
because it is divorced from any cultural/historical contexts, is limited in which bodies, identities,
and relationships are able to resonate with their framing of wonder. For more nuanced and
productive explorations of wonder see Lorrain Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the
Order of Nature, 1150-1750. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998; Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Strange
Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2008; Lisa Sideris, Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge, and the Natural World.
Oakland: University of California Press, 2017.
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Chapter Two
Disasterscapes: Depletion, Abandonment, Toxicity
“‘My wound is geography,’ writes Southern novelist Pat Conroy. ‘It is also my anchorage, my
port of call.’ Some wounds—we are grateful to confess—never heal. They grow with us,
festering and prodding, reminding us often that the wound is what grants the storyteller his
narrative power. Most people, I suspect can plot a geography of broken places in their lives,
pointing to fierce landscapes and threatening terrain they have negotiated alone or with others.
Their wound even becomes, sometimes, an anchorage… The quest for the mystery of place
functions as an infirmity of sorts, summoning ever-new forms of diagnosis and methods of
treatment. Understanding the incurable attraction of human beings to places they perceive as
sacred is an ‘affliction’ I have come to love. I can’t get over it.”
Belden Lane, Landscapes of the Sacred165

One of the most moving stories of cleanup efforts after the BP spill is the origin of the
Hermit Crab Survival Project. Park ranger Leanne Sarco working Grand Isle State Park Beach in
Louisiana describes the project as a hopeful opening within weeks of frustration, anxiety, and
desperation. “‘When we initially saw oiled animals,’” Sarco said, “‘we would call the US Fish
and Wildlife hotline . . . I was frustrated by their response. At best, it would take them an hour or
two to show up. By that time, the bird had moved on or already died.’”166 Cleanup officials told
volunteers that they were not allowed to clean the beach or help wildlife common to the coast
because they lacked the required special training.167 Amid her frustration Sarco said she saw,
“hundreds of hermit crabs attempting to scramble ashore, only to get stuck under the sheen and
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suffocate.”168 “‘BP and Fish and Wildlife were busy saving the birds, as well as edible wildlife—
animals with either an economic benefit or cuteness factor,’” Sarco said, but “‘hermit crabs were
just part of the beach. When I saw the BP workers shoveling living hermit crabs covered with oil
into bags for disposal, I knew I had to at least try to help them.’”169 The crabs, it turns out, were
not off-limits to Sarco and her hundred volunteers who using everyday objects in a makeshift lab
cleaned and released approximately ten thousand creatures.170
Artist Jacqueline Bishop originally came to Grand Isle to collect oil to use in her
dystopian collage work. After experiencing alarming skin reactions to the dispersants in the Gulf
water, Bishop abandoned her plan to collect the oil and “began to use her camera to document
the extent of the disaster and to chronicle the cleanup response. She took pictures of oiled
marshlands and tar balls on beaches, as well as of BP work crews—including teams of
supervised inmates from the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. She also began taking an
inordinate number of pictures of hermit crabs.”171 In an interview with Eben Kirksey, Nicholas
Shapiro, and Maria Brodine, Bishop described grounding her “desire for a liveable future in the
figure of the hermit crab” by joining the Survival Project.172 Cleaning the little creatures
“involved edging Q-tips into their shells without injuring their delicate bodies. ‘I felt so
comfortable cleaning the hermit crabs,’” Bishop said, “‘swabbing with the Q-tip was the same
gesture as painting, except I was taking oil off instead of applying it.’”173
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This brief glimpse into interspecies encounter is a profound model of affiliation and
attachment. It also, however, stirs up troubling ethical questions. Why are some humans drawn to
the struggling crabs but not others? Why are some humans compelled to care for these creatures
while others regard them as refuse? Stories like this one provide yet another occasion (albeit
with some peculiar twists) to do as biophilia proponent E. O. Wilson suggests: inquire after the
motivations (what circumstances and on which occasions) of human action to protect nonhuman
others. In chapter one, I traced arguments from influential voices within religion and ecology that
regard disincentive to cherish life as the result of ontological orientations that do not recognize
affinity with the more-than-human world as our evolutionary legacy and ethical attachments as
our sole hopeful recourse. Championing the unifying and galvanizing power of scientific
cosmologies to provide an orienting mythos for all humans, these spectacular retellings of the
universe story offer opportunities for emotional investment in the more-than-human world by
positioning humans as a small part of the wondrous planetary family. In awe of the beauty of our
shared universe and feeling the appropriate reverence for its sacred intricacy our ethics will shift,
these scholars contend, in favor of biophilic care for our genetic kin. However, what stories,
relationships, bodies, and politics do we disregard in this pursuit of a single orienting narrative?
This chapter argues that painful environmental legacies and unsettling quotidian encounters
render questions of affinity and attachment particularly troubling for religion and ecology.
Considering the Hermit Crab Survival Project, new cosmology authors would resonate
with the compulsion to care for these little creatures. New cosmology proponents might site
Sarco’s undergraduate work in hermit crab biology174 as a catalyst for later interventions, arguing
that scientific inquiry can lead to empathy. Indeed in conversation with Connie Barlow, E. O.
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Wilson, Lynn Margulis, Paul Mankiewicz, and Stephen Harding describe forming allegiances
with species they study, “intimate involvement with wild things— sometimes very intimate,”
that leads to conservation work.175 Others, like Lee Klinger, describe affinities for particular
habitats (the formation of bogs) and bioregions— a love for place that guides their projects.176
These narratives, Barlow argues, are indicative of the conviction that “life loves life” and those
who “deeply value biodiversity, who find it sacred, have fired that conviction with the memory
of an intimate encounter with one or more real organisms at some point in our lives” organisms
that are familiar and “creatures that are still alien, that are at home in the wild and can therefore
never be fully at home with us— try as we might.”177 These biophilic attractions, flashes of
fellow feeling or familial affinity even with very different organisms and strange regions, can
become attachments that new cosmology argues could be affectively cultivated. While this
material rarely delves into the mechanics of affinity and attachment, how we affect and are
affected by others and how we form emotional bonds, new cosmology nevertheless offers a
normative conception of the human characterized by affective investment. To be appropriately
human is to be in relationship with nonhuman others, awed by their existence and invested in
caring for their wellbeing. But, as I contend in chapter one, there is an unspoken limit to these
relationships and investments. Why do some encounters, feelings, and attachments post-disaster
seem out of step with these affective norms? In this chapter I begin to ask why intimacies postdisaster seem to fall outside the onto-ethical paradigm of new cosmology by pairing new
cosmology’s universal narrative with a particular context. Here, I dig into the environmental
history and contemporary concerns of the U.S. Gulf Coast where 2005 sister storms Hurricane
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Katrina and Hurricane Rita (two of the strongest storms the Atlantic has ever experienced) and
the 2010 BP oil disaster (the largest “accidental” marine oil spill in history) drastically altered
what can be said about environmental concerns in the region.
While new cosmology speaks to hermit crab affinity, this material is less helpful for
making sense of the motivations of the other actors in our opening. It would be less complicated
to let the faceless BP funded cleaning crews remain as corporate foils, all that was wholly awful
about the spill represented by their careless shoveling of live creatures into bags. In hindsight,
however, we know that while gaining tax credits BP largely employed migrant worker and
supervised work release labor from the prison in Angola to clean the spill, factors that necessitate
conversations on the circulations/distributions of power, privilege, and vulnerability.178 Racial
tensions in Grand Isle heightened during the cleanup as the predominantly white and Cajun
community verbalized discomfort with black crews leaving their worksites and docked sleeping
quarters to venture into the community for meals and leisure.179 While we can only speculate,
what might it feel like for the predominantly black and brown bodies, working for grossly low
wages in sweltering heat and exposed to chemical dispersants, to encounter these crabs? What
might cleanup workers think about these zones of intimacy as their bodies began to manifest the
long-term health effects related to the spill?
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I will return to these difficult questions in the following chapters but for now, the open
questions for religion and ecology are, why is environmental disaster beyond the frame of
dominant discourses in the field? And, how do we begin to better address environmental disaster
and uncertain futures? The first step is to start recognizing environmental disaster is an everyday
reality for many communities. American studies scholar Curtis Marez argues that the aftermath
of disasters and the complicated problems associated with their names (Katrina, BP) have a way
of transforming what we thought we knew about the past and the present’s pressing issues.180
“To what extent is disaster ‘exceptional,’” Marez asks, “and to what extent is it the norm?”181
The U.S. Gulf Coast is a devastated landscape in recovery not only from BP but also from the
spectacular failures of response to Hurricane Katrina and the lack of care for black bodies. The
entire Katrina event visibly testified to the kind of racial inequality and environmental injustice
many Americans claimed did not exist in their nation, thereby illuminating numerous ways that
“particular bodies and populations are made disposable.”182 In the case of Katrina, is disaster the
“moment the levees broke” or, Marez asks, does disaster also “signify the political-economic
context that preceded the hurricane” and the “matrixes of disposability” exposed by its wake?183
The Gulf Coast after BP, Katrina and Rita, I argue, offers an opportunity to scholars in religion
and ecology to consider how our theory disregards disasterscapes and their function as the norm
for many beings on the planet.

180

Curtis Marez, “What is a Disaster?” American Quarterly, 61:3 (2009), x.

181

Marez, “What is a Disaster?” x.

182

Ibid.

183

Ibid.

71
One could counter that to force new cosmology and evolutionary history to engage and
account for quotidian concerns, to compel big history to speak to daily injustice, struggle, and
despair, is unfair. However, I make the argument in the previous chapter that while new
cosmology hopes to cultivate a galvanizing narrative with the kind of awe-inspiring grandiosity
that rivals religious mythos, they do intend for these stories to influence everyday ethics— a
reorientation of our relationship with/to nonhuman others in such a way that we see ourselves as
part of a cosmic sacred family with responsibilities to care for this family. These stories of
wonder and intimacy are effective, they argue, because of their universal appeal with the ability
to be grafted onto religious traditions or act as a civic home for those exploring emotional
connections with/to non-human others. But if they struggle to include disasterscapes where awe,
wonder, and reverence compete with anxiety, aversion, and apathy, and they do not speak to
large populations living after environmental decline where intimacies with nonhuman others risk
vulnerability and exposure, can new cosmology claim universal appeal? Can the sacrality of new
cosmology negotiate toxicity? Are all non-human others truly regarded as sacred or does this
sacrality hover above quotidian encounters as an ideal, glossing over histories of injustice, abuse,
and pollution? How might religion and ecology address the skeletons here in this branch of the
planetary family? At face value, new cosmology offers an intriguing bend to this conversation—
an exciting democratization of sacrality, space, and ontology by positioning the whole universe,
and its dizzying array of intricate, alien, unfathomable parts, as sacred. However, as I
summarized in the previous chapter, this sacrality is vaguely unparticular, un-rooted, uninclusive of large portions of the planet in its sidestepping of environmental degradation. My
contention is that the focus of new cosmology on one affective-ethical narrative renders this
discourse unable to attend to contemporary concerns. Drawing critical geographies, space and
place, and environmental justice scholarship into a conversation that unsettles new cosmology
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conceptions of sacred nature, here I sit with the particulars of degradation along the Gulf Coast
to advocate for opening sacrality to damage, loss, and mutation.

Landscapes of Depletion: Erosion, Super Storms, Spills
“I have got in touch with a few people. Or they have managed to get in touch with me. I have
managed to send some emails out. The happiness that comes from knowing people are still alive
is brief like the flame of a match. Be happy, then be miserable. I have to watch all this guttwisting stuff on TV—water, angry people, lies, familiar street signs in water, pregnant women
wading in the water. Wade in the Water is part of the title of my poetry anthology. Irony. A boat
is anything that floats . . . They are not showing my neighborhood on TV. It may be that I have
no neighborhood, no house, no nothing. How to start… to start over . . . All the faces and hands
are African American. The news informs us all the people are black. I feel miserable, sick. I
guess I have trauma. Unlike the common cold, trauma affects the mind, the soul, the body. I am
restless. All the African Americans are . . . Guns, gunfire. Who is shooting? Some people in the
shelter make ugly comments about the stupid people who are still in New Orleans. It does no
good to respond. They are convinced anyone who stayed was stupid. They are convinced thugs
are shooting at helicopters. Anger makes my body hot . . . That is a dead man in the water? Who
is killing? Time. Football lives. Writing something other than the information people give me for
their FEMA applications helps. Dead. And no drinking water. And wading in poisoned water
with the snakes and the dead bodies of animals and people floating by. Writing. Help! I have not
been writing the way I want to write. I have been thinking about writing, the fragility of writing,
how personal it is. Water can wash it away. Baseball games—the national pastime lives. Boats
and helicopters and the military … the people who could help are over there-Iraq- killing
terrorism. Sand. They must be killing shadows in the sand. The terrorism is here- hurricanes in
the South, on the Gulf Coast, in and around the Crescent City. Yes, I have to write.” Jerry W.
Ward, Jr. The Katrina Papers184
“Explosion. Fireball. Destroyed: Eleven men. Created: Nine widows. Twenty-one father-less
kids, including one who’ll soon be born. Seventeen injured. One hundred and fifteen survive
with pieces of the puzzle lodged in their heads. Only the rig rests in peace, one mile down. Only
the beginning. Blowout. Gusher. Wild well. Across the whole region, the natural systems
shudder. Months to control it. Years to get over it. Human lives changed by the hundreds of
thousands. Effects that rippled across the country, the hemisphere, the world. Imperfect judgment
at sea and in offices in Houston, perhaps forgivable. Inadequate safeguards, perhaps
unforgivable. No amount of money enough. Beyond Payable.” Carl Safina, A Sea in Flames185
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2005. A very bad year. By the morning of August 25th Tropical Depression Ten circling
near the Bahamas began to look more ominous. “Upgraded” to Tropical Storm Katrina, the storm
moved toward northeastern Miami-Dade County and became a Category 5 hurricane shortly after
pulling into the balmy bath of the Gulf of Mexico. When August 26th projections moved
Katrina’s eye toward Grand Isle, emergency management officials on the Louisiana coast began
discussing catastrophic impact for below sea-level New Orleans. August 28th at 9:30am, New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco issued the first-ever
mandatory evacuation for the city warning that “the storm most of us have feared” was soon to
make landfall.186 Blanco urged residents to get out as soon as possible and for those 112,000
residents without cars to find rides wherever they could. Those who could not get rides were
directed to relocate to the Superdome as a shelter of last resort as soon as possible.187
When Katrina made landfall at 6:00am on August 29th near Buras-Triumph Louisiana,
the destruction was more devastating than even the grimmest predictions. Storm surge and
seventeen hours of hurricane-force winds severely damaged the shores of Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama. 80% of the greater New Orleans area was under water, many areas under more
than ten feet of water, mostly due to engineering policy failures like 53 levee and floodwall
breaches spilling billions of gallons of water from the Gulf of Mexico, Lake Borgne, and Lake
Pontchartrain into New Orleans.188 2006 reports estimated in New Orleans alone, at least 1,118
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people lost their lives, 135 are missing and presumed dead, and more than 400,000 residents had
to flee the city— many will not return. Direct damage to property is estimated at $21 billion with
public infrastructure damage estimated at an additional $6.7 billion.189 121 known dead in
Mississippi, 67 missing, and 90% of structures up to mile inland from the shore were completely
obliterated.190 Most troubling for long-term restoration projects, Katrina flooding saturated the
region in a toxic combination of oil, chemicals, waste, sewage bacteria, and garbage. The Coast
Guard reported five major oil leaks from damaged tankers and refineries including at least
819,000 gallons leaking into south New Orleans.191 Surrounding downtown New Orleans is a 95acre superfund site, a former toxic dump that lost its topsoil covering in the flooding and leached
its chemicals into the area.192 Survivors either had to swim, float, or wade through this hazardous
muck to safety or wait, days of waiting on rooftops, for rescue. Three weeks later Hurricane Rita,
the fourth-most intense storm ever recorded in the Gulf, hit Louisiana’s western coast decimating
what was left of the coastal communities after Katrina. The two storms were so large “Katrina
destroyed the Louisiana coast from the Mississippi state line to Grand Isle and Rita pretty much
finished the job from Grand Isle to the Texas border.”193 My attempts to summarize this level of
destruction are grossly inadequate. I cannot do it justice.
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Unnatural Disasters and Disposability
Why were these storms so devastating? While mind-stretching, the statistics about these
disasters do not capture the truly immense, frustratingly complex, injustices impacting those that
call this region home and that continue to shape the impact of these events. Helpful for
understanding these complexities, in his groundbreaking work Slow Violence and the
Environmentalism of the Poor, Rob Nixon coins the term “slow violence”194 to redirect our
attention to “violence that occurs gradually and out of sight,” the “attritional catastrophes that
overspill clear boundaries in time and space” and that are “marked above all by displacements—
temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and
underestimate, in advance and retrospect, the human and environmental costs.” 195 Such
displacements “smooth the way for amnesia,” Nixon writes, “as places are rendered irretrievable
to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate
media.”196 It might seem counterintuitive to use slow violence to think through disasters like
Katrina with their spectacular impact and media attention, but Nixon and others in environmental
justice provide ways to illuminate all the actions, choices, and abandonments that lead up to and
follow (even speculatively in the very distant future) environmental catastrophes that remain
beyond our “rapidly eroding attention spans.”197 We must figure out ways to creatively address,
politically and representationally, the “slow erosions of environmental justice,” and the particular
environmental concerns of populations habitually positioned as disposable in order to understand
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that the world’s poor “can seldom afford to be single-issue activists: their green commitments are
seamed through with other economic and cultural causes as they experience threat not as
planetary abstraction but as a set of inhabited risks, some imminent, others obscurely long
term.”198 Nixon’s work resists strains of environmental thought like new cosmology that
continue to attempt to address environmental concerns separate from their political
dimensions,199 particularly the reverberations of chattel slavery, neocolonialism, and fast
capitalism.
In a 2006 report In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster, and Race after
Katrina, Manuel Pastor et al. argue that Katrina, while “sweeping away businesses, homes, and
lives” and embedding “images of desperate and seemingly abandoned residents” into American
minds, shattered two “illusions Americans usually associate with disasters.”200 The first of these
“is that the government would always be there as an effective safety net.”201 Shocked by the
“slow and now much criticized federal response” and the “stranded individuals and families” that
were “left to fend-or not to fend-for themselves,” sentiment after the storms, they argue, is
characterized by a “growing wave of criticism and cynicism about government capacity.”202 The
second illusion that “Katrina swept away” was “the traditional belief that natural disasters are a
sort of equal opportunity affair— acts of God that affect us all. But as the government’s
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emergency rescue and recovery efforts floundered,” they argue, “particularly in beleaguered
New Orleans, the country began to realize that this was not the case.”203 Make no mistake,
longtime environmental justice advocate Robert D. Bullard writes, “the disaster in New Orleans
after Katina was unnatural and man-made.”204
The disproportionate environmental burden dealt to poor communities of color is
painfully unsurprising to those advocates who, since the United Church of Christ Commission
for Racial Justice’s 1987 groundbreaking study Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States,
continue to argue that environmental and social justice concerns are intertwined. In the 1980’s
environmental issues became part of the civil rights agenda initiated by what Bullard calls a
“fragile alliance” between labor organizers, environmental groups at the 1983 Urban
Environment Conference in New Orleans, the UCC Commission for Racial Justice, and
predominately black grassroots activists living in “cancer alley,” the chemical manufacturing
corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans.205 The UCC Commission findings from two
cross-sectional studies of demographic patterns associated with “commercial hazardous waste
facilities” and “uncontrolled toxic waste sites,” demonstrate entrenched environmental inequality
with a consistent national pattern of race proving “to be the most significant among variables
tested in association with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.”206 Toxic Wastes
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and Race reported, “three out of every five Black and Hispanic Americans lived in communities
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites” with more than “15 million Blacks” living in communities
with “one or more uncontrolled toxic waste sites.”207 Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty, a 2007
update, found “many of our communities not only face the same problems they did back then,
but now they face new ones because of government cutbacks in enforcement, weakening health
protection, and dismantling the environmental justice regulatory apparatus.”208 While “Katrina
blew the lid off the ‘dirty little secret’ of race, vulnerable populations, disaster response, and
unequal protection,” Rev. M. Linda Jaramillo writes, Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty only
reconfirmed what many living in these communities already knew: “people of color are
particularly concentrated in neighborhoods and communities with the greatest number of
hazardous waste facilities” raising serious questions “about the ability of current policies and
institutions to adequately protect people of color and the poor from toxic threats.”209
What these studies recognize as national vulnerabilities is perhaps even more the case in
the South, as Pastor et. al.’s In The Wake of the Storm report indicates. “The South,” they write,
is “host to the majority of the nation’s African American population” comprising “32 percent of
the population in Louisiana, 36 percent in Mississippi and 26 percent in Alabama.”210 Those “left
behind as the flood waters rose in New Orleans,” they write, “were from neighborhoods that
were even poorer and more African American. Such increased vulnerability is typical of the
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South, a place where the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and white resistance has affected both
race relations and the region’s ecology. The plantation system exploited not only humans but
also the land, and the South has often been thought of” as “a sort of dump for the rest of the
nation’s toxic waste.”211 Pockmarking much of the landscape impacted by these storms are areas
Vernice Miller-Travis calls “sacrifice zones” where residents suffer a “disproportionate burden”
of toxic chemical exposure.212 “Sacrifice zones,” Steve Lerner writes, is a term that was
originally used “by government officials to designate areas dangerously contaminated as a result
of the mining and processing of uranium into nuclear weapons.”213 During the Cold War, Lerner
writes:
when the Soviet Union and the United States were racing to build up their nuclear
arsenals, large areas in both nations were contaminated with radioactivity. In the United
States, some of these catastrophically polluted places were fenced off and warning signs
were posted; but others were not, and people continued to live in them and fall ill. Today
hundreds of these national sacrifice zones are scattered across the United States, where
the by-products of uranium mining operations, nuclear weapons production facilities, and
atomic test sites have left behind irradiated landscapes unfit for human habitation.214
But these locations contaminated by radioactivity are not the only “places ‘sacrificed’ to the
ravages of intense pollution,” Lerner contends.215 He makes the case that the “‘sacrifice zones’
designation should be expanded to include a broader array of fenceline communities or hot spots
of chemical pollution where residents live immediately adjacent to heavily polluting industries or
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military bases.”216 Residents in these areas are overwhelmingly low-income minorities that “are
required to make disproportionate health and economic sacrifices that more affluent people can
avoid.”217 The decision of where to locate these plants, dumps, and hazardous sites Miller-Travis
argues, “takes us back to the question of who is valuable.”218 “Permission to locate a new
industrial facility adjacent to an existing residential area,” Lerner argues, “is often sold to the
community in terms of the jobs it will create.” 219 This tradeoff, Miller-Travis explains, “is
viewed by the environmental justice community as a kind of ‘economic blackmail’ . . . ‘It is a
heinous thing to ask people to do, but it happens all the time,” Miller-Travis asserts, “in essence,
people are offered a choice between jobs and a shorter life.”220 These fenceline communities are
one form of “spatial segregation,” Lerner argues, where the “geographic concentration and
economic isolation of low-income and minority citizens in rural pockets, inner suburbs, and
central-city ghettos” exposes communities of color, those on the “wrong side of the tracks,” to
industrial development that zoning laws push far from white communities.221
New Orleans itself is a staggeringly apt study in all these environmental justice issues
harming communities “long before Katrina’s flood-waters emptied the city.”222 New Orleans is
located along the Mississippi River Chemical Corridor which is host to “more than 125
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companies that manufacture a range of products including fertilizers, gasoline, paints, and
plastics.”223 Areas impacted by the disasters already disproportionately had problems with
childhood environmental lead poisoning and air quality related asthma and respiratory disease.224
“When the hurricane hit,” Pastor et. al. write, “the existing inequalities and the history of
discrimination in the American South played out in tragic yet predictable ways. Evacuation
strategies, for example, left the most vulnerable populations—the poor, minorities, the elderly—
inadequately protected.”225 Weeks before Katrina and Rita, Bruce Nolan, a Times-Picayune
reporter, distinctly summed up these abandonments in his critique of emergency transportation
plans: “city, state and federal emergency officials are preparing to give the poorest of New
Orleans’ poor a historically blunt message: In the event of a major hurricane, you’re on your
own.”226
When thinking about these storms, “landfall is not just a physical question,” geographer
Cindi Katz argues, because “geography is always socially produced.”227 Every landscape, she
writes, “can reveal sedimented and contentious histories of occupation: struggles over land use
and clashes over meaning, rights of occupancy, and rights to resources.”228 On the Gulf, “Katrina
churned through historical geographies of extraordinary multiculturalism but extreme racial
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segregation, of amazing environmental wealth exploited rapaciously, of mythic significance in
the American and even global imaginary whose celebrations masked the enduring legacies of
poverty and discrimination that they fed off and opposed.” New Orleans, romanced as “the
southernmost port of the United States and the northernmost port of the Caribbean,” is a city,
Katz writes, “whose strange wonderfulness— that vibrant patchwork of beautiful, colorful,
messy difference— is celebrated more than its hideous horribleness— the twisted legacies of
venal corruption shot through with deep if quirky racism— is mourned and criticized.”229 The
labor of Bullard, Lerner, Katz, and others working in environmental justice illuminates that what
Katrina “revealed to the nation” was what the “hardened contours of racialized impoverishment
and the residual costs of environmental exploitation” do to people’s lives, particularly black
bodies, rendering them invisible, inconsequential.230
“The wholesale abandonment of the poor on the part of the state and capital in New
Orleans was not a turn of phrase or hyperbolic calling to attention in the wake of Katrina,” Katz
writes, “it was a social fact.”231 “Underneath all the physical wreckage and debris,” Katz argues,
“what Katrina and the flood in its wake scoured was the desperately uneven landscape of social
reproduction in New Orleans. It revealed the costs of long term disinvestments in the social wage
. . . the costs of enduring social and environmental injustice; the neglect of crucial infrastructure
including even New Orleans’s intricate water management system; and the evisceration of public
support for housing, healthcare, education, and social welfare . . . all jumbled together.”232
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Within this, what Katz terms, “landscape of depletion” it is important to understand these
disasters as the product of “long-term disinvestment” in the social reproduction, “environmental
infrastructure, health care, education, housing, and social justice,” that ensures the futurity of the
“material social practices of everyday life” for communities on the Gulf Coast. 233 It is also an
occasion to ask if the recovery years after the storms are producing more of the same.

Displacement and Dispossession
To get an idea of the immense material changes left after a superstorm the size of Katrina
and Rita requires absorbing a set of stunning statistics. Katrina left an estimated 22 million tons
of debris, more than half in Orleans Parish alone.234 350,000 motor vehicles, 60,000 boats,
300,000 underground fuel tanks, and 42,000 tons of hazardous waste that all had to be collected
and disposed of in ways that did not risk more contamination.235 Katrina blew down offshore oil
platforms and refineries, caused six major oil spills releasing 7.4 million gallons of oil, hit five
Superfund sites, and contaminated drinking water supplies.236 Of course injustices did not end
once the waters began to recede and the cleanup began but the destruction wrought by Katrina
and Rita reoriented justice efforts toward opportunities for resisting the “pre-disaster status quo”
during the recovery and rebuilding process.237 However, as Manuel Pastor et. al.’s assessment In
The Wake of the Storm details, distressing realities of disparity, dislocation, and dispossession
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during recovery and rebuilding persist. Survivors of the storms suffered what they term the
“second disaster” where those communities most impacted by the flooding were also most likely
to be “underprepared and underinsured, and to be living in unsafe, substandard housing.”238 The
slow distribution of federal aid to these communities left many residents of lower-income
neighborhoods in New Orleans “concerned that federal, state, and local officials will not
prioritize their communities for cleanup and reconstruction” rendering the city “little more than
a theme park for tourists.”239 The “uneven geographies of cleanup and reconstruction,” Katz
argues, are palpable in every day encounters like “mundane practices of disrespect and disregard
such as the city’s failure to even replace street signs destroyed or washed away in many poor
neighborhoods so that those intent on rebuilding might find their way.”240 Lack of investment in
futures for these neighborhoods indicates, even in restoration opportunities, a clear distinction
between “the visible city of tourism and the invisible city of residential deprivation.”241
One of the most pressing concerns for working through pre-Katrina social and
environmental erosion in recovery is the right to return and rebuild for those dislocated by the
storm. “On August 29 a black city, called by activists the most Afro-centric city in the United
States, was almost literally blown off the face of the Earth,” environmental justice advocate Eric
Mann writes, and “the bungled and chaotic evacuation effort scattered more than a quarter of a
million black people to the winds. The majority went to Shreveport and Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
Houston, Texas; and Atlanta, Georgia, but New Orleans activists say that the dispossessed and
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dispersed members of the black community are in 44 states. Many of them are still trying to find
their way home.”242 The five-day “active abandonment of New Orleans” Clyde Woods writes,
was followed by years of “massive resistance to the demands of displaced residents to return.”243
Corrosive policies and governmental failures, Katz writes, “left gaping room” for nongovernmental organizations, religious, and grassroots communities to continue facing “the
sprawling rot that was there all along.”244 These activists245 identified housing, and grim
possibilities for “low-income, non-white residents” to return as the leading impediment to
recovery efforts.246 Katrina alone forced more than a million Louisiana residents to flee their
homes with an estimated 100-300,000 of those residents at risk for ending up permanently
displaced.247 FEMA contracted for 120,000 mobile homes but weeks after Katrina, faced with
difficulty getting evacuees out of shelters due to water, sewer, and electricity infrastructure
problems, FEMA still had 4,600 Louisiana families in trailers, hotel rooms, or cruise ships
docked in New Orleans and 100,000 evacuees still housed in “barrack-style shelters scattered
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across twenty-six states.”248 To discourage evacuees from moving into their communities, some
Louisiana parishes near New Orleans, Bullard and Wright detail, “adopted emergency
ordinances limiting the density of mobile-home parks.”249 Compounding these abandonments,
the trailers FEMA purchased for $2.6 billion were notoriously vulnerable to inclement weather
and later found to be toxic to their inhabitants.250 After evacuees started showing signs of
formaldehyde exposure (nausea, rashes, asthma attacks, memory impairment, insomnia,
headaches, intestinal problems) the Sierra Club tested FEMA trailers and found 83% of the
tested trailers had formaldehyde levels way above the EPA limit leading to potential long-term
health effects.251 2007 Congressional hearings found FEMA “deliberately neglected to
investigate any reports of high levels of formaldehyde in trailers so as to bolster FEMA’s
litigation position in case individuals affected by their negligence decided to sue them.”252 Two
years after the storm, an estimated 195,000 people were still living in FEMA trailers.253 For those
that were able to stay or return but were not part of rebuilding investments, “people declared
disposable by some ‘new’ economy to find themselves existing out of place in place,” they must
negotiate what Nixon calls “displacement without moving,” referring to the “loss of the land and
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resources beneath them, a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the very
characteristics that made it inhabitable.”254
Prior to Katrina, 5% of the New Orleans population lived in public housing, about “7500
units of public housing” yet two years after the storm only 1200 units were made habitable while
the rest remained barricaded or were demolished.255 For those barred from returning and settling
elsewhere, disasters only serve to worsen competition for affordable housing. For example, the
East Baton Rouge Parish population “surged from 425,000 to 1.2 million as a result of Katrina.
Katrina made Baton Rouge one of the fastest-growing regions in the country. The influx of these
new residents to the region created traffic gridlock and crowded schools,” and “many of the
mostly white suburban communities and small towns are not known for their hospitality towards
blacks.” 256 Federal cash assistance programs to repair homes only served homeowners and 55%
of the New Orleans community were renters.257 Where were those citizens who made up the
“fabric of the city,” Katz argues, those “teachers, nurses, waiters, bellhops, taxi drivers, small
business owners, police and firefighters supposed to live” without this infrastructure?258 “What
hope is there for the future of New Orleans as a working, habitable city,” Katz asks, “as opposed
to a theme park if the core of its working population is essentially evicted?”259
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Stormy, Oily Forecasts
Eroding social protections and opportunities for communities on the Gulf Coast,
particularly poor communities of color, are intensified by erosion on the coastline. For some time
before Katrina, environmental activists working in the Gulf warned that sinking land, rising seas,
and warming oceans would lead to superstorms like Katrina and Rita.260 Oil and gas drilling and
its effects have all but eroded away the protective wetlands and barrier islands that slow down
hurricanes.261 It is difficult to convey just how important the oil and gas economy is to the Gulf
Coast. While many Americans might imagine a few rigs dotting the horizon, Mike Tidwell
writes there are “no fewer than 4,000 colossal platforms in the Gulf used for oil drilling and
production. They employ 85,000 workers, far more than the entire U.S. space program.”262
Stretched end-to-end they would span from “Washington, D.C. to Philadelphia, rising more than
ten stories above the ground and with a width nearly that of a modern aircraft carrier. On nautical
charts, the individual oil platforms in the Gulf are so numerous they look like stars in the sky, a
kind of galaxy at sea. They even group themselves—coincidentally—into ‘constellations’ not
unlike the Big Dipper and Southern Cross.”263 Numerous studies, Tidwell writes, show “at least
a third—and probably more— of Louisiana’s land loss stems directly from the erosion and
altered hydrology caused by the industry’s ten thousand miles of pipeline canals and navigation
channels.”264 As inland oil and gas reserves rapidly run out “all across the region, wells and tank
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batteries have been abandoned, the hulking equipment rusting and falling apart waiting to be
carted off as scrap metal,” and the “large companies- Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, BP
Amoco, and others” are eager to be “done with this old and dying coast, this depleted shoreline,
free instead to turn to the vast reserves just beyond the horizon, there in the fathomless sea. Out
there, along the ocean floor, lies the new frontier.”265 “The question persists,” Tidwell writes
prophetically in 2003, “what will this coast do when a Category 4 hurricane finally does come
ashore with almost nothing to stop its surge tide, which is likely to be in the neighborhood of
eighteen feet? The water will furiously topple all levees in its path and go and go and go, all the
way to the outskirts of Baton Rouge, like a liquid bulldozer, flattening everything it meets, and
hundreds of thousands of people will be at risk of drowning.”266
In 2010 one of these rigs, Deepwater Horizon, one of so many, exploded killing 11
people. The damaged well at the Macondo formation pumped crude oil into the Gulf for 87 days.
BP risked the health futures of 16,000 miles of coastline and its inhabitants to disperse the oil
and disperse the blame. For those rebuilding after Katrina and Rita, some of them New Orleans
residents who waited for days on rooftops without government response, what did it feel like to
watch the underwater footage of plumes of crude gushing for days? For fishing communities that
sorted through the haystack messes of splintered boats, docks, and homes in order to rebuild,
what did it feel like to wait and see how much oil would wash ashore, how many fish would die,
how many days they would be unemployed? How might activists feel facing another
insurmountable disaster threatening their homes, bodies, and human/nonhuman neighbors?
While difficult to represent, this complex environmental, racial, and economic history of
“acceptable” risks, disinvestment, displacement, and dispossession shapes the Gulf landscape

265

Tidwell, 304.

266

Ibid., 338.

90
and how it is experienced by those that attempt to call it home through erosion, erasure, and
haunting remainders. Like toxic exposures, do these abandonments also sediment in bodies
shaping our emotional orientations and future attachments?

The Sacred and the Human
Keeping these historical and pressing environmental concerns in mind, I return to the
discussion of sacred natures. In chapter one I argued that while new cosmology authors (some of
whom claim their fidelity to nature is a secular feeling best expressed through religious affects)
do not clearly define what they mean by “sacred” when they claim nature is sacred and should be
revered/experienced as such, it seems to be the case that “sacred” likely functions as affective
experience and ethical compulsion. Through working to revitalize our evolutionarily innate
capacities to marvel at the more-than-human world by sacralizing scientific knowledge and
encouraging others to treat the planet with reverent care, these authors argue humans will find
renewed meaning and purpose on the planet as one type of being amongst the dizzying array of
sacred kin. However, as I summarized, critiques of new cosmology point out the inability of their
epic narratives to persuasively speak to practical environmental concerns or to the social
locatedness of their own stories. But most troubling, I find, is their lack of reflection on what
they mean by “the human” or which humans serve as their models. It seems to be the case, at
least in its current iterations, that the onto-ethics of sacred natures discourse functions best under
the assumption that encounters with nonhuman others do not shake our onto-ethical ideals too
much.
For example, while new cosmology authors do not meditate at length on ontology, they
do offer some insight into how they implicitly position the human within the universe through
their relationships with sacred nonhuman others. In Brian Swimme and Thomas Berry’s The
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Universe Story: From the Primordial Flaring Forth to the Ecozoic Era—A Celebration of the
Unfolding of the Cosmos, they describe human relation within the epic of evolution thusly:
the human being within the universe is a sounding board within a musical
instrument. Our mathematics and our poetry are the merest echoes of the
universe entire. We are unable to capture more than fragments, even ciphers of
fragments, in our most exalted moments. Even so, as we become captivated by the
quantitative aspects of our knowledge of the epistemological concerns of our knowing,
often forget this deeper psychic dimension of things that activated our awareness. We
enter a narrowing of human reality and take the sounding board for the whole. Poetry and
the depths of soul emerge from the human world because the inner form of the mountains
and the numinous quality of the sky have activated these depths in the human. Just as
with carbon, we can analyze a mountain into the form of rock and the type of mineral that
compose the mountain. Mountains can also be understood as agencies in the world,
participating in the ongoingness of the universe. That is, mountains act, and in a
multivalent way. They sculpt the cycles of the hydrosphere and atmosphere. They shape
the climates and thus the biology of the local region. And particular mountains also stun
at least some of the animals. A human being, for instance, can climb a mountain and get
hit by something so profound, at so deep a level, that the human will never be quite the
same. This precise feeling will not occur on the ocean or in a cave or a valley. Other sorts
of experience will take place there. This specific moment will emerge only in the
presence of the mountain; it is evoked out of potentiality by the mountain. The dynamic
of the mountain is accomplishing something in the universe, is acting, is altering reality.
From our quantum perspective on evolutionary cosmology, we can approach the reality
of a human stunned by a particular mountain only through a series of negatives. It is not
accurate to say that the human has invented or created these feelings all by itself. It is not
accurate to imagine that these feelings are present objectively in such a form within the
mountain. It is not accurate to think that these same feelings would happen if a different
sentient being were there, or a different mountain. The feelings are neither subjective
fantasies of the animal nor simply objective experiences of the mountain. Such profound
feelings, such emotions that are even tinged with personal significance and with hints of
destiny, are the mutual evocation of mountain, animal, world. Depth communication of
primordial existence is the reality at the foundation of all being. Humans give voice to
their most exalted and terrible feelings only because they find themselves immersed in
the universe filled with such awesome realities. The inner depths of each being in the
universe is activated by the surrounding universe.267
This passage conveys the grandeur I discussed in chapter one. Our math, poetry, and other
creative endeavors, they write, try to speak to the magnificence of the universe but it slips
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beyond our abilities. Compellingly, at first glance The Universe Story attributes nonhuman
nature some stunning agentic capacity. Mountains are not inert matter but rather sculpt the
environment around them. The mountain acts in the life processes of its home. Meditating on
one of Earth’s most awe-inspiring formations, Swimme and Berry infuse a sense of mystery into
contemplating carbon and atmospheric cycles by writing humans, and “some” other animals,
relate instinctively to these processes affectively though perhaps in ways that we do not fully
understand. “Some” mountains have the agentic capacity to move us and our reverberating
wonder, attempts to capture that mystery and ensure its continuation, is our role.
Perhaps they have a certain mountain in mind, or a personal mountaintop experience to
relate to, but the agentic capacity of mountains becomes more insubstantial in the particulars.
These feelings are connected to the mountain—other locales will conjure other feelings and
while the feelings are “evoked out of potentiality by the mountain” not all beings will be
moved.268 Furthermore, Swimme and Berry argue the emotions do not originate in human
subjectivity, nor are they an inherent property of the mountain, but rather formed in relationship,
the “mutual evocation of the mountain, animal, world.”269 So why this mountain? Any
mountain? Which “sentient” beings? Does all material have agentic capacities or just particular
materials? What are the conditions of possibility that allow one to be awed by a particular
mountain? Swimme and Berry do not expand but there are some clues to implicit positioning of
the human in relationship to nonhuman others as they continue:
the capacity within human awareness to hear and respond to the
spontaneities of the universe was deeply appreciated by primal peoples of every
continent. In order to approach their genius we need to recognize in the vast diversity of
their cultural expressions an insistence on establishing a close relationship with the
psychic depths of the universe. Their aim was a life in resonant participation with the
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rhythms of reality. For this reason the drum became their primary instrument. The drum
was part of the sacred techniques for orchestrating the unity of the human universe dance.
The drumbeat and, more broadly, the songs, chants, and dances of our ancestors
expressed the visions and dreams awakened in them by the spirit work, by those
dimensions of nature beyond the phenomenal world, but integral with materiality—the
wild dimension of the universe . . . Tonight on every continent humans will look into the
edge of the Milky Way, the band of stars our ancestors compared to a road, a pathway to
heaven, a flowing river of milk. Formed by the seemingly insignificant ripples in the birth
of the universe, this milky band has been activating its stars with its own fluctuating
waves for ten billion years, and when we stare at it, we stare back at our own generative
matrix. New ripples in the fabric of space-time, we humans ponder those primal ripples
that called us into being. The vibrations and fluctuations in the universe are the music that
drew forth the galaxies and stars and their power of weaving elements into life. Not to
hear such music? If autism or deafness had interrupted the music at any time in this
fifteen-billion-year event, the symphony would have suddenly gone silent.270 Our human
responsibility as one voice among so many throughout the universe is to develop our
capacities to listen as incessantly as the hovering hydrogen atoms, as profoundly as our
primal ancestors and their faithful descendant’s in today’s indigenous peoples. The
adventure of the universe depends upon our capacity to listen. Humans tonight will watch
the Milky Way galaxy not only with eyes, but also with radio telescopes, satellites, and
computer-guided optical telescopes, with minds trained by the intricate theories of the
composition, structure, and dynamic evolution of matter. Though we wait as faithfully as
the ancient Inuit who stared eye-to-eye with a blue-black whale, we will not see a galactic
eye blinking back at us. Though we may be as dedicated to the wild spirit of the night
sky, no eye of the universe will appear from behind a cloud. Nor do we need such an
experience to realize what that ancient hunter came to realize. For after such long
centuries of inquiry, we find that the universe developed over fifteen billion years, and
that the eye that searches the Milky Way galaxy is itself an eye shaped by the Milky
Way. The mind that searches for contact with the Milky Way is the very mind of the
Milky Way galaxy in search of its inner depths.271
Here, humans are inherently drawn to these sacred mysteries, the same mystery that makes up
our very being, and we should strive to listen to the reverberations of the universe—mysteries
that have always captivated us. Swimme and Berry appeal to “primal” humans, their
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“descendants” in contemporary indigenous peoples, and their fascination with the workings of
the material world as the best examples to follow for this attunement. While much of Universe
Story feels under cited, with their appeal to the primal, mystery, and humans celebrating sacred
mysteries I was, again, expecting a gesture to Mircea Eliade here. In chapter one I speculated
that Eliade’s ambivalence about whether or not the natural world itself can be sacred rather than
only a manifestation of the sacred might render his conception of sacrality less helpful for efforts
to sacralize all material in the universe. But here, contemplating human and nonhuman relation,
agentic capacity, and being, Swimme and Berry seem to echo Eliade’s conceptions of sacrality.
Manuel Vásquez writes that Eliade believes “modernity has disenchanted reality, dulling our
sense for the sacred” thus the “scholar of religion should not be primarily interested in
contemporary experiences of the sacred.”272 In order to understand the power of the sacred,
Eliade argues, scholars should turn their attentions to “primitive man”:
the man of archaic societies tends to live as much as possible in the sacred or
in close proximity to consecrated objects. The tendency is perfectly understandable,
because, for primitives as for the man of all pre-modern societies, the sacred is equivalent
to power, and in the last analysis, to reality. The sacred is saturated with being. Sacred
power means reality and at the same time enduringness and efficacy. The polarity sacredprofane is often expressed as an opposition between real and unreal or psuedoreal. Thus,
it is easy to understand that religious man deeply desires to be, to participate in reality, to
be saturated with power.273
It is important to remember, though, as Vásquez highlights in his critique of Eliade’s work, in
“approaching so-called primitive societies, Eliade is not interested in the particularities of the
ethnos. He does not aspire to construct a painstaking ‘thick description’ of the native’s local,
ever-changing intersubjective world, as an interpretive ethnographer working in Clifford
Geertz’s mold would.” Instead:
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Eliade is interested in the ‘primitive man’ as the privileged point of entry in the journey
toward the origins of religion . . . Eliade wants to study early peoples because he thinks
they provide an open window to the essence of humanity, which in illo tempore was
inextricably bound up with the sacred . . . What the historian of religion is ultimately after
is ‘the original religious matrix’ that grounds our Dasein, to use a Heideggerian term.
S/he seeks to ‘grasp the permanence of what has been called man’s specific existential
situation of ‘being in the world,’ for the experience of the sacred is its correlate. In fact,
becoming aware of his own mode of being and assuming his presence in the world
together constitute a ‘religious experience.’274
Through pursuing what Vásquez calls his “religious ontology,” Eliade “leads away from history,
materiality, and praxis” toward transcendent “divine archetypes.”275 Thus Eliade, Russell
McCutcheon argues, “sets up an implicit distinction between the study of religious aspects of
human life and the study of that which is expressed in these varied forms, the study of the sacred
conceived as an ahistorical agent that operates outside and through the natural world.”276
Reading Eliade alongside the more cosmic iterations of new cosmology, like Swimme and
Berry’s Universe Story, leads me to believe that these authors, like Eliade, might be sensitive to
the dizzying array of material in our universe that humans throughout history have deemed
sacred, but they are less interested in encountering materiality on its own terms. If they are
pointing toward some essential sacred and archetypal human, attuned toward more abstract,
ahistorical, and transcendent conceptions of materiality, the question becomes—can this sacred
be accessed through damaged environments? What is our role as humans in devastated
landscapes, to ignore our present entanglements and celebrate healthier environments? Should
we invest in them in hopes that the awe and wonder new cosmology advocates transcends
histories of fear, abandonment, and vulnerability in this particular locale? Perhaps these sacrifice
zones must also be sacrificed to the essential sacred?
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While Berry and Swimme acknowledge the agentic capacity of some material to affect us
through our feelings of awe, wonder, and reverence, their agency seems confined to these
movements. To truly recognize the agency of nonhuman others, however, would also require
recognizing their ability to surprise and repel us, their ambivalence to our existence, and their
recalcitrance to our desires. New cosmology appeals to the language of sacrality to afford
nonhuman material higher status in our collective conscious. It is not mere inert matter but
integral in relationship to all the other marvelous parts of the universe including everything that
makes up who we are as humans. In its reliance on more transcendent conceptions of sacrality,
new cosmology is left without the tools to encounter and address the particulars on location,
historicity, and socio-cultural resonance. However, as I will unfold in the next chapter, it is the
particulars of encounter that determine how we affect and are affected by our environments and
all the beings that dwell within them.
So why hold onto sacrality at all? Why not dismiss this tangle as too loaded for
contemporary ecological concerns? As is also the case in their use of “kinship,” I contend that
new cosmology authors have a much more intriguing concept in the works than they realize. If
we hold onto sacred as emotional investment and an accompanying kinship ethic while still
allowing for the complexities of environmental degradation, it opens up religion and ecology to
an array of fascinating inquiries. What if we claim the Gulf Coast and all its inhabitants, some
damaged, deformed, ill, and mutated, with unsettling pasts and complicated futures as sacred?
Rather than arguing it was once sacred and could be again or potentially made sacred through
salvific hopes, what might be possible through arguing it is sacred as is— a landscape filled with
beloveds that matter? What work is being done/needs to be done to keep the coast as our ultimate
concern? Can we speak about the Gulf as a place of power not in its purity, but as it is, was, and
will be with deep wounds and deep love?

97
While new cosmology discourse offers a twist to discussions of space and place in its
curious orientation toward cosmic spatiality, I find work in sacred space helpful for making the
case that the uses of the language of sacrality in new cosmology are themselves political acts,
engendered through ritual and emotion, often at the expense of particular bodies, locales,
histories, and communities. Work in religious studies on “the contested category of the sacred,”
David Chidester and Edward Linenthal argue, generally falls within two “broad lines of
definition . . . one substantial, one situational.”277 Substantial definitions of the sacred, like those
employed in “Rudolph Otto’s ‘holy,’ Gerardus van der Leeuw’s ‘power,’ or Mircea Eliade’s
‘real,’” they claim are attempts to “replicate an insider’s evocation of certain experiential
qualities that can be associated with the sacred” described affectively as “uncanny,” “awesome,
or powerful manifestation of reality, full of ultimate significance.”278 Van der Leeuw, they argue,
“attributed sole, transcendent, and ultimate agency to sacred power” maintaining the sacred
“positioned itself in the world.”279 In contrast, situational analysis, they summarize, traces back
to Émile Durkheim and locates “the sacred at the nexus of human practices and social projects”
insisting that “nothing is inherently sacred.”280 These perspectives, including Arnold van
Gennep, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Jonathan Z. Smith, regard the sacred as an “adjectival or
verbal form, a sign of difference that can be assigned to virtually anything,” what van Gennep
calls the “pivoting of the sacred,” “through the human labor of consecration.”281 The sacred is
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thus the “by-product of this work of sacralization.”282 Reengaging conceptions of the sacred,
Kim Knott writes, with “social and cultural constructionist approaches from anthropology and
sociology,” Smith provocatively argues, “‘human beings are not placed, they bring place into
being,’ and they do this—at least in the case of sacred places—through ritual. Ritual, that
creative process whereby people make a meaningful world that they can inhabit, ‘is not . . . a
response to ‘the sacred’; rather, something or someone is made sacred by ritual.’”283
The division between the two perspectives is most contested, Chidester and Linenthal
claim, when regarding sacred space. Eliade, again, maintains that the sacred “errupted,
manifested, or appeared in certain places, causing them to become powerful centers of
meaningful worlds.”284 In contrast, Smith demonstrates how “place is sacralized as the result of
the cultural labor of ritual, in specific historical situations involving the hard work of attention,
memory, design, construction, and control of place.”285 Regardless of where one’s position falls
between the “poetics and the politics of sacred space,” and work in new cosmology seems to
dabble in both, Chidester and Linenthal argue that within theory on sacred space “construction
and contestation has always been a subtext, even in attempts to work out a substantial,
essentialist definition of the sacred.”286 Even Van der Leeuw, they claim, while cultivating a
romantic poetics of sacred space in his enthusiasm for “natural sacred sites, the forests and
caverns, rocks and mountains, waterfalls and springs” seemed to recognize “the very category
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‘nature’ was a nineteenth-century invention.”287 They argue that Van der Leeuw understood
“every establishment of sacred place was a conquest of space” in that embattled “selection,
orientation,” and limitation are involved in claiming something as sacred.288 Furthermore, in his
work on the sanctity of homes functioning through reinforced boundaries, Van der Leeuw raises
the “possibility that a politics of exclusion might be an integral part of the making of sacred
space,” in that boundaries determine who is inside and outside of sacred space.289 For Van der
Leeuw the most sacred places were far removed from human access and, resonant with new
cosmology arguments that humans lost their orientation in the cosmos and long for new
narratives, the “most authentic religious experience in relation to sacred space was
homesickness.”290
Explicitly recognizing, however, “the politics of position and property, exclusion and
exile” inherent within conceptions of the sacred, Chidester, Linenthal, and Knott argue, opens up
new opportunities for understanding how the sacred is “produced and reproduced” in America.
One, “we can identify sacred space as ritual space” that might “enact a myth, signal a transition,
reinforce political authority, or express emotion” through spatial practice.291 These spatial
practices are performed “in conscious tension with the way things are normally perceived to be
in the ordinary world” with ritual acts of “worship, sacrifice, prayer, meditation, pilgrimage” and
ceremony working to consecrate these spaces as sacred by “producing the distinctive quality and
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character of sacred space.”292 The human body and its ritualized disciplines, they argue, are
crucial for the production of sacred space. Our bodies, in “gestures and rhythms, its speaking,
eating, and excreting, situate embodied practices in place.”293 Furthermore, in conversation with
Veikko Anttonen, Knott argues that the interactions of mind, body, space, and place are
fundamental to the production of sacred as a limit or “category boundary,” working even on a
“preconceptual level” to produce “cognitive categorization and its cultural applications of the
notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and third space between them, the boundary.”294 “The
boundaries between body, territory and beyond,” Knott writes, “become culturally dependent
cognitive markers” for determining which entities, places, spaces, and communities have value.
295

Significantly, once we recognize that embodied practices can consecrate, Chidester and
Linenthal contend, we understand “they can also desecrate a sacred space. Throughout the
history of religions, the production of sacred space has depended upon control over purity” with
the management and controlling of bodily functions, habits, and movements “required for the
production and maintenance of sacred space.”296 While different religions and cultures have
different perspectives on purity and defilement, Chidester and Linenthal argue that “rigorous
discipline of the body” in the concerns of purity is prevalent in American religious
perspectives.297 For example, they gesture toward American theologian Jonathan Edwards who

292

Chidester and Linenthal, 10.

293

Ibid.

294

Knott, “Spatial Theory and the Study of Religion,” 1106.

295

Knott, 1106.

296

Chidester and Linenthal, 11.

297

Ibid.

101
declared, “‘this world is all over dirty. Everywhere it is covered with that which tends to defile
the feet of the traveler.’”298 From Edward’s perspective, they write, “body and soul had to be
defended from defilement” and “the body itself was a microcosm of the defiling world. ‘The
inside of the body of man,’ Edwards held, ‘is full of filthiness, contains his bowels that are full of
dung, which represents the corruption and filthiness that the heart of man is naturally full of.’ In
a world so thoroughly defiled, almost nothing can be done to establish purity. It cannot be
constructed through ritual but must depend upon an unmerited grace. Nevertheless, American
heirs of Jonathan Edwards have persisted in observing various ritualized practices for exercise
control over the body in the interest of establishing purity in a defiling world.”299
Two, Chidester and Linenthal contended “sacred space is significant space, a site,
orientation, or set of relations subject to interpretation because it focuses crucial questions about
what it means to be a human being in a meaningful world.”300 Sacred space serves as a means
for “grounding classifications and orientations in reality, giving particular force to the
meaningful focus gained through these aspects of a worldview.”301 As significant space, sacred
space asks what it means to be human by focusing on “classification of persons, carving out a
place for a human identity that can be distinguished from superhuman persons, perhaps to be
worshiped, and those classified as subhuman who can be excluded, manipulated, dominated,
degraded, or sacrificed.”302 To understand these spaces and their ontological resonances
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“considerable attention will have to be paid to the interpretive labors” invested in making these
spaces significant.303 For the sacralization of “natural” environments in American history,
American Indian religious practice, “the spiritual politics of modern environmentalists,” 304 and
“religious interpretation of land and landscape,” what Catherine Albanese calls “nature religion,”
defines an “open set of interpretive strategies for investing the natural environment with sacred
significance.”305 It is important to remember, though, that “all this interpretive industry” should
convince us to recognize that nature is always a cultural product.306 While nineteenth century
“romantic naturalism transferred a sacred web of sentiment from God to nature” thus tying
natural spaces to emotions and rituals “formerly reserved for a majestic God,”307 it did so only by
obscuring the “economic production, packaging, and presentation of natural environments in
America” and the military conquests on First Nations lands and peoples that guaranteed access to
these spaces.308 Furthermore, the wilderness spaces that remain in the U.S., spaces one could
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claim as sacred in their separation from humans, are still thoroughly cultural productions of
space through the political gymnastics required to reserve them as protected American
investments with recorded profits.309
Three, Chidester and Linenthal insist on recognizing sacred space as fundamentally
contested space. While poetic perspectives like Eliade’s “view sacred space as simply ‘given’ or
‘revealed,” it is inevitably “entangled with the entrepreneurial, the social, the political, and other
‘profane’ forces,” that take part in setting sacred space apart.310 Where space is located, what and
whom is located within it, what and whom is protected, all these questions are essential to its
existence as sacred but these questions also “open or foreclose possible futures” by determining
narratives that give shape to public memory and public sentiment, as in the case of monuments,
memorials, shrines, etc.311 Environmental movements are no strangers to the contested character
of sacred space. Chidester and Linenthall gesture to the work of radical environmentalists whose
“dramatic rituals of resistance, from civil disobedience to industrial sabotage, in defense of what
they have perceived as a sacred natural order” mobilize the tools they outline including,
“innovative myths, rituals, and forms of communal organization.”312 Environmental activism
shows “how sacred space is perceived as sacred precisely because it is always in danger of
desecration.”313

309

Chidester and Linenthal, 13.

310

Ibid., 17.

311

Ibid., 23.

312

Ibid., 21.

313

Ibid.

104
What is obvious from all this scholarship on the sacred is that “sacred” is overripe with
meaning. Sacred is shaped by legacies of construction that undoubtedly seep into our
contemporary usage. While new cosmology authors are not explicit about whom they draw from
while invoking the sacred, their usage is nevertheless in conversation with this scholarship.
Along these lines, it would be a productive exercise for new cosmology authors, and for religion
and ecology as a subdiscipline, to think more about the politics of the sacred by asking if their
implicit conceptions of “sacred” require investments in particular boundaries and which places,
spaces, and peoples are kept outside these boundaries. For those invested in Chidester and
Linenthal call “poetic” conceptions of the sacred like Eliade’s, if they regard nonhuman others as
inherently sacred and affectively experience their resonating power and significance, does
environmental decline impact nature’s power? Will there come a time when we no longer have
ideal natural spaces to gesture toward to anchor this power? Politically, if these authors believe
nature is made sacred through cultural labors then how does new cosmology participate in the
work of sacralization? Which rituals do they employ to control this sacralization?314 If new
cosmology wants to reconceptualize the sacred, what conceptions must they explicitly resist?
Which emotions, bodies, and habitats should we use, or conversely ignore, to anchor this
worldview? What cultural tools do we use to produce this new sacrality? I will return to purity
and defilement in the next chapter, but it is important to ask ourselves about these persistent
divisions and how we police the embodied boundaries consciously and unconsciously. If we
argue that interactions of mind, body, space, and place are fundamental to the production of the
sacred, then how do we see the results of environmental racism and degradation impacting these
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interactions? This legacy of abuse and abandonment in the Gulf region shapes bodies and
landscapes, experiences and relationships thus would it not also impact the interactions that
produce the sacred? Finally, has the conscious and unconscious refusal to cultivate the sacred
within environmental decline determined possible futures for portions of the planet? Might
insistence on cultivating the sacred within environmental destruction open possible futures for
devastated landscapes?

Silt Traces
Nuanced environmental theory on the Gulf must negotiate brutal inheritances:
sedimented histories of racial injustice, “disposability as structural violence,”315 and legacies of
toxic exposure. These constellations makeup the everyday affective worlds along the Gulf
coast— the murky, mucky, frustrating work left after the spectacles have passed out of so many
attention spans. On Grand Isle, Leanne Sarco points to an economic/affective investment in the
birds over the crabs, but there’s also something particularly jarring about oil slick birds with their
dripping wings stuck at grotesque angles that captures the affective compulsion of the
spectacular versus the quotidian. Publicly attending to the birds while offstage ordering the
disposal of live crabs was the most expedient way to return to business-as-usual for BP but the
“death of the disregarded”316 still reverberates— so many crab bodies, so many floating black
bodies in New Orleans. How do these persistent exclusions, abandonments, exposures, and
trauma leave traces in bodies, communities, landscapes? Do these histories affect us like our
biophilic resonances? How might future encounters be influenced by these vulnerabilities? In
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these complex economies, hopes that teaching sacred cosmologies would result in compassion
for our nonhuman genetic kin seem naïve but resistance to challenging the political limitations of
sacred natures discourse leaves us at an impasse. In the next two chapters, I pick-at our
discomfort with devastation by asking, what if the geographical wounds Belden Lane romances
in our opening epigraph were less hyperbolic and more actual material and psychic wounds?
How might we speak to persistent wounds of place that include: attachments to toxic homes,
affinity with damaged creatures and eroding coastlines, longing for places and spaces washed
away by the floods, vulnerability to toxic risks, chemical sensitivities, and post-traumatic stress?
While we consider affinity and attachment with/to nonhuman others, how might we also witness
to the politics of geography, recovery, and environmental impact? In the next chapter, I model
the methodological alliances that will be necessary for religion and ecology to begin theorizing
this chaotic jumble of historical and pressing injustices, hurting bodies and minds, tired
communities and depleted resources.
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Chapter Three
Disastrous Intimacies
“There’s nothing left of Buras now or the rest of lower Plaquemines Parish. It was crowded with
collapsed homes and upside-down schoolhouses and buildings speared through by flying
telephone poles. Shrimp boats lie wrapped around the legs of fallen water towers in roadways
crowded with unmoored barges and dead cows. That’s what happens when a Category 4
hurricane arrives with 125-mile-per-hour winds and a twenty-foot surge tide and no barrier
islands or marshes to slow it down. As the storm continued it crashed into New Orleans and the
coast of Mississippi, images of its destruction were now seared into our national consciousness:
the Superdome and I-10 overpass, the Convention Center and the 17th Street canal levee, hungry
looters, starving pets, and cadavers left on sidewalks or wrapped in sheets by the dozens in
hospital chapels. And local, state, and federal rescue efforts failed to respond adequately—or not
at all. One storm, long foreseen in all its details, laid bare more of our deepest fault lines as a
nation- fault lines of poverty, race, health care, national security, the environment, and energy.”
Mike Tidwell, Bayou Farewell317
“Hurricanes are Satan’s gumbo, environmental gumbo, gumbo with toxic flavors—Swamp New
Orleans is a filthy bathtub.” Jerry W. Ward, Jr., The Katrina Papers318
Disasters like Katrina, Rita, and BP lend a particularly strange resonance to conceptions
of intimacy. Purely in spatial terms, whether it be through adjusting to living with strangers in
shelters, trying to get a feel for new neighborhoods and homes, sorting through the wreckage for
one’s belongings and treasures, or walking familiar paths altered by erosion, pollution, and
debris, disasters dislocate familiarity and bring foreign objects and bodies into close proximity.
Intimacy as part of human relational life is similarly impacted by disaster as humans mourn the
loss of or disconnection from lovers, family, friends, and neighbors, as they care for physically
and mentally ill loved ones in the aftermath, and through dealing with the stresses recovery,
relocation, and rebuilding bring into relationships. Finally, in terms of familiarity with one’s own
body, disasters like these invite unsettling changes into our daily embodiments. Dealing with the
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emotional trauma of superstorms and their aftermath, healing from wounds physically and
emotionally, negotiating toxic exposures and what the future might bring, disasters can make us
particularly disfamiliar with the bodies we once thought we knew, the homes we were familiar
with, the other bodies we love/d while simultaneously bringing us into intimate relation with
some truly frightening material. For approaches in religion and ecology that are affectively
grounded in connection and encourage deepening intimacy with nonhuman others, these realities
stir up a distressing stew of questions. How do we relate to human and nonhuman others within
ecological systems that are incredibly damaged? What does intimacy in these environments look
and feel like? Should religion and ecology continue to encourage deepening affinities and
attachments within devastated landscapes?
Troubling both the assumed “human” and the “relationship” in new cosmology ontoethical ideals for human/nonhuman relationships, I argue that this scholarship’s conception of the
human is more discrete, impervious, and rational than realities on the Gulf afford. Understanding
complex life in devastated landscapes, I contend, requires an ontology without sharp divisions
and an affective attunement that puzzles through our unsettling intimacies with others. To do this
will require resources that will enable us to think about what an orientation toward life that digs
into quotidian relations in a gravely damaged environment might entail. Employing material
feminisms and feminist genealogies of affect theory, in this chapter I discuss the co-constitutive
materiality of the organic and inorganic residents that exist in this devastated landscape as well
as the affective economies that bind them together as communities in crisis.319 While scholarship
in religion and ecology is rich in emotional language, historically appealing to the power of
emotional investment as locus for green movements/theology within religious communities,
there has yet to be engagement with growing scholarship in affect theory that digs into
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embodiment, everyday sensation, and the social construction of emotion. Thus, integrating affect
theory in this project serves not only to challenge some of the assumptions within religion and
ecology about the affective structure of affinity and attachment but also as a constructive
exercise to demonstrate what affect theory has to offer the interdisciplinary commitments of the
subdiscipline. Furthermore, since humans experience the planet as embodied, sensing creatures, I
contend that work in religion and ecology that considers space, place, and emotional
relationships with “nature” must take these embodied realities into account and not all
embodiments are represented equally by scholarship. Consequently, I rely primarily on work in
material feminisms and feminist genealogies of affect theory to insist that the kinds of bodies we
have and the cultural legacies they bear matter. Here, I will question what we mean by “religious
emotions” and if emotions like awe, wonder, and reverence are as universal or rationally chosen
as new cosmology contends. By way of scaffolding for the chapter: first, puzzling through what
it means to be human post-disaster I consider how the ontologies of what some scholars are
calling the “nonhuman turn” offer a very different vision to new cosmology by contending that
we are always already a body vulnerable to that which is toxic. Second, I draw from affect theory
to understand what emotions do: what cultural conditions make certain feelings possible or not
possible, how emotions bind particular bodies together and against others, and how affective
spaces, through the production of felt difference, teach us what to value and desire.

Material Feminisms
“With Katrina, there was a question of responsibility, and blame. New Orleans is associated in
the public imagination with the enjoyment of sex, unhealthy food, drinking. It was somehow like
the country was saying to the city, ‘Let’s look at your life decisions. What did you expect when
you were wearing that sexy dress?’” Eve Troeh for NPR320
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“I drive around and try to figure out those Byzantine markings and symbols that the cops and the
National Guards spray-painted on all the houses around here, cryptic communications that tell
the story of who or what was or wasn’t inside the house when the floodwater rose to the ceiling.
In some cases, there’s no interpretation needed. There’s one I pass on St. Roch Avenue in the 8th
Ward at least once a week. It says: ‘1 dead in attic.’
That certainly sums up the situation. No mystery there. It’s spray painted there on the front of the
house and it probably will remain spray-painted there for weeks, months, maybe years, a
perpetual reminder of the untimely passing of a citizen, a resident, a New Orleanian.
One of us …
I wonder who eventually came and took 1 Dead in Attic away. Who knows? Hell, with the way
things run around here—I wonder if anyone has come to take 1 Dead in Attic away. And who
claimed him or her? Who grieved over 1 Dead in Attic and who buried 1 Dead in Attic? Was
there anyone with him or her at the end of what was the last thing they said to each other? How
did 1 Dead in Attic spend the last weekend in August of the year 2005? What were their plans?
Maybe dinner at Mandich on St. Claude? Maybe a Labor Day family reunion in City Park—one
of those raucous picnics where everyone wears matching T-shirts to mark the occasion and they
rent a DJ and a SpaceWalk and a couple of guys actually get there the night before to secure a
good, shady spot?
I wonder if I ever met 1 Dead in Attic. Maybe in the course of my job or maybe at a Saints game
or maybe we one stood next to each other at a Mardi Gras parade or maybe we once flipped each
other off in a traffic jam.
1 Dead in Attic could have been my mail carrier, a waitress at my favorite restaurant or the guy
who burglarized my house a couple years ago. Who knows?
My wife is right. I’ve got to quit just randomly driving around. This can’t be helping anything.
But I can’t stop.”
Chris Rose, “1 Dead in Attic,” The Times-Picayune321
Enveloped within what some scholars are calling the “non-human turn,”322 material
feminisms and affect theory negotiate frustrations with the representational theory of linguistic
methodologies in the 1970s-1990s.323 Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman argue that the linguistic
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turn’s “complex analyses of the interconnections between power, knowledge, subjectivity, and
language” was incredibly productive for feminist scholarship allowing us “to understand how
gender has been articulated with other volatile markings, such as class, race, and sexuality,
within cultural systems of difference that function like a language.”324 Deconstructing the
gendered dichotomies that “ground Western thought: culture/nature, mind/body, subject/object,
rational/emotional,” etc., postmodern linguistic theory, particularly in its feminist forms,
“exposed the pernicious logic that casts woman as subordinated, inferior, a mirror of the same, or
all but invisible.”325 However, a growing conversation among feminist theorists of the body, the
sciences, and the environment326 argue there are troubling liabilities within linguistic projects.
Particularly problematic is that while “postmoderns claim to reject all dichotomies, there is one
dichotomy that they appear to embrace almost without question: language/reality” by insisting
that the “real/material is entirely constituted by language.”327 Resisting the “epistemology of
modernism” that is “grounded in objective access to a real/natural world,” linguistic theory,
material feminists claim, was uncomfortable with concepts of “the real” or “the material” and
insisted “what we call the real is a product of language and has its reality only in language.”328

readings as well as seeking out overlooked genealogies in these archives: for example, tracing
influences from Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson, and Charles Darwin.
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Despite the importance of “discursive critique and rearticulation for feminist scholarship and
feminist politics,” this discursive realm is “nearly always constituted as to foreclose attention to
lived, material bodies and evolving corporeal practices” making it difficult to cultivate
scholarship that rethinks materiality, “the very ‘stuff’ of bodies and natures.”329 Some linguistic
theory, Susan Bordo argues, functions best “at the expense of attention to the body’s material
locatedness in history, practice, and culture.”330 Furthermore, “this overly narrow focus on power
as a discourse, in turn, severely limits our capacity to explore and confront the multiple physical
ways (beyond symbolic violence) in which power impinges on the bodies of women,” people of
color, queer communities, and nonhuman others.331 “Our materiality,” Bordo writes, “(which
includes history, race, gender, and so forth, but also the biology and evolutionary history of our
bodies, and our dependence on the natural environment) impinges on us—shapes, constrains, and
empowers us—both as thinkers and knowers, and also as ‘practical,’ fleshy bodies.”332
Focusing on materiality is understandably contentious for feminism, since western
thought historically relegated women to the maligned domain of “irrational” nonhuman nature.
Resisting persistent cultural Cartesianism, some feminists, like Monique Wittig and Gayle
Rubin, advocate that feminist critique should retreat from notions of “nature” that make it
treacherous (misogyny, “essentialism, biological determinism, homophobia, and racism”) in
favor of language and culture.333 However retreating from these discussions only “serves to
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calcify nature as a solid ground for heterosexist infrastructure.”334 Furthermore, the exclusive
focus on “representations, ideology, and discourse” has made it difficult for feminist theory to
engage with the sciences in any “innovative, productive, or affirming way” pushing
environmental feminisms to the margins and leaving feminists struggling to respond to massive
ecological problems like climate change, species erasure, and environmental disasters. 335
Central to this methodology, and most compelling for future work in religion and
ecology, are material feminism’s innovative approaches to agency and ethics. In response to the
question, do all mountains have agentic capacity, material feminists would respond in the
affirmative as well as include all the material, human and nonhuman, existing on the planet.
Material feminists redefine our understanding of the “relationships among the natural, the
human, and the nonhuman” by developing theories that insist nonhuman nature is “more than a
passive social construct but is, rather, an agentic force,” what Jane Bennett terms vital
materiality, “the material agency or effectivity of nonhuman or not-quite-human things.”336 Vital
materialisms regard nonhuman others as “bona fide agents . . . actors alongside and within us”337
that interact with and change the “other elements in the mix, including the human.”338 For this
scholarship, “nature ‘punches back’ at humans and the machines they construct to explore it in
ways that we cannot predict.”339 Understanding nonhuman others as vital agents requires, these
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scholars contend, rethinking what it means to be a human in the mix. I will expand more on some
of these conceptions later in the chapter but three of these interactionist ontologies are
particularly helpful. Susan Hekman argues that modernist ontologies assumed a “fixed reality
about which we seek absolute knowledge” and that humans can have “unmediated knowledge of
an objective world.”340 Consequently, postmodern linguistic theorists are leery of discussing
ontology in favor of epistemology, demonstrating how our knowledge production is shaped by
language. Material feminists, and other material theorists, Hekman contends, return to ontology
by arguing yes, our “knowledge is always mediated by concepts, and, in many cases, technology
as well” but she insists these concepts and theories also have material consequences.341 “There is
a world out there,” Hekman argues, “that shapes and constrains the consequences of the concepts
we employ to understand it,” and ourselves.342
Hekman draws from the work of contemporary philosopher of science, Andrew
Pickering, who brings “the material world back into the equation of science” by arguing “the
world is filled with agency; it is continually doing things that bear on us.”343 Attempting to
develop a “performative’ image of science, in which science is regarded as a field of powers,
capacities, and performances, situated in machinic captures of material agency,” Pickering resists
normative representational conceptions of science. 344 These approaches position science as “an
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activity that seeks to represent nature, to produce knowledge that maps, mirrors, or corresponds
to how the world really is” and are, thus, plagued by a “set of fears about the adequacy of
scientific representations that constitute the familiar philosophical problematics of realism and
objectivity.”345 While work since the 1970s, particularly on the sociology of scientific knowledge
and reflexive science studies, troubles this model (and cultural studies has already somewhat
embraced nonrepresentational theory) it continues to shape our contemporary understandings of
science.346 But, Pickering contends, there are other ways to think about science—one can start
from the idea that “the world is filled not, in the first instance, with facts and observations, but
with agency. The world, I want to say, is continually doing things, things that bear upon us not as
observation statements upon disembodied intellects but as forces upon material beings . . . much
of everyday life, I would say, has this character of coping with material agency, agency that
comes at us from outside the human realm and that cannot be reduced to anything within that
realm.”347 Within this material agency, Pickering situates the human thusly: “scientists are
human agents in a field of material agency which they struggle to capture in machines. Further,
human and material agency are reciprocally and emergently intertwined in this struggle. Their
contours emerge in the temporality of practice and are definitional of and sustain one another.
Existing culture constitutes the surface of emergence for the intentional structure of scientific
practice and such practice consists in the reciprocal tuning of human and material agency, tuning
that can itself reconfigure human intentions.”348 This onto-theory he characterizes as the mangle,
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resonant in some ways with Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage, and it is an impure mixing up of
everything together, “the human and the nonhuman, the material and the discursive,” that
produces unpredictable results.349 “Human and material agency,” he writes, are reciprocally and
emergently intertwined . . . their contours emerge in the temporality of practice and are
definitional of and sustain one another.”350 The “mangle,” he writes, highlights that the
“contours” themselves of “material and social agency are mangled in practice.”351 Human
intention, practice, machines, nonhuman material, philosophies of science, conceptions of nature,
all are “emergently intertwined.”352 What Pickering calls his ‘mangle realism” is grounded in the
very understanding that “how the material world is leaks into and infects our representations of it
in a nontrivial and consequential fashion.’”353
A second vital concept of co-constitutive materiality is Nancy Tuana’s viscous porosity.
In “Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina,” Tuana thinks about the city of New Orleans in the
wake of Katrina in a way that embraces “an ontology that rematerializes the social and takes
seriously the agency of the natural.”354 Viscous porosity, Tuana argues, is an interactionist
ontology that emphasizes “emergent interplay” and the “in-between of the complex interrelations
from which phenomena emerge.”355 Kin to Pickering’s “dance of agency” in mangled realism
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and Donna Haraway’s “material-semiotic,” Tuana’s ontology seen through “the eye of Katrina
reveals no hard-and-fast divide between natural and social; rather they are seamlessly swept
together in its counter-clockwise rotation.”356 Katrina only came into being, she remarks, through
a “concatenation of phenomena— low pressure areas, warm ocean waters, and perhaps swirling
in that classic cyclone pattern are the phenomena of deforestation and industrialization” but the
problems of Katrina are not so easily separated into “natural” or “human-induced.”357
“Viscosity” she employs to convey there is no “sharp ontological divide” between “human and
environment . . . social practices and natural phenomena.”358 While distinctions can be made,
boundaries between human and nonhuman other, material and culture, science and philosophy,
are mercurial and we have overlooked sites of “resistance and opposition.”359 Resisting the
persistent Edenic myth of “passive indigenous peoples who simply lived in but did not transform
‘nature,”’ Tuana argues that the people who lived in what became New Orleans actively shaped
its land but it always pressed back through “swampy land bred” illnesses and low-land
flooding.360 Historically, humans have further shaped it through the desires and abandonments I
have outlined. Thus, humans may have thought they subdued the landscape through technology
but if Katrina teaches us anything it is that these interconnections have agency and it “behooves
us to remember,” the dance between humans and material that makes living below sea level
possible.361 Regarding the “toxic soup” Katrina left behind, Tuana employs “porosity” to convey
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that this “dance of agency between human and nonhuman agents also happens at a more intimate
level” as the “boundaries between our flesh and the flesh of the world we are of and in” are
porous.362 “While porosity is what allows us to flourish— as we breath in the oxygen we need to
survive and metabolize the nutrients out of which our flesh emerges—this porosity often does
not discriminate against that which can kill us. We cannot survive without water and food, but
their viscous porosity often binds itself to strange and toxic bedfellows.”363 As environmental
justice advocates on the coast continue to protest, toxic wastes are a long-standing concern for
the Gulf coast and her communities. These toxins settle in bodies, disproportionately and with
materialized racial bias, belying “any effort to identify a ‘natural divide between
nature/culture.”364
One final helpful articulation of relational ontologies, Stacy Alaimo explores the
“interconnections, interchanges, and transits between human bodies and nonhuman natures” by
figuring human corporeality as trans-corporeality.365 In Alaimo’s trans-corporeality, the “human
is always intermeshed with the more-than-human world.”366 Again resonant with Deleuze and
Guattari, Pickering’s mangle, and Tuana’s viscous porosity, Alaimo’s vision of the human
underscores the trans to indicate “movement across different sites” opening up a “mobile space
that acknowledges the often unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman
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creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and other actors.”367 Thinking across bodies,
human and nonhuman, Alaimo hopes “may catalyze the recognition that the environment, which
is too often imagined as inert, empty space or as a resource for human use, is, in fact, a world of
fleshy beings with their own needs, claims, and actions.”368 Alaimo suggests we situate our
inquiries “within the many interfaces between human bodies and the larger environment”
considering the ethical and political possibilities that unfurl when our “conceptions of the human
self are profoundly altered by the recognition that ‘the environment’ is not located elsewhere out
there, but is always the very substance of ourselves.”369 Like Pickering and Tuana, Alaimo
argues that these shifts are both material and discursive as this understanding of the “substance
of one’s self as interconnected with the wider environment marks a profound shift in
subjectivity. As the material self cannot be disentangled from networks that are simultaneously
economic, political, cultural, scientific, and substantial; what was once the ostensibly bounded
human subject finds herself in a swirling landscape of uncertainty where practices and actions
that were once not even remotely ethical or political matters suddenly become the very stuff of
the crises at hand . . . humans are the very stuff of the material, emergent world.”370
These three conceptions of co-constitutive materiality, of intertwined ontoepistemologies,
are the kinds of approaches needed that can effectively grasp all the working elements of
environmental and social degradation along the Gulf coast. They demonstrate the unavoidable
porosity of bodies and the need to reshape environmental thought around these vulnerabilities.
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Pulling these conversations together, the conceptions of power and discourse of the linguistic
turn and the focus on the body and nonhuman nature of the material, allows material feminism
the ability to question the social construction of the sciences via asking how scientific knowledge
is produced, upon whose bodies it is built, what histories it illuminates and erases, and finally
what sorts of work it allows us to do through coalition building. Thus, Tuana argues that
relational ontologies are inherently “ethical” ontologies. Because our understandings of human
and nonhuman boundaries are mangled, viscous, and transcorporeal, impossible to separate and
ponder in tidy boxes, material feminists argue that our ethical conceptions similarly need
rethinking.
For example, Alaimo and Hekman argue that material ethics requires we “compare the
very real material consequences of ethical positions and draw conclusions from those
comparisons. We can, for example argue that the material consequences of one ethics is more
conducive to human and nonhuman flourishing than that of another.”371 Furthermore, material
feminisms insist that ethics must be “centered on the material consequences” of our theory.372
Approaching environmental issues from this perspective requires wading in uncertainty which
may be uncomfortable waters for many environmental scholars, including new cosmology
perspectives, that hope for tidier narratives and more assured futures. Reconceptualizing the
human as a transcorporeal subject forces us to “relinquish mastery” as we find ourselves
“inextricably part of the flux and flow of the world that others would presume to master”
affecting a rather “disconcerting sense of being immersed within incalculable, interconnected
material agencies that erode even our most sophisticated modes of understanding.”373 What
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material feminisms offer, however, is a shift from “ethical principles to ethical practices” which
“unfold in time and take place in particular contexts” allowing for incorporating the “needs, the
significance, and the liveliness of the more-than-human world.”374 A focus on ethical practices,
as opposed to ethical principles, unsettles the need for environmental discourses to “extend
themselves over and above material realities,” like superstorms and environmental racism,
offering opportunities for taking on “multiple material consequences.”375
While chaotic, a little unsteady, discomfortingly vulnerable, these methodologies offer
such tremendous possibility for religion and ecology to rethink relationships between humans
and nonhuman others. Complicating new cosmology’s tentative steps into agency and
embodiment, and echoing Lisa Sideris’s critique of new cosmology’s dependence on science to
offer the really real expert knowledge of the world, material feminisms would caution our
approaches to science. Material feminisms ask, what are the political implications of
championing sacralized sciences? Instead of marveling that some mountains seem to possess
agentic capacity, what are the material and discursive conditions that turn us toward particular
nonhumans over others? Which bodies, stories, places, and communities are obscured, ignored,
and erased through the creation of the new narrative? Why does new cosmology make the
choices that it makes and include the human-nonhuman relationships that it does? Furthermore,
why does it not include some relationships, particularly relationships in and with damaged
environments, as part of its religious ecotheory? The human that experiences nonhuman others in
new cosmology scholarship seems implicitly to come to encounters blissfully neutral, free from
historical influences or contemporary political entanglements, and exercises control over all
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encounters. Yes, the human is moved by awe and wonder, but not moved too much as “nature” is
afforded only those affective registers and “the human” only those responses. New cosmology
scholarship does not allow these affective engagements to get too unruly. In devastated
landscapes nonhuman others affect us in more ways than these orderly allowances. What
happens when we begin to acknowledge the weight of past experiences and habits that we carry
with us into encounter? I will address these questions further in chapters four and five.

Cultural Emotions
“This wasn’t the way America was supposed to be . . . Many people in the United States
genuinely believe—with a fervor that puts religious fanatics to shame—that nobody else in the
world can do anything better than America. But the failure of government at all levels in
responding to the hurricane disaster rehashes a much older story about the United States, one that
has been steadily and deliberately noisily drowned or whited out of mainstream discourse. It is
the story of race, class, poverty, and studied incompetence . . . for the rest of us, blacks in the
United States serve as the proverbial canary in a coal mine. Those images on TV should,
therefore, be a lesson for Africans and other people of African ancestry all over the world.
Whether you are in peril in Darfur, Sudan, Ruhengeri, Rwanda, or New Orleans, saving your
black behind isn’t a priority for the American government, founded on a doctrine of white
supremacy.” Vukoni Lupa-Lasaga, “Katrina Unmasks the Real America,” for The Monitor376
“Fuck you, you fucking fucks.
I don’t give a damn what the hell you Yankees/Texans do, do it in your own yard, and shut the
fuck up. We don’t care what you do, and we don’t want your damned PVC sided beige square
houses uglying up our town. Go home, and quit looking at my home as simply a chance to line
your wallets.
I’m so glad all you Chicagoans have figured out exactly how to fix New Orleans. Look at your
own nasty city and explain why you can’t deal with the snow other than to throw tons of salt on
the road, and why you can’t buy a beer for under $5. Fuck you, you fucking fucks.
What about you fucks that don’t want to rebuild NOLA because we’re below sea level. Well,
fuckheads, then we shouldn’t have rebuilt that cesspool Chicago after the fire, that Sodom San
Francisco after the earthquakes, Miami after endless hurricanes, or New York because it’s a
magnet for terrorists.
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And fuck Kansas, Iowa, and your fucking tornados.
Fuck you, San Antonio. You aren’t getting our Saints. When I get to the Alamo, I’m taking a piss
on it. You probably go to funerals and hit on the widow. Classless fucks.
Fuck you Houston and Atlanta. No matter how many of our residents you steal, how many of our
events you pilfer, you still ain’t got no culture. One of our neighborhoods has more character
than all of your pathetic cookie-cutter suburbs laid end to end. Fuck you, fuck you all.
Fuck you Tom Benson. I hate you on so fucking many levels, but the main one is this: they
aren’t your Saints, they’re ours. The NEW FUCKING ORLEANS Saints. All you had to do was
say that you were coming back. But you didn’t. You had to fuck around to try to get more
money. Fuck you, you greedy bastardo. Don’t think we haven’t noticed that you have phased out
all of the merchandise that has the state of Louisiana on it. Don’t think we haven’t noticed how
hard it is to get some Saints merchandise that actually says “New Orleans” on it. Fuck you, Fuck
San Antonio, Fuck your whole fucking family. And if you and Rita think that anybody is going
to patronize your car dealerships, then you got another thing coming, fuckface.
Fuck you New York. You lose a neighborhood and get scads of federal aid. We lose an entire
FUCKING COAST, and the freespending W administration finally decides to become fiscally
responsible. And fuck you all for taunting the New Orleans Saints fans, who have to deal with
playing a home game in the Meadowlands. Fuck you, you classless motherfuckers. New Orleans
donates a fire engine to the FDNY after 9/11, and you give us shit. Fuck you, fuck your town,
fuck your residents, fuck your politicians. You. All. Suck.” Ashley Morris, “Fuck you, you
fucking fucks,” Ashley Morris: the blog377
Opening our ontological inquiry to co-constitutive natures and transcorporeal movement
requires recognizing we are not only materially open to our complex environments but
susceptible to being emotionally pivoted, affected by human and nonhuman others. Affect
theory, building on the more-than-linguistic turn in cultural criticism, can be very loosely defined
as inquiry into bodily capacities to affect and be affected. It is impossible, however, to offer
readers in religion and ecology a more substantial definition that would also definitively
characterize all the work within this umbrella for a number of reasons. First, affect’s theorization
is in process within many disciplinary approaches, some that are in conversation but nevertheless
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have their differences including philosophy, cultural studies, psychology and psychoanalysis,
cultural anthropology and geography, neurosciences and science studies, gender, queer, and
critical race theories, and most recently religious studies.378
Second, there is much contention within this scholarship on whether or not to draw strong
divisions between affect and emotion. Donovan Schaefer’s Religious Affects: Animality,
Evolution, and Power helpfully addresses this disagreement by tracing a dual genealogy for
contemporary affect theory tied to two seminal texts, Brian Massumi’s 1995 essay “The
Autonomy of Affect,” and Eve Kososky Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s Shame and Its Sisters: A
Silvan Tomkins Reader. 379 Massumi’s text crystallizes “a particular intellectual lineage—from
Spinoza to Nietzsche to Deleuze to contemporary neuroscience” via Baruch Spinoza’s sense of
affects as “a multitude of forces that are the plural, heterogeneous materials of subjectivity.
Deleuze characterizes this as the ethological approach, in which bodies are understood as a
compendium of crisscrossing lines of force.”380 For Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze, Schaefer writes,
“affect dislocates the anthropocentric perspective, opening up onto a multiplicity of animal ways
of being organized around the variety of ‘natures’ making up the bodies of different organisms.
The ethological approach explores the variety of animal life streams by mapping our affective
makeup as heterogeneous networks, rather than undifferentiated subjects.”381 Massumi uses
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terms like compulsion, and intensity but insists that affect and emotion are distinct as “conscious
awareness is structurally incongruent with the overwhelming intensity of affect in this plenum of
intensity.”382 For Massumi, Schaefer writes, the “autonomy of affect: its escape from structures
of capture and control, its formal indiscernibility to conscious awareness” makes affect
“ontologically incompatible with the structuring grid of personal experience.”383 For Deleuzian,
or “subphenomenological” affect theorists, like Massumi, Eric Shouse, and Erin Manning,
feelings are “personal and biographical” and emotions are “socially expressed feelings”
characterizing what is “stable . . . structured … and detectable” about social life, those captures
that affects slip beyond.384 The other strand, Schaefer writes, traces from psychologist Silvan
Tomkin’s theory of “affects as an ensemble of psychological engines— as emotions that rise to
the level of the personal, even if they are not reducible to language.”385 This model, what
Schaefer calls “phenomenological affects” draws from phenomenological traditions in
philosophy and approaches affects as “woven into the textures of experience, hovering around,
rather than beneath, the line of ‘conscious’ awareness” of named emotions “(shame, happiness,
fear, anger, etc.) and the as-yet-unnamed emotions of embodied affective palettes.”386 For
Tomkins, affect theory “diagrams a complex and transitory landscape, in which language and
embodied histories interface with evolutionary, affective, and cognitive structures—the shifting
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material repertoire of embodied life.”387 Thus, for Sedgwick, Frank, and others reading Tomkins
like Teresa Brennan, Elspeth Probyn, Lauren Berlant, and Kathleen Stewart, the way we feel
“has a complex, heterogeneous history” and affects are “something that rises into embodied
spheres of awareness.”388 Sedgwick, Schaefer writes, “insisted on bringing to the fore Tomkin’s
sophisticated sense of the plasticity of affects, the possibility that emotions could be reshaped
and redistributed through the embodied histories of individual bodies: ‘Affects can be, and are,’
she reminds us, ‘attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions,
institutions, and any number of other things, including other affects. Thus, one can be excited by
anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy.’”389
Third, my attempts at wading into this fascinating but intricate constellation of projects
will be one of the first maneuvering affect theory and religion and ecology into conversation. I
will not claim that my approach to feeling, emotion, and affects is definitive nor even the most
effective for ecotheory. Currently there is significant excitement, understandably with their
emphasis on pre-or extra-linguistic affective flows, about the possibilities Spinoza, Deleuze, and
Massumi’s work offer to ecotheory and animal studies.390 Concerned, though, with the lack of
attention paid to the intersections of religion and ecology with marginalized bodies, I find myself
persistently drawn to scholarship orienting affect studies within ongoing work on race, class,
gender, sexuality, and ability.391 The scholarship I read and champion in this project is, I argue,
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the most effective for thinking through natureculture complexities because it starts from the
inside out, beginning with the feelings of marginalized embodied daily life and moving to their
theorization. These approaches, particularly the work of Sara Ahmed, Mel Y. Chen, Ann
Cvetkovich, and Avery F. Gordon, are less rigid about divisions between affect and emotion and
conceptualize affects as part of “the cultural politics of everyday life.”392 “I tend to use affect in a
generic sense,” Cvetkovich writes, “rather than in the more specific Deleuzian sense, as a
category that encompasses affect, emotion, and feeling, and that includes impulses, desires, and
feelings that get historically constructed in a range of ways (whether as distinct specific emotions
or as a generic category often contrasted with reason) but with a wary recognition that this is like
trying to talk about sex before sexuality.”393 Cvetkovich also uses,
feeling as a generic term that does some of the same work: naming the undifferentiated
‘stuff’ of feeling; spanning the distinctions between emotion and affect central to some
theories; acknowledging the somatic or sensory nature of feelings as experiences that
aren’t just cognitive concepts or constructions. I favor feeling in part because it is
Ahmed, and Whitney Bauman are salient examples. But I find that the secondary scholarship
mining similar genealogies in Deleuzian affect and materialist theories (like new materialism,
speculative realism, and object oriented ontologies) sometimes theorizes the virtual, the
posthuman, the autonomy of objects, and affects’ autonomy from the social as convenient
avenues for talking about materialist politics without wading into discussions of race, gender,
class, and ability or what I would argue are the actual daily implications of this theoretical work.
Furthermore, by characterizing these scholarly interests as “new turns,” particularly in how this
work is taken up in the blogosphere/public scholarship, some of this commentary avoids
addressing its debt to feminist and critical race theories. In a 2015 AAR panel I contributed to
addressing ecology and New Materialism, a female commentator asked a male presenter to
address some of the critiques of object-oriented ontologies coming from feminist and Chicana
theorists and he was quick to respond frustratingly that “new” scholarship like OOO cannot yet
be expected to coherently address issues like sexism and racism. For more productive
commentary see Severin Fowles’, “The Perfect Subject, (Postcolonial Object Studies)” Journal
of Material Culture 21.1 (2016) and Anthony Paul Smith’s “On the Use and Abuse of Objects
for the Environmental Humanities: Recent Books on Object-Oriented Ontologies and
Ecotheory,” https://itself.blog/2017/07/06/on-the-use-and-abuse-of-objects-for-theenvironmental-humanities-recent-books-in-object-oriented-ontology-and-ecotheory/.
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intentionally imprecise, retaining the ambiguity between feelings as embodied sensations
and feelings as psychic or cognitive experiences. It also has a vernacular quality that
lends itself to exploring feelings as something we come to know through experience and
popular usage and that indicates, perhaps only intuitively but nonetheless significantly, a
conception of mind and body as integrated. Public Feelings take seriously questions like
‘How do I feel?’ and ‘How does capitalism feel?’ as starting points for something that
might be a theory but could also be a description, an investigation, or a process. Terms
such as affect, emotion, and feeling are more like keywords, points of departure for
discussion rather than definition.
Drawing from these perspectives by using affects as a point of departure, our work in
religion and ecology might ask, what do encounters with nonhuman others feel like? Why do we
desire, or not desire, connection? When we move in certain environments how might we describe
what these spaces and places feel like? Why do some encounters resonate as positive while
others we might begin to characterize as negative, ambivalent, or repulsive? How do we come to
desire, or not desire, connection with/to places and creatures we have never physically
encountered? For new cosmology scholarship, orientations and attachments are very important
but their largest stumbling blocks regarding feelings and emotions is their insistence on
ahistorical perspectives and neutral politics. They imagine a feeling human subject without any
of the cultural differences and specificities that might shape that subject. They are chiefly
concerned with cultivating an orienting narrative that will readdress common ontological
inquiries (who are we? where do we come from? what is our purpose?) and encourage kin
attachments to creatures and habitats. But thus far this orientation toward some nonhuman others
functions by ignoring, in its lack of context, that it comes only at the expense of many
disregarded others. How/why does new cosmology affectively orient toward some bodies and
landscapes and away from others? For the remainder of the chapter I will consider these
questions primarily in conversation with Sara Ahmed’s affective work on place, space, race, and
orientation. Ahmed’s scholarship is particularly helpful here because she works at the
intersections of feminist, queer, and critical race theories to argue that emotions are cultural
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practices. Ahmed agrees with new cosmology that affective language, particularly via habitual
repetition, is social power that can shape identities and alliances but, importantly, she contends
that there are always political implications. Affects join some bodies and communities together
while separating from others. Ahmed’s work can help us begin to think about how racial and
environmental histories in the American south continue to shape affective orientations.

Encounters and Impressions
In “Collective Feelings, Or the Impressions Left by Others,” Sara Ahmed begins with
similar questions, “how do emotions work to secure collectives through the way in which they
read the bodies of others? How do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and
against other others?”394 Responsively, Ahmed argues that affects are embodied but also social
and transpersonal. “Emotions,” she writes, “play a crucial role in the ‘surfacing’ of individual
and collective bodies. Such an argument challenges any assumption that emotions are a private
matter, that they simply belong to individuals and that they come from within and then move
outwards toward others. It suggests that emotions are not simply ‘within’ or ‘without’, but that
they define the contours of the multiple worlds that are inhabited by different subjects.”395
Affects, she argues, are primarily relational and “materialization takes place through the
‘mediation’ of affect,” forming the skin of bodies and the skin of collectives. 396 Emotions work
“to create the very distinction between the inside and the outside,” she argues, and “this
separation takes place through the very movement engendered by responding to others and
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objects. Rather than locating emotion in the individual or the social, we can see that
emotionality−as a responsiveness to and openness towards the worlds of others− involves an
interweaving of the personal with the social, and the affective with the mediated.”397 For
example, she gestures to the function of skin, the surface that paradoxically connects and
separates us from one another, where skin “appears to contain us” but also where others “impress
upon us.”398 “I have an impression of others,” she writes,
but they also leave me with an impression; they impress me and impress upon me.
Indeed, we can think about impressions as the marks left by others, in which the others
might leave their mark insofar as they have already left . . . The skin may in this way
record past impressions, past encounters with others, who are others insofar as they have
already made an impression. Hence the very impression of the skin surface is itself an
effect of impressions . . . sense perception and emotion take place in what I would call the
contact zone of impressions; they involve how bodies are ‘impressed upon’ by objects
and others.399
Ahmed’s conception of “contact” goes beyond pure tactile encounter to also include the
perception of others that may or may not physically touch us as contact “involves the subject as
well as histories that come before the subject.”400
Thus, affects carry socio-historical resonances. Drawing from a lineage that includes
Deleuze, Spinoza, and what she writes is Descartes’ surprising perception that feelings “take the
‘shape’ of the contact we have with objects,” Ahmed argues that the “perception of others as
‘causing’ an emotional response is not simply my perception, but involves a form of ‘contact’
between myself and others, which is shaped by longer histories of contact.”401 Ahmed’s reads
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racism as one “particular form of intercorporeal encounter” that “depends on histories of reading
that come, as it were, ‘before’ an encounter between subject and another takes place.”402 For
example, in the “moment of contact” between a “white racist subject who encounters a racial
other” and experiences an “intensity of emotions (fear, hate, disgust, pain),” this “‘moment of
contact’ is shaped by past histories of contact, which allows the proximity of a racial other to be
perceived as threatening, at the same time as it reshapes the bodies in the contact zone of
encounter. These histories have already impressed upon the surface of the bodies at the same
time as they create new impressions.”403 In this way affects are performative as they “repeat past
associations” while “generating their object.”404 Hate, for example, “may generate the other as
the object of hate insofar as it repeats associations that already read the bodies of others as being
hateful. Indeed, the loop of the performative works powerfully: in reading the other as being
hateful, the subject is filled up with hate, as a sign of the truth of the reading.”405 I will return to
these ideas at the end of the chapter to think about how fear and hate, in responses to the Gulf
coast after Katrina, function to shape these communities and geographies as repugnant and
disposable.

402

Ibid.

403

Ibid.

404

Ibid., 32.

405

Ahmed, “Collective Feelings,” 32.

132
Affective Economies
Ahmed argues that while “emotional responses to others involve the alignment of
subjects with and against other others,”406 emotions do not “positively inhabit any-body as well
as any-thing, meaning that ‘the subject’ is simply one nodal point in the economy, rather than its
origin or destination.”407 These, what she terms, affective economies, “need to be seen as social
and material as well as psychic,” where objects, nonhuman others, environments, and
communities are caught up and intertwined within the “circulation of signs of affect” that shape
the “materialization of collective bodies.”408 Within “affective economies,” she writes,
“emotions do things, and they align individuals with communities—or bodily space with social
space—through the very intensity of their attachments.”409 Our histories, Ahmed writes, “are
bound up with attachments precisely insofar as it is a question of what sticks, of what
connections are lived as the most intense or intimate, as being closer to the skin.”410 As a stirring
demonstration of affects’ sticky associations, the viscous combination of bodies, materials, and
emotions, Ahmed draws this passage from Audre Lorde’s 1984 Sister Outsider:
The AA subway train to Harlem. I clutch my mother’s sleeve, her arms full of
shopping bags, Christmas-heavy. The wet smell of winter clothes, the train’s
lurching. My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snowsuited body down.
On one side of me a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a fur hat staring
at me. Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops down, pulling mine with
it. Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line where my new blue snow pants and her
sleek fur coat meet. She jerks her coat closer to her. I look. I do not see whatever terrible
thing she is seeing on the seat between us—probably a roach. But she has communicated
her horror to me. It must be something very bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my
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snowsuit closer to me away from it, too. When I look up the woman is still staring at me,
her nose holes and eyes huge. And suddenly I realize there is nothing crawling up the seat
between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch. The fur brushes my face as she
stands with a shudder and holds on to a strap in the speeding train. Born and bred a New
York City child, I quickly slide over to make room for my mother to sit down. No word
has been spoken. I’m afraid to say anything to my mother because I don’t know what I
have done. I look at the side of my snow pants secretly. Is there something on them?
Something’s going on here I do not understand, but I will never forget it. Her eyes. The
flared nostrils. The hate.411
“In this encounter,” Ahmed writes, “Audre Lorde ends with emotion; she ends with ‘the hate’. . .
What passes is not spoken; it is not a transparent form of communication. The sense that
something is wrong is communicated, not through words, or even sounds that are voiced, but
through the body of another, ‘her nose holes and eyes huge’. The encounter is played out on the
body, and is played out with the emotions. This bodily encounter, while ending with ‘the hate’,
also ends with the reconstitution of bodily space. The bodies that come together, that almost
touch and co-mingle, slide away from each other, becoming relived in their apartness.”412 The
white woman’s disgust and Lorde’s confusion shape the resonance of the space conveying what
is and is not appropriate, what is and is not acceptable, in the eyes of white culture. Their bodies
“move apart” and allow for the “redefinition of social as well as bodily integrity” with the
emotion of hate aligning “the particular white body with the bodily form of the community— the
emotion functions to substantiate the threat of invasion and contamination in the body of a
particular other who comes to stand for and stand in for, the other as such.”413 In other words,
“the hate encounter aligns not only the ‘I’ with the ‘we’ (the white body, the white nation), but
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the ‘you’ with the ‘them’ (the black body, Black people).”414 In the narrative, Lorde’s
“misperception” of the cause of the woman’s embodied disgust “creates an object. The object—
the roach—comes to stand for, or stand in for, the cause of ‘the hate’. The roach crawls up
between them; the roach, as the carrier of dirt, divides the two bodies, forcing them to move
apart.”415 Audre also recoils but realizes it is she, herself, that is “the ‘it’ that stands between the
possibility of their clothes touching. She becomes the roach— the impossible and phobic
object— that threatens to crawl from one to the other.”416 The circulation of affects in the
moving train (disgust, hate, confusion, and fear) “brings others and objects into existence; hate
slides between different signs and objects whose existence is bound up with the negation of its
travel. So Audre becomes the roach that is imagined as the cause of the hate . . . It is not simply
that any body is hated: particular histories are re-opened in each encounter, such that some
bodies are already read as more hateful than other bodies,” and what sticks remains, an
amalgamation of disgust, cockroaches, and racists impressions of and upon black bodies.417
Keeping Ahmed’s work on affective impressions, economies, encounters and events in mind, I
will return again to histories of black bodies regarded as animal others at the end of this chapter.
But Ahmed’s reading of what is happening in this train space clearly demonstrates what, in her
later work, she calls “the drama of contingency,” that affects rise to the surface in relation, beingwith and directed-toward others within what she terms “the messiness of the experiential, the
unfolding of bodies into worlds”418 Events, Ahmed argues, encounters between our bodies and
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the bodies of others like the tense amalgamation of black and white bodies on the train, “have
backgrounds,” backgrounds that explain “the conditions of emergence” for what plays out in
these encounters.419

Affective Mapping
The social movement of affects in Ahmed’s scholarship helps us understand not only the
importance of feelings and emotions in the surfacing of bodies and collectives, I/we in intimate
and perhaps agitating proximity with you/them, but how space, place, environments, and objects
are similarly affectively charged. In her text Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects,
Others, Ahmed performs feminist, queer, and critical race readings of classic works in
phenomenology and spatial theory, scholarship from Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Henri Lefebvre. Here, Ahmed offers a queer phenomenological
reading of “orientation” that is helpful for understanding that affinities and attachments, while
often assumed to be rational choices (or at least in the case of new cosmology choices made in
line with our ancestral proclivities) carry situated and complex affective social investments.
Paying particular attention to the “orientation” in sexual orientation, and the “orient” in
orientalism, Ahmed considers how “spatial orientations (relations to proximity and distance) are
shaped by other social orientations, such as gender and class, that affect ‘what’ comes into view,
but also are not simply given, as they are effects of the repetition of actions over time.”420
Furthermore, she argues, compulsory heterosexuality and racism “‘orientates’ bodies in specific
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ways,” where “different orientations, different ways of directing one’s desire, means inhabiting
different worlds.”421
“The starting point for orientation,” Ahmed writes, “is the point from which the world
unfolds: the ‘here’ of the body and the ‘where’ of its dwelling. Orientations, then, are about the
intimacy of bodies and their dwelling places.”422 Reading Merleau-Ponty, Ahmed writes the
“body provides us with a perspective,” but the:
‘here’ of the body does not simply refer to the body, but to ‘where’ the body dwells. The
‘here’ of bodily dwelling is thus what takes the body outside of itself, as it is affected and
shaped by its surroundings: the skin that seems to contain the body is also where the
atmosphere creates an impression; just think of goose bumps, textures on the skin
surface, as body traces of the coldness in the air. Bodies may become oriented in this
responsiveness to the world around them, given this capacity to be affected. In turn, given
the history of such responses, which accumulate as impressions on the skin, bodies do not
dwell in spaces that are exterior but rather are shaped by their dwellings and take shape
by dwelling.423
Inhabiting spaces, becoming familiar, “involves orientation devices,” Ahmed continues, “ways
of extending bodies into spaces that create new folds, or new contours of what we could call
livable or inhabitable space” but if “orientation is about making the strange familiar through the
extension of bodies into space, then disorientation occurs when that extension fails. Or we could
say that some spaces extend certain bodies and simply do not leave room for others.”424 We
know from the work of Nigel Thrift, Edward Soja, and Cindi Katz that space is not a neutral
container but is “dynamic and lived” and through attending to “orientation,” we can recognize
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that space is dynamic via the body being “directed in some ways more than others.”425 What
comes to be regarded as “normative” ways to inhabit bodies and worlds are an “effect of the
repetition of bodily actions over time, which produces what we can call the bodily horizon, a
space for action, which puts some objects and not others in reach.”426 It is not simply that bodies
“have a direction, or that they follow directions,” Ahmed argues, rather, “in moving this way,
rather than that, and moving in this way again and again, the surfaces of bodies in turn acquire
their shape. Bodies are ‘directed,’ and they take the shape of this direction.”427
When we follow directions, Ahmed writes, we seem to “arrive, as if by magic” so that the
“work of arrival is forgotten in the very feeling that the arrival is magic” but “the work involves
following directions” and we will “arrive when we have followed them properly: bad readings
just won’t get us there.”428 However, “following a line is not disinterested,” she writes, “to
follow a line takes time, energy, and resources, which means that the ‘line’ one takes does not
stray apart from the line of one’s life as the very shape of how one moves through time and
space.”429 Following directions, following lines to arrival, also takes social investment. “Such
investments,” Ahmed argues, “‘promise’ return (if we follow this line, then ‘this’ or ‘that’ will
follow), which might sustain the very will to keep going. Through such investments in the
promise of return, subjects reproduce the lines that they follow.”430 What comes to matter, what

425

Ibid., 12-15

426

Ibid., 66.

427

Ibid., 15-16.

428

Ibid., 16-17.

429

Ibid., 17.

430

Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology, 70.

138
garners and rewards value, are those objects, bodies, and behaviors that invest in and reproduce
these lines. For example, Ahmed considers sexuality in terms of “‘having an orientation, which
itself is understood as being ‘directed’ in one way or another . . . sexual desire orientates the
subject toward some others (and by implication not other others) by establishing a line or
direction” so that the “direction one takes makes some others available as objects to be
desired.”431 We could view sexuality where “being directed toward the same sex or the other
sex” is traveling along different lines.”432 However, because “heterosexuality as an orientation
toward ‘the other sex’” is regarded as normative, bodies are required to “follow a straight line
whereby straightness gets attached to other values including decent, conventional, direct, and
honest” that reward and value those bodies following that line and regard bodies with
homosexual desires as aberrant deviations from the straight line.433 Adrienne Rich’s work on
compulsory heterosexuality is helpful here, Ahmed argues, because it demonstrates that a “set of
institutional practices” require “men and women to be heterosexual” so one is required to
become straight, to participate in the “fantasy of a natural orientation . . . that organizes worlds
around the form of the heterosexual couple, as if it were from this ‘point’ that the world
unfolds.” 434 These “orientations are binding,” she writes, “as they bind objects together.”435
Following the heterosexual family line, “subjects are required to ‘tend toward’ some
objects and not others as a condition of familial as well as social love” 436 and these objects: the
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opposite sex, heterosexual reproduction, familial inheritance, particular approaches to happiness,
love, and care, styles, “capacities, aspirations, techniques,” and the materials that facilitate and
reward this way of being, are infused with affective power as a social good.437 Heterosexuality is
an “effect of how objects gather to clear a ground, how objects are arranged to create a
background” where repeated actions over time, investment in these lines of being, make this line
normative—just how things are, a “given.”438 We can see that the “‘tending toward’ certain
objects and not others . . . produces what we would call ‘straight tendencies’,” Ahmed writes, “a
way of acting in the world that presumes the heterosexual couple as a social gift” allowing the
“straight body, and the heterosexual couple, to extend into space” affectively shaping spaces,
bodies, and objects in ways that others are not allowed.439 For example, Ahmed gestures to Gill
Valentine who writes, “heterosexual desires congeal over time to produce the appearance that the
street is normally a heterosexual space” so homosexual ways of being seem out of place,
deviations from the straight line, improper, threatening, and made to feel unsafe for other ways of
being.440
Like compulsory heterosexuality, whiteness functions similarly to diminish some bodies’
capacity to move within and reach beyond these lines of social investment. Ahmed, reading
Frantz Fanon’s scholarship describing “the lived experience of being the object of the hostile
white gaze,” writes that Fanon’s work demonstrates how histories of colonialism render
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whiteness as background.441 Racism “‘stops’ black bodies inhabiting space by extending through
objects and others; the familiarity of the ‘white world,’ as a world we know implicitly,
‘disorients’ black bodies such that they cease to know where to find things— reduced as they are
to things among things.” 442 This “disorientation affected by racism diminishes capacities for
action” for “if the world is made white, then the body at home is one that can inhabit
whiteness.”443 Racist histories shape the surfaces of bodies and collectives, orienting them in
specific directions and “such forms of orientation are crucial to how bodies inhabit space, and to
the racialization of bodily as well as social space.”444 Bodies, Ahmed writes, remember these
histories even if we attempt to forget them so in a way, “race does become a social as well as
bodily given, or what we receive from others as an inheritance of this history.”445 To be
inheritors of whiteness is to “become invested in the line of whiteness: it is both to participate in
it and to transform the body into a ‘part’ of it, as if each body is another ‘point’ that accumulates
to extend the line. Whiteness becomes a social inheritance; in receiving whiteness as a gift, white
bodies—or those bodies that can be recognized as white bodies—come to ‘possess’ whiteness as
if it were a shared attribute.”446 This inheritance, that is both embodied and historical, is
“‘always already’ there, before our arrival . . . a world shaped by colonial histories, which affect

441

Ibid., 111.

442

Ibid.

443

Ibid.

444

Ibid.

445

Ibid.

446

Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology, 125.

141
not simply how maps are drawn, but the kinds of orientations we have towards objects and
others.”447
In her phenomenological reading of race, Ahmed argues that “spaces acquire the shape of
the bodies that ‘inhabit’ them,” via our bodily habits, in particular she underscores whiteness as a
“bad habit,” tendencies that we inherit that “allow some bodies to take up space by restricting the
mobility of others.”448 Like compulsory heterosexuality, Ahmed and Linda Alcoff suggest “race
might be understood as a matter of the ‘behind,’” with race functioning as the concealed
backdrop for “social action and the promise of social mobility.”449 Whiteness as background
goes “unnoticed” in encounters with objects, goods, spaces, places, and others that whiteness
assumes are an extension of its skins/way of being.450 White bodies “do not have to face their
whiteness; they are not orientated ‘toward’ it, and this ‘not’ is what allows whiteness to cohere,
as that which bodies are orientated around” shaping both spaces and the bodies that inhabit
them.451 Furthermore, whiteness as an institution affectively produces collective and public
spaces as white norms. For example, Ahmed and Nirmal Puwar describe the strange out-ofplaceness nonwhite bodies feel in academic spaces: “black feminists walk into the room and I
notice that they were not there before, as a retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already
inhabited. I look around and reencounter the sea of whiteness. Whiteness is only invisible for
those who inhabit it, or for those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it,
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even when they are not it.”452 Spaces, Ahmed presses, “are oriented ‘around’ whiteness,” the
“institutionalization of a certain ‘likeness,’ which makes nonwhite bodies uncomfortable and feel
exposed, visible, and different when they take up this space.”453 Like compulsory
heterosexuality, while whiteness functions as unrecognized background its reproduction requires
work, lines of investment, repetitions “made over time,” that shape spaces and encounters.454
Returning to Fanon’s phenomenology of black bodies, Fanon positions whiteness as a
“bodily form of privilege: the ability to move through the world without losing one’s way. To be
black or not white in ‘the white world’ is to turn back toward oneself, to become an object,
which means not only not being extended by the contours of the world, but being diminished as
an effect of the bodily extensions of others.”455 If white bodies are the assumed universal, “if to
be human is to be white, then to be not white is to inhabit the negative: it is to be ‘not.’”456
Ahmed reads the “experiences of a black man in a white world” as “the loss of orientation, as the
body becomes an object alongside others. The experience is one of nausea, and the crisis of
losing one’s place in the world, as a loss of something that one has yet to be given.”457 Fanon’s
phenomenology, Ahmed writes, “could be described in terms of the bodily and social experience
of restriction, uncertainty, and blockage, or perhaps even in terms of the despair of the utterance
‘I cannot.’”458 “For bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social,” Ahmed writes:
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bodily movement is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping is an action
that creates its own impressions. Who are you? Why are you here? What are you doing?
Each question, when asked, is a kind of stopping device: you are stopped by being asked
the question, just as asking the question requires you to be stopped. A phenomenology of
‘being stopped’ might take us in a different direction than one that begins with motility,
with a body that ‘can do’ by flowing into space. To stop involves many meanings: to
cease, to end, and also to cut off, to arrest, to check, to prevent, to block, to obstruct, or to
close. Black activism has shown us how policing involves a differential economy of
stopping: some bodies more than others are ‘stopped’ by being the object of the
policeman’s address. The ‘hey you’ is not here addressed to the body that can inherit the
ego ideal of an organization, or who can be recruited to follow a given life, but to the
body that cannot be recruited, to the body that is ‘out of place’ in this place. In other
words, the ‘unrecruitable’ body must still be ‘recruited’ into this place, in part through the
very repetition of the action of ‘being stopped’ as a mode of address . . . Stopping is
therefore a political economy that is distributed unevenly between others, and it is also an
affective economy that leaves its impressions, affecting the bodies that are subject to its
address.459
By habitually investing in a neutral affective subject, one that needs not wrestle with
exposure, violence, disorientation, and restriction in their affinities and attachments, new
cosmology champions the white subject as universal.460 Through their insistence on a single
narrative, a body unshaped by difference, and normative affective encounters/relationships with
nonhuman others, new cosmology ignores differences in experience and encounter that do not fit
into its vision and therefore continually reinvest in: whiteness as an institution, objects and
desires only available to white bodies, and spaces/places/encounters that whiteness deems
valuable. The urgent teachings of the Black Lives Matter movement, a social movement focusing
on the prevalence of state-sanctioned anti-black violence, demonstrate that stopping as a
technology of racism affirms and reproduces whiteness as an institution by materially and
affectively shaping all spaces as improper objects for black bodies. Black bodies are not safe
from institutional violence as children or adults, in their homes, schools, or social gatherings,
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parks or neighborhoods, legally armed or unarmed. Black bodies in all places are subject to
stopping leaving no home for black bodies. While white bodies can ignore these realities and
move unawares through space and toward objects of desire, black bodies must remain
hyperaware of these continual restrictions in the hopes, often blighted, of safety. As the affective
encounter between young Audre and the white woman on the train demonstrates, the white
woman assumes all the space on the train is within her reach, appropriately her space, while
Audre comes to understand through the circulations of affects within this intimate space that her
body is expected to remain restricted—not too close to whiteness, preferably not near at all.
While new cosmology authors argue humans grapple with alienation in the “natural” world
without a single reorienting narrative, they have not considered how this narrative they have
constructed further alienates black bodies through solidifying whiteness and its freedoms as the
unrecognized background of new cosmology’s vision. Whiteness as background for
environmental theory is, of course, not unique to new cosmology environmentalism but the
continuation of inherited legacies. In the next chapter, I will explore how whiteness as
background is worked into the very fabric of American religious environmentalism to prepare for
developing ways to resist habituating these same affective habits.
Before moving to think further about affective relationships with nonhuman others, it is
important to understand what work in affect theory, particularly Sara Ahmed’s scholarship,
teaches us about affinity and attachment. In summary, affects arise in encounters with one
another and these encounters are preceded by particular histories that we both embody and
promulgate through our habitual movements. Affinities and attachments are neither neutral nor
ahistorical as our bodies inherit lines of social investment that determine how we are able to
move (or not move) through the world, which places/spaces/bodies/environments we can and
should care for and about, what futures are possible. Describing these lines of social investment
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in the context of geography and environmental psychology, Jonathan Flatley calls our “range of
intentions, beliefs, desires, moods, and affective attachments” that we carry and shape our social
environments— affective mapping.461 “These emotional valences,” Flatley writes, cohere to
geographical spaces whether they are experienced personally or not.462 For example, Flately
describes living in Detroit and getting the sense that:
some people in the suburbs who have not crossed over the city limits for years carry
around with them a map on which Detroit is a large, hazily defined space, but a space
clearly marked by some mixture of fear, anxiety, sorrow, and nostalgia. They avoid
Detroit not because of poor urban planning or a lack of landmarks but because of the
emotions they have associated with the city space of Detroit . . . For in all likelihood the
person from the suburbs of whom I write is white, and Detroit is largely African
American, and this split is of course overwritten by a class divide, so emotions about
Detroit as a space are, for these suburban residents, inevitably also emotions about class
and ‘race’ and racism.463
Of course, Ahmed would argue whiteness as background affectively shapes all spaces/places, not
just Detroit or the Gulf Coast, but it is important to follow these lines of social investment,
examine how we are oriented toward and against others, to trace this affective mapping, in order
to better understand why environmental scholarship has affinities-with and attachments-to
certain environments and not others, certain bodies but not others. Working in cultural studies,
Lawrence Grossberg calls these structures of affective investment mattering maps, an
organization of affects that “makes possible certain objects of investment (what we can care
about) and certain modes of investment (how we can care about such things)” determining not
only our investments but “the very practices of investment.”464 Mattering maps, Grossberg
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writes, “define not only what sites (practices, effects, structures) matter but how they matter. And
they construct a lived coherence for those enclosed within their spaces.”465 These formations of
affiliation: lines of investment, affective mapping, mattering maps, Grossberg argues, are
cultural apparatuses that “actualize specific configurations of belonging;” affective articulations
that “actualize value, enabling it to be effective in the lived world.”466 As Ahmed saliently
illustrates with heterosexuality and whiteness as background, lines of investment function as
“apparatuses of other-ing” that both unite and divide us by determining the inside and the
outside, us and them.467
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Chapter Four
Affecting Environmental Imaginaries
“After my initial journeys back home, following Katrina, I stay away for a long time, though my
grandmother asked again and again to make the trip. I know I can’t live there anymore, she’d
say. I just want to see it one more time. For three years I kept putting her off—saying one day—
so that, at ninety-two she could at least hold onto the hope of getting there. I never considered the
consequences of this tactic, how it might haunt me later. When I started going back more often, it
was because I had to, and by then it was too late. It occurs to me now that I had been waiting,
foolishly, for the recovery to be complete. I had wanted to show her the place she’d spent her life
without the narrative of destruction still inscribed on the landscape.” Natasha Trethewey, Beyond
Katrina: Meditation on the Mississippi Gulf Coast468
“The fisheries closures continue expanding. Now totaling 88,522 square miles. About 37 perfect
of the Gulf’s federal waters. Federal waters begin three miles from shore, but most states waters
are also closed. More than half the Gulf remains open to fishing, but buyers are canceling orders.
‘I’ve had guys saying, ‘If it’s from the Gulf, we don’t want it,’’ says a New York City seafood
distributor. The celebrity chef says, “People are really wondering if we’re getting safe fish.’ In
Chicago and elsewhere, restaurants display signs declaring, ‘Our Seafood Is Not From the Gulf
of Mexico.’ ‘They believe it’s toxic,’ a New York chef says. ‘So let me be clear,’ says the
president of the United States. ‘Seafood from the Gulf today is safe to eat.’ The New Orleans
sales rep who ships fish nationwide says, ‘They’re not ordering anything. Not a one. They know
we’re not selling tainted fish. But their customers? No way. They don’t want seafood from
Louisiana at all.’” Carl Safina, A Sea in Flames469
In the previous chapter I traced how compulsory heterosexuality/whiteness are the
backgrounds that determine normative ways of being by facilitating space for some bodies but
not others, allowing some objects to be desired but not others. However, these are not the only
affective lines of investment we negotiate. Religious thought and practice function similarly. In
order to understand new cosmology’s affective investments, it is necessary to understand the
mattering map of American environmental thought that new cosmologists have inherited and
pass on. These investments, I argue, shape which places, spaces, bodies, and communities
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matter, which affinities and attachments seem possible. By examining how fear shapes
devastated landscapes, in this chapter I draw material feminisms, affect theory, and religion and
ecology into productive conversation to argue that advocating for awe, wonder, and reverence as
the ideal affective relationships humans should have with nonhuman others is ignorant of both
the functions of affect and the histories of inherited racist oppression and environmental injustice
that shape these landscapes, bodies, and encounters.
While he does not utilize the language of affect theory nor speak at length about race, I
read Evan Berry’s text Devoted to Nature: The Religious Roots of American Environmentalism
to be positioning the whiteness of our inherited American Protestant environmental imaginary as
a similarly concealed background. First, I will outline some of Berry’s arguments then discuss
what his work reveals about the affective legacies new cosmology inherits and reproduces. Berry
argues that “American environmentalism was grounded in a vision that linked nature with
spiritual redemption,” a “particular approach to human flourishing” that attempted to address the
increasing exploitation of nonhuman nature yet also “recapitulated the racist and sexist
ideologies prevalent in turn-of-the-century Protestant America.”470 Furthermore, Berry contends
that our inherited “mentalities that characterize the environmental imagination have not been
radically overturned by the articulation of a coherent scientific frame for ecological issues,”
despite the tendency of scholarship to frame environmental theory in the 19th and 20th centuries,
and its developing fascinations with evolution, ecology, and outdoor recreation, as increasingly
secular.471 American environmentalism is better understood, Berry contends, as a “synthesis of
religious ideas and scientific knowledge,” a fusion of Progressive era Protestant,
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transcendentalist, and romantic conceptions of nonhuman nature as a potent wellspring for
redemptive experiences nurtured through “social practices intended to reconnect individuals with
the forces of nature as a means to moral improvement and spiritual renewal.”472
Precursors to modern environmental movements, Progressive Era conservation and
nature organizations like the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and the
Boy Scouts of America, functioned as conduits “for metaphysical and soteriological ideas about
the natural world.”473 Anxious about social concerns like urbanization, industrialization, and
immigration, and influenced by the “romantic insistence on the spiritual benefits of outdoor
recreation,”474 they “sought to address social ills by yoking the spiritual power of nature,” in the
hopes that increased exposure to outdoor spaces through healthful recreation475 and public
planning/landscape architecture476 could “cure the moral decay brought about by the pressures of
urban life.”477 The nation’s “religious vernacular,” Berry writes, also “borrowed on the
redemptive capacity of nature,” with a “push toward more muscular expressions of Christian
faith” practiced through camp meetings and outdoor revivals.478 “Championed by Evangelical
circuit preachers like Billy Sunday” this vision of Christianity “asserted that America needed
Christian discipline and a Protestant work ethic in order to rise to the challenge of
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modernization.”479 Although optimism about the “redemptive power of industriousness” has
always been a “central tenet of American religious life,” masculine/muscular forms of
Christianity at the time paid “special attention to the relationship between the individual and
society,” arguing “the Christian faith could and should be harnessed to effectively manage
business and social affairs in the face of mounting social pressure,” particularly the “perceived
decline” of a “predominantly agrarian economy.”480 These organizations, particularly those with
a youth-focus, championed their ability to provide “wholesome, character building activities,”
that would “establish lasting institutional structures that engendered the same kinds of
wholesome character traits as had (the perhaps mythical) life on the farm.”481 These groups laid
the groundwork, Berry contends, for the “social structures that shape middle-class American
ideas about childhood (youth sports leagues, playgrounds, summer camp, etc.)” and drew
“heavily on ideas about the salvific capacities of nature.”482
As celebrations of agrarian life morphed “into a post-frontier vernacular in which
uninhabited landscapes, rather than farms, were identified as the source of moral vitality,”
wilderness replaced nature as the “heart of recreational enterprise” and social ideal.483 Nature had
been “the intellectual apparatus by which Emerson’s generation and understood the
transcendental organization of the cosmos,” Berry writes,
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but by the time John Muir and John Burroughs had become preeminent American authors
concerned with the preservation of natural beauty, the wilderness ideal had moved to the
forefront of the American environmental imagination. Wilderness, for this generation of
thinkers and writers, was not primarily an ecological category, as it would become during
subsequent decades. It emerged first as a spatial category necessary to the quest for
spiritual purity in nature: ‘wilderness coalesced first as a social ideal, not the
environmental ideal that distinguishes it today . . . During the decades that the national
parks system was built up, neither managers nor bureaucrats made much of an effort to
‘define what it meant to maintain natural conditions.’ Even as advocates began to agitate
for more rigorous schemes to protect wilderness areas, the very idea of wilderness
remained an abstract philosophical concept independent of rigorous scientific scrutiny.484
“Wilderness” captured the “realm of the natural world that embodied radical alterity and
afforded transcendental experience” focusing more on the “soteriological benefits of nature than
on the intrinsic value of plants, animals, and ecosystemic functioning.”485 This “decidedly
anthropocentric” conception of wilderness as a social ideal “oriented a cultic sensibility about
nature,” emphasizing the “total absence of metropolitan influence,” a necessary counter to “the
psychic and moral disruptions of ‘mechanization.’”486 Journeys to wilderness, “like the
multiweek outings organized by the Sierra Club, Mountaineers Club, and Appalachian Trail
club,” promised to “strip away ‘the veneer of civilization. The rough, hard country, the constant
nearness of nature, the full dependency on yourself and your meager resources . . . force upon
you a new feeling which you cannot have elsewhere.’”487 Wilderness as an ideal, in
“retrospective admiration for frontier experience,” captured many of the “basic virtues cherished
in particular by Americans,” such as “self-sufficiency, ingenuity, camaraderie, and fortitude.”488
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It is this “fusion of agrarian sentimentalism, romantic naturalism, and Progressive
conservationism,” Berry argues, that “is the true genesis of the environmental movement.”489
“As the wilderness ideal took shape,” Berry writes, “there were robust debates among its
exponents,” like Muir, Robert Marshall, and Aldo Leopold, “about whether wilderness was to be
appreciated for its utility or for its aesthetic and spiritual qualities (and whether these qualities
were themselves a kind of utility.)”490 These voices were influential in increasing American
understanding that their environment was becoming rapidly degraded. Muir, Marshall, and
Leopold argued that to push back “against the mechanism and reductionism of scientific
forestry” they needed to “put the professionalism and effective techniques of scientific
conservation to a higher purpose, toward the protection of those landscapes by which Americans
could continue to cultivate the ‘spirit of the wilderness.’”491 While wilderness preservationists
were committed to resisting the refrain that American resources, in the form of forests and
wildlife, were inexhaustible, the movement’s luminaries also shared an “unambiguous
commitment to the spiritual significance of their cause” describing their love of nature as a
“spiritual vocation and linked measures to protect outdoor recreation in an economy of spiritual
goods.”492 “Nature spirituality has no more celebrated figure than John Muir,” Berry writes, and
while “environmental historians still struggle to classify and describe Muir’s religious views,
labeling his asystematic writings as ‘secular pantheism,’ ‘transcendentalism,’ and ‘postProtestant,’” Berry sees Muir’s reverence of wilderness more in line with his theological
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contemporaries.493 Muir’s “unique brand of mystical ecospirituality,” Berry writes, utilized
Christianity as a “springboard” toward harmonizing “theological ethics with a post-Darwinian
view of the position of human beings in the natural order” threads that will later be taken up by
Lynn White and the new cosmology movement.494 Berry reads “Muir’s assertion that wildness
was the fundamental source and site for human redemption,” as drawing directly from Christian
soteriology, creating a “theological vision in which people in modern societies were afforded—
by the grace of God’s creative magnanimity—natural temples in which to redeem their depraved
natures. The prophetic message of repentance was straightforwardly transformed into a
preservationist morality: ‘his writings never lost their message of repentance from the sins of
over-civilization, baptism in wilderness, and ejection of the money-changers from the mountain
temples.’”495 Muir, and other preservationists of the period leading up to the Second World War,
directed humans to know the wilderness and come to love it as they loved it. Spiritual rhetoric
coupled with wilderness preservation permeated the American spiritual imagination through
“foresters, policy makers, local activists, journalists, preachers, and professors eagerly”
discussing how the “nation ought to think about, enjoy, and protect the natural environment,” for
its “salvific potential,” offer of moral cleansing, and ability to “repair the damages of a life of
urban industrial alienation.”496
Attachment to these particular conceptions of the value and potential of nonhuman nature
solidified through affinities with particular materials, those natural formations and places that
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resonated with the grandeur of a salvific narrative. Twentieth century nature writers, drawing
from and reshaping a “theology of immanence” (divine dwelling or manifestation in the material
world) reconceived mountains and forests, “once monstrosities of the medieval Christian
imagination,”497 as “objects of affection and wonder.” 498 “Far from being spaces of
bewitchment, mountains and forests became key symbols of beauty, healthfulness, and power in
American environmental thought” and a “robust system of national parks” formed around the
“protection of mountain landscapes” as reserves for “untrammeled nature for the pleasure of the
nation.”499 Publications devoted to nature proclaimed mountains and alpine forests as “sacred,
transformative spaces” that were imbued with “their own intrinsic power500 to affect the lives of
humans wandering among them” if humans kept an “open heart and an open mind” toward
“absorbing” their profound benefits.”501 Rhetoric about “the primal impulse of the human spirit
to journey among mountain wilderness” was prevalent within nature enthusiast writings, as well
as the what we might now call affective conviction that the deeper meanings hidden within these
sacred sites “was sometimes too profound for verbal expression.”502 Through 1920’s and ‘30s car
culture affinity for these places, and attachment to these encounters as personal and social good,
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became ubiquitous for middle class Americans who were able to drive to and through these
landscapes.503 This nurtured spirit of wanderlust, cultivated desires for particular experiences
with nonhuman others as manifestations of the good life (social, spiritual, and healthful goods),
solidified this “imagined purity of undeveloped landscapes” in our geographic imagination,
recapitulating Genesis narratives in which “natural splendor is shattered by moral rupture and
followed by a desire to return to the primordial order.”504
The irony, as Berry articulates, is that “establishing uninhabited landscapes” as the center
of the American environmental imaginary was only possible via white settlers “displacing native
communities and economies with successive waves of development.”505 This material
displacement was “deeply tied to racialized ideas about the ecological Indian and the noble
savage, ideas that obscure the real impact of white settlement.”506 Ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant
and environmental historians Kevin Deluca and Anne Demo point out that while formulating
wilderness as an ideal, wilderness advocates like Muir and Samuel Bowles denigrated the natives
they encountered on the land as part of this process of “whitening the wilderness.”507 In his bestselling 1868 The Parks and Mountains of Colorado: A summer Vacation in the Switzerland of
America, Bowles justified Indian displacement writing, “we know they are not our equals . . . we
know that our right to the soil, as a race capable of its superior improvement, is above theirs . . .
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let us act directly and openly our faith . . . Let us say [to the Indian] . . . you are our ward, our
child, the victim of our destiny, ours to displace, ours to protect.”508 “At the same time that parks
and wilderness were being reconstructed as white and pure for the benefit of white tourists,”
Merchant writes, “Indians were being characterized as dark and dirty.”509 In his My First
Summer in the Sierra (1911), Muir “wrote disparagingly of the Indians he encountered there,
equating Indians with unclean animals that did not belong in the wilderness.”510 Encountering a
“band of Indians from Mono collecting acorns on their way to Yosemite,”511 Muir writes, “they
were wrapped in blankets made of the skins of sage-rabbits. The dirt on some of their faces
seemed old enough and thick enough to have a geological significance . . . How glad I was to get
away from the gray, grim crowd and see them vanish down the trail!”512 While configuring
national parks as “Edens containing beautiful scenery, rivers, animals, flowering trees, and
carpets of wildflowers,” Muir513 and others, “continually contrasted Indians with wilderness,
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writing of them as polar opposites to the pristine lands.”514 Writing on encountering a native
woman, Muir remarks, “her dress was calico rags, far from clean. In every way she seemed sadly
unlike Nature’s neat well-dressed animals, though living like them on the bounty of the
wilderness. Strange that mankind alone is dirty. Had she been clad in fur or cloth woven of grass
or shreddy bark, she might then have seemed a rightful part of the wilderness; like a good wolf at
least, or bear.”515 Whether tying them to the land as animals or separating them from aweinducing wilderness as too savage, the “myth of pristine wilderness,” DeLuca and Demo write,
“is founded on the erasure of the humanity, presence, and history of Native Americans.”516
This vision of American environmentalism revolving around pristine unpeopled
landscapes “was publicly enshrined in the 1964 Wilderness Act,” as environmental dogma that
expressed hopes to return the land to its “‘original conditions—as witnessed by the first white
settlers.’”517 Berry concludes his text by arguing the Christian roots of American
environmentalism, those lasting arguments “that individuals can and should be brought into
conformity with an immutable, beneficent natural order” found within a conception of nature as
“fundamentally good and the reciprocal idea that human beings are inherently ecologically
destructive,” continue to run deep within contemporary environmental thought. What resonated
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in the Progressive Era as affectively powerful and beneficial about “nature,” is echoed
wholeheartedly by new cosmology texts. Attachment to particular portions of nonhuman nature
as powerful, possessing the ability to strike us with awe and wonder as well as the power to
reshape our habits if we are really paying attention, is a feature of early environmentalism as
well as the center of new cosmology thought. Furthermore, we can also see that new
cosmology’s reliance on sacralized science to provide the kinship links between humans and
nonhuman others it argues were uncoupled by religious belief is not without precedent but a
continuation of the ideas that germinated the environmental movement. “Insofar as these ideas
have dominated American public discourse about the environment,” Berry writes, “theological
tradition has set a boundary condition for the environmental imagination.”518 The dependence on
conceptions of nature as removed, ideal, “set apart from humanity” has “impoverished our
capacity to think about ecosystems as communities inhabited by people.”519
Our impoverishment, though, is much deeper than Berry conveys. Drawing from what I
outlined in the previous chapter, it is clear that our dependence on the ontologically
compartmentalized conception of human/nonhuman others in American Protestant
environmentalism makes it incredibly difficult to address the blurring necessitated by
environmental disaster and degradation—how nature is recalcitrant to our desires and can, even
when we do not desire shaping, shape us materially and affectively. Furthermore, our inherited
environmental imaginary serves as a troubling line of affective investment that makes possible
the recognition and preservation of only particular environmental objects: unpeopled landscapes,
ideal environments, and those creatures/environments with certain affective payoffs. The
mattering map of American Protestant environmentalism invests in and facilitates upwardly
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mobile access to particular conceptions of “nature,” wilderness spaces and their nonhuman
inhabitants, as moral and spiritual goods that can redeem our depravity and reset us via spiritual
reconnection. For contemporary environmental thinkers, these inheritances affectively shape
what objects we continue to gravitate toward as well as the “appropriate” ways we should relate
to and experience them—a persuasive example of this legacy motivates new cosmology’s
interest in grandiose spaces, those with transcendent potential to invoke awe/wonder/reverence.
Our habitual gravitation to these particular habitats and nonhuman others, however, comes at the
expense of those bodies and places that are barred from inclusion in this mattering map.
Thinking of our American Protestant environmental imagination as a troubling line of
affective investment becomes even more compelling when paired with the perspectives of those
who are not inheritors of this line. What Berry actually describes is not the birth of an
environmental movement that was caught up in the problematic racial politics of the era, I argue,
but the birth of the environmental movement as a line of white investment520 that is foreclosed to
the bodies and environmental imaginaries of people of color. In her formative research Black
Faces, White Spaces: Reimagining the Relationship of African Americans to the Great Outdoors,
Carolyn Finney argues that the “lack of comprehensive studies addressing the nature of a black
environmental imaginary” hinders our understandings of how African Americans negotiate a
“conflicted environmental history and a contemporary environmental experience that appears to
ignore them.”521 Whiteness as background facilitates American environmentalism with a
universal narrative, obscuring that many bodies (female, nonwhite, queer, disabled, immigrant)
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carry alternative environmental histories that shape their encounters and attachments. Finney’s
work challenges universal narratives arguing we must recognize “our unhealthy relationships
with the natural environment are intimately linked to our unhealthy relationships with each
other.”522
During the period Berry reads as the birth of contemporary environmental thought, a
significant number of events impacting African Americans shaped a very different black
environmental imaginary. The Emancipation Proclamation and Homestead Act initially allowed
“approximately forty thousand freedmen to receive four hundred thousand acres of abandoned
Confederate land” and the 1865 congressional Freedmen’s Bureau was formed to “supervise and
manage all abandoned and confiscated land in the South and to assign tracts of land to former
slaves.”523 In 1866, however, “former white owners of the land, who were pardoned after the
war, began to pressure President Andrew Johnson to allow their land to be returned to them,”
fearful that “black landowners and farmers would start to accumulate wealth and power in the
South.”524 In response to their requests, in 1866 Congress defeated the portion of the Freedmen’s
Bureau Act that “gave it the authority to assign land to former slaves, and president Johnson
ordered all land titles rescinded. The freedmen were forced off their newly acquired land, and it
was returned to former white plantation owners.”525 While Muir was giving influential lectures in
the 1870s on forest preservation and “revering the ‘pristine-ness’ of nature,” black men and
women were continually negotiating their relationships with the landscapes they were once
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forced to cultivate, owned for a brief moment, and then had torn from them.526 In the 1880s,
while Gifford Pinchot and Muir’s conservation ideologies influenced President Theodore
Roosevelt to take an interest in forestry and eventually sanction the creation of the National Park
Service, significant pieces of legislation527 were “enacted to limit both movement and
accessibility for African Americans, as well as American Indians, Chinese, and other nonwhite
peoples in the United States.”528 As American environmentalism was forming its orientation, this
legislation coupled with “numerous race-related massacres of African Americans: two hundred
in Louisiana in 1868; nine in North Carolina in 1898; and seventy in Colfax, Louisiana in 1873,”
solidified “nature” as an inappropriate object of desire for black bodies.529
What lies beneath denying African Americans access to land and nature leisure, however,
is more insidious than the fear of the social power of black landowners. While “many modernday mainstream environmental organizations understandably disavow, dismiss, or even deny any
connection to the tenets of eugenics that emphasize ‘purification’ of the human gene pool by
discouraging the reproduction of those with objectionable traits,” these ideas informed
Roosevelt’s conception of a “‘new nationalism’ that ‘placed the moral issue and patriotic duty of
conservation into the context of a racial conversation.’”530 The “themes of race, sexuality,
gender, nation, family, and class have been written into the body of nature in western life
sciences since the eighteenth century,” and Haraway discusses the positioning of black human
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bodies, an amalgamation of sex and conquest, as more ape-like: “European culture for centuries
questioned the humanity of peoples of color and assimilated them to the monkeys and apes in
jokes, medicine, religious art, sexual beliefs, and zoology.”531 As part of a long history of white
Europeans positioning black bodies as closer to nonhuman nature, this understanding of race was
woven within a potent “emerging narrative that defined ‘the Negro’s place in Nature,’” at the
“bottom of the evolutionary run while reifying whiteness as closest to God, thereby morally
justifying any act of exclusion from the nation-building project that was foremost in the minds of
European Americans.”532 Finney sites numerous examples in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries of “how blackness and primitivism were constructed and disseminated in scientific,
professional, and public venues” including the dehumanization of Saartjie Baartman who was
publicly displayed and debased in London between 1810 and 1815 and Ota Benga, a human
abducted from the Congo who was forced in 1906 to be on display in a Bronx Zoo primate
exhibit as the “evolutionary ‘missing link.’”533 Eugenics theories during the period that birthed
the environmental movement effectively positioned black bodies as objects of nature, part of its
wildness not beneficiaries of its salvific potential.
While wilderness conservationists like Leopold and Muir might disavow these racist
rhetorics534, if to be fully human means cultivating a particular affective relationship with
nonhuman nature (a love and respect for uninhabited wilderness as source and site of redemption
from human depravity) and nonwhite bodies were/are systematically barred from desiring and

531

Haraway, Primate Visions, 154.

532

Finney, 39.

533

Ibid., 40-41.

534

For more on racism and nature advocacy in the early twentieth-century see Donna
Haraway’s “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York City, 19081936,” in Primate Visions, 26-59.

163
cultivating these affinities and attachments, then American Protestant environmentalism
functions as an affective economy that only allows white bodies their full humanity through the
extension of white bodies into nature spaces and environmental thought. Furthermore, thinking
with Ahmed and Fanon, American Protestant environmentalism works as a stopping mechanism
that further marks black bodies as “unrecruitable” in the cause of spiritual nature conservation,
shaping black bodies as test cases for the depravity of over-civilization rather than fullparticipants in what our environmental legacy (and new cosmology) regards as nature’s grace.
The stopping mechanisms ingrained within American environmentalism that withhold the
natural world as an object of desire from black bodies, restricting their entry/cultivation/affective
engagement with nonhuman nature, were not resolved by civil rights legislation but continue to
reverberate for contemporary environmental concerns—a legacy that new cosmology writers
refuse to acknowledge in their insistence that these affective relationships are desirable, or even
possible, for everyone. The Wilderness Act and the Civil Rights Act may have marked “the use
of wilderness areas for the public purposes of recreation, scenic viewing, scientific
understanding, education, conservation, and historic preservation,” but for which public?535
These histories “have left African Americans at times physically and psychologically exiled from
their homeland while still in it,” and when we consider “the role that our public lands play in
determining the national characteristics of this ‘homeland’” we can begin to understand that it is
“difficult for African Americans to have an ‘uncomplicated union with the natural world.’”536
Furthermore, whiteness as background for American environmentalism makes it easier to ignore
how white bodies are shaped by these legacies of dehumanization, particularly the seemingly
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endless capacity of white bodies to tolerate black pain537 and our continued dedication to forming
and celebrating conceptions of nature that refuse to recognize these legacies.
As Lorde, Fanon, and Ahmed detail, emotions do things. The affective habits and the
lines of investment they carve are the social momentum that draws bodies and communities
together while separating from others. The affective project that positions the “natural” world as
salvific potential set-apart from actual human communities and their diverse encounters with
nonhuman others, both in the cultivation of American white protestant environmentalism and
new cosmology’s ontoethical ideals, is only possible when these theorists and activists continue
to ignore which populations, encounters, and bodies were erased to make these narratives
possible. Awe, wonder, and reverence for nature not only attempt to describe very complex
relationships with others, but they align us with a particular history oriented around a particular
environmental imaginary. Our American environmental imaginary is a religious heritage that
helps us express these feelings but is also built upon the exclusion of so many people and
environments. Our bodies remember these histories even if academia is loathed to acknowledge
them. However, if we want to be able to speak to the complexities of our contemporary
ecological problems, how ecological degradation and climate change will continue pressing on
bodies in predictably unequal ways, we must recognize that these histories of unhealthy
relationships with nonhuman nature and human difference are intertwined and timely. Finally,
maneuvering material feminisms, affect, and ecotheory into conversation can show us how the
mattering maps of white environmentalism make it easier to turn away from those places, spaces,
and encounters that are not regarded as valuable, namely toxic concerns, slow violence, damaged
environments, poisoned nonhuman kin and the humans that live with and love them. Thinking
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about the affective economies that stick to the Gulf Coast after disaster, which connections are
lived as the most intense, intimate, and close to the skin, concluding this chapter I push religion
and ecology to move beyond our attachments to only exploring awe and reverence by sitting
with the affective politics of fear that shape imaginaries and encounters in devastated landscapes.
Focusing on emotions outside the comfort zone of new cosmology’s intimacies demonstrates
how much the specificities of location, culture, embodiment, and location shape our emotional
connections with human and nonhuman others and how ill-equipped new cosmology’s ontoethics are to address these entanglements.

Toxic Inheritance
“You welcome me to the trash heap. Everything has become surreal. You have made me the
trashman’s helper. You have made me wear a heavy surgical mask to cover my hands with heavy
duty rubber gloves. I look like an out-of-work actor reader to audition for a minor role in a
science fiction film. The work is too much for me alone. My friend Dave Brinks lends his
strength to cut stinking, soggy carpet and haul it to the curb. He is giving me assistance and
courage. I cannot let Dave see me cry. No tears will stream down my face. They will just have to
drip into my stomach. He wants me not to open the refrigerator. We do not want to see what
might be inside. We do not want to inhale the stink. We bind the refrigerator with yards of duct
tape and angle it out to the sidewalk. Books that dampness and mold have rendered beyond
salvation are tossed into large trash bags along with shoes and other items of clothing. Although
my more than two hundred LP albums are ruined, I cannot bear to expel them. Not yet.
Eventually the lost and damaged contents of 1928 Gentilly Boulevard must go. I don’t have a
digital camera. Flooding has made my 35mm as useless as my PC. Much of the lost and the
damaged—can I sell that phrase as the title for a new soap opera series —will sit and wait for the
flood insurance adjustor to come. Dave has gone, and I have the freedom to cry. I opt not to. Let
the tears remain in my guts. Use the energy it takes to cry to strengthen your effort to write. Yes,
Hurricane Katrina violated my house. But that violation was minimal when I recall that many
people who lived in various sectors of the greater New Orleans area no longer have homes. I
have been blessed. Because you are in exile, at a distance from your relatives and friends and
from what remains of the unique cultural gumbos of New Orleans, those social and spiritual
foods that nourished you, you must write.”
Jerry W. Ward, Jr. The Katrina Papers538
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Katrina, Rita, and the BP spill are events with particular backgrounds where embodied
affects ferment within vital encounters. The work I have outlined in chapters three and four
illuminates some of the sociocultural background that is already there (stewing, pressing,
sticking) when disasters happen, and unsettling intimacies unfold. This scholarship helps us
understand how affects are born from embodied encounters with one another and that they orient
us, align some others with and against other others, within the messiness of the social.
Recognizing fear as an emotion that is associated with the region,539 concluding this chapter I
consider environmental disaster, material complexity, and affective power together while
focusing on the lived experiences of those bodies, creatures, and environments that fail to inherit
the benefits of white environmental imaginaries.
Returning to Ahmed’s model of emotion as affective economy, Ahmed challenges the
notion that fear has an object.540 For example, Ahmed writes a common refrain contrasts anxiety
as the “‘tense anticipation of a threatening but vague event,’ or a feeling of ‘uneasy suspense,’
while fear is described as an emotional reaction ‘to a threat that is identifiable.’”541 But fear, she
contends, is really “linked to the ‘passing by’ of the object.”542 Fear works as an economy of
proximity where we fear coming in close contact with objects of fear and these objects become
even more fearsome when fear ceases to be contained within any one object. Ahmed
demonstrates this slippage through her reading of a curious passage from an Aryan Nations
website positioning white nationalism as acts of love:
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the depths of Love are rooted and very deep in a real white nationalist’s soul and spirit,
no form of ‘hate’ could even begin to compare. At least not a hate motivated by
ungrounded reasoning. It is not hate that makes the average white man look upon a mixed
race couple with a scowl on his face and loathing in his heart. It is not hate that makes the
white housewife throw down the daily jewspaper in repulsion and anger after reading of
yet another child molester or rapist sentenced by corrupt courts to a couple of years in
prison or on parole. It is not hate that makes the white workingman curse about the latest
boatload of aliens dumped on our shores to be given job preference over the white citizen
who built this land. It is not hate that brings rage into the heart of a white Christian
farmer when he reads of” Ahmed argues it positions a subject, “(the white nationalist, the
average white man, the white housewife, the white working man, the white citizen, and
the white Christian farmer when he reads of billions loaned or given away as ‘aid’ to
foreigners when he can’t get the smallest break from an unmerciful government to save
his failing farm. No, it’s not hate. It is love.543
We see here, again, how “emotions circulate between bodies and signs” to align the “bodies of
individual subjects and the body of the nation,” with and against “imagined others whose
proximity threatens not only to take something away from the subject (jobs, security, wealth),
but to take the place of the subject.”544 Reading this passage, as well as Fanon and Lorde’s work,
Ahmed highlights how through the mobilization of affects like hate and fear, the “fantasy” of the
“ordinary white subject” comes into being.”545 What is ordinary, normative, the good, is what is
“already under threat by imagined others.”546 These figures described, “the mixed-racial couple,
the child molester, the rapist, aliens, and foreigners,” come to “embody the threat of loss: lost
jobs, lost money, lost land.”547 These figures become objects of fear when they “signify the
danger of impurity,” the violation of “pure bodies,” and such bodies “can only be imagined as
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pure by the perpetual restaging of this fantasy of violation.”548 Fear, here, “responds to that
which is approaching rather than already here. It is the futurity of fear, which makes it possible
that the object of fear, rather than arriving, might pass us by.”549 Fear “both envelops the bodies
that feel it, as well as constructs those bodies as enveloped, as contained by it, as if it comes from
outside and moves inward.”550 In the encounters Fanon and Lorde describe, fear works to
differentiate between white and black bodies by opening up “past histories that stick to the
present” and “allow the white body to be constructed as apart from the black body”
reestablishing “distance between bodies whose difference is read off the surface.”551 Past
histories of association that position black bodies within the white environmental imaginary as
aggressively animal, corruptible, unrecruitable, unsaved, sticks to black bodies attributing them
with “emotional value, in this case, as being fearsome.”552 Black bodies become “even more
threatening,” Ahmed writes, “if he passes by; his proximity is imagined then as the possibility of
future injury. As such, the economy of fear works to contain the bodies of others, a containment
whose ‘success’ relies on its failure, as it must keep open the very grounds of fear.”553 Fear does
not, Ahmed concludes, “involve the defense of borders that already exist; rather, fear makes
those borders, by establishing objects from which the subject, in fearing, can stand apart.”554
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It is important to understand the function of fear in order to understand affective
intimacies in the American south especially after these disasters. Fear coupled with disgust swirls
within this theme of “invasion” to shape the bodies and environments of devastated
landscapes.555 In his article “Legitimizing Neglect,” Hemant Shah tracks how conservative news
media, commentators, and leaders positioned residents of New Orleans after the storm as threats
to white bodies, communities, and the nation.556 While I have outlined the true complexity of the
environmental history of the Louisiana coast as well as the compounding environmental
injustices impacting the area of New Orleans (all the reasons humans were left behind, stranded,
and forced to fend for themselves without food, water, and shelter) journalists cast white
citizenry as rationally perplexed by Katrina’s aftermath.557 According to some journalists,
“Blacks were putting themselves, their city, and by extension, the global image of the entire
nation at risk by their irrational behavior describing survivors as looting, raping, and murdering
hordes. In many ways, the news coverage was consistent with the way Whites have viewed nonWhites for millennia: as a threat to ‘our’ society, to ‘our’ world, to ‘our’ way of life, to ‘our’ way
of thinking, to modern rationality itself.”558 These foreclosed lines of white investment were
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particularly cruel for the region’s environmental concerns because they affectively shape New
Orleans residents as animalistic and socially flawed thus unworthy of environmental
intervention, protection, and rebuilding. Shah writes New Orleans residents were described as a
“‘very different breed’ that was engaging in ‘hardcore, armed, violence’ and ‘making it
impossible to save the city.’”559 A Dallas Morning News article “uncritically reported the views
of Baton Rouge Mayor Kip Holden who said, ‘we do not want to inherit the looting and the
foolishness that went on in New Orleans. We do not want to inherit the breed that seeks to prey
on other people.”560 Columnist Mark Alexander wrote that, “these loathsome creatures [referring
to Black looters] have filled industrial-size garbage bags with clothes and jewels and floated
them down the street”561 and Tunku Varadarajan for the Wall Street Journal lamented, “some of
those who remained on the scene of the disaster have offered a disconcerting form of civic
theater: And as one who has watched this theater, one has recoiled from the actors’ retreat into a
primitive state.”562 Finally, commentator Rocco DiPippo concluded “given the fact that during
the recent crisis there, many of its citizens chose the law of the jungle over the rule of law, it is
easy to conclude that the restoration of New Orleans’s social fabric will be an impossible
task.”563 These notions of “primitive violence and lawlessness,”564 mirror what Finney described
as our American racial inheritance that associates blackness with inferior nonhuman animals;
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black bodies as objects of nature’s wildness. Furthermore, while side-stepping any of the
environmental and political causes of the crisis in New Orleans, conservative commentators
enveloped the ordinary, good, rational white subject as constantly at risk of invasion from the
threat of black contamination. Working in critical geographies, Rachel Brahinsky, Jade Sasser,
and Laura-Anne Minkoff-Zern, argue our “ways of thinking and experiencing space, nature, and
the environment are inextricably linked to race and racialization,” or the “ongoing iterative
process through which race is defined and applied to people.”565 The legacies of white Protestant
environmentalism are naturalized by positioning bodies of color as “out of place, or unnaturally
present,” from wilderness spaces to suburban streets, and racial inequalities are naturalized by
marking black bodies as innately at home in violent and toxic environments.566
While disregarding the socio-historical and environmental conditions that contribute to
New Orleans being an ecologically precarious city with a high population of African American
citizens in poverty, conservative news media positioned New Orleans residents as a test case for
the unrecruitability of black communities in the moral cause of American white futurity.
Commentator Tony Sailer wrote, “what you won’t hear, except from me, is that ‘Let the good
times roll’ is an especially risky message for African-Americans. The plain fact is that they tend
to possess poorer native judgement than members of better-educated groups. Thus, they need
stricter moral guidance from society.”567 Jesse Lee Peterson commented, “when 75 percent of
residents had left the city, it was primarily immoral welfare-dependent Blacks that stayed behind
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and waited for government to bail them out.”568 Fred Pinkney for the Arizona Republic wrote,
“the facts are irrefutable. Black Americans in New Orleans proved gullible people duped into
social dependency will surely experience social disaster and failure.”569 Conservative
commentators singled out the black male body, inheritors (they claim) of a long line of irrational
and irresponsible behavior from the absence of their black fathers, as particularly responsible for
the behaviors (often completely fabricated) they deemed socially corrupt. Pat Buchanan wrote,
“no sooner had Katrina passed by and the 17th Street levee broke than hundreds of young men
who should have taken charge in helping the aged, the sick and the women with babies to safety
took to the streets to shoot, loot and rape.”570 Jonah Goldberg for the National Review positions
black people, regardless of occupation, as predisposed to lawlessness writing, a “sizable majority
of blacks—including police—behaved reprehensibly in the aftermath, shooting at rescue
workers, raping, killing and, yes looting (though no cannibalism.)”571 Finally, commentators like
Bill O’Reilly positioned the crisis in New Orleans as a warning to all black bodies in America if
they did not turn away from their (inherently) irrational ways saying “connect the dots and wise
up. Educate yourself, work hard and be honest. If you don’t the odds are you will be desperately
standing on a symbolic rooftop someday yourself.”572 Through rhetoric like this, conservative
talking-points define what it means to be human in ways that echo our American Protestant
environmental inheritance as a line of white investment. To be human here, is to be rationally in
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control of one’s emotions and a welcoming recipient of the grace normative American behavior
offers as a respite from the depravity of urbanity. This commentary positions black bodies as
inhuman, incapable of fulfilling American norms and expectations, their shortcomings
unsurprising because this (imagined) behavior is to be expected as animalistic black bodies
cannot be trusted to participate accordingly.
These disturbing ontologies further demonstrate how fear as an affective economy
repulses the white nation and naturalizes whiteness, regards poor communities of color with
disgust as acceptable losses, positions their communities as sacrifice zones, and considers them
unworthy of protection from environmental degradation. Following the storm, Shah argues,
“conservative commentary often acknowledged that those stuck in the flood-waters of New
Orleans were victims of neglect and incompetence in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane.
But even so, these victims were apparently unworthy of sympathy.”573 David Brooks for the New
York Times wrote, “most of the ambitious and organized people abandoned inner-city areas of
New Orleans long ago,” implying those who “chose” to “remain behind are victims of their own
irrational decision-making and behavior.”574 Commentator Jon Dougherty insinuated that victims
of Hurricane Katrina were hardly victims writing, “not all ‘victims’ wanted to be rescued
because they were looting anything and everything they could carry.”575 Political leaders like
Arizona Sen. John Kyl de-legitimized black survivors by asking, “if people know year after year
that natural disasters occur in a particular place and if people continue to build there and want to
live there, should they bear the responsibility of buying insurance or should everyone else bear
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the responsibility?”576 O’Reilly furthered these sentiments on his show with a clear “racial spin
on the topic: ‘The White American taxpayers are saying: ‘How much more do we have to give
here?’”577 Sen. Rick Santorum suggested instituting “tough penalties” for those who “decide to
ride it out,” suggesting their “choice” to remain in hazardous conditions risks the bodies of more
rational citizens.578 Finally, House Speaker Dennis Hastert recommended leveling the city
entirely commenting, “it makes no sense to spend billions of dollars to rebuild a city that’s 7 feet
under sea level . . . it looks like a lot of that place could be bulldozed.”579
The perception of other humans as “the origin of danger,” the positioning of black bodies
as objects of fear, “is shaped by histories of racism” in which the presence of black bodies “is
already read as an invasion of bodily territory as well as the territory of the nation.”580 Fearing
racial invasion like an ever-approaching toxic substance has always been a part of our American
racial imaginary but within environmentally depleted portions of the country, this fear mixes
with material toxins in peculiar ways. Toxicity becomes a product of racial fear but does not
actualize as concern for the realities that toxic materials are unduly burdened upon nonwhite
bodies. Exploring racialized toxicity, Mel Chen writes “toxins-toxic figures— populate
increasing ranges of environmental, social, and political discourses. Indeed, figures of toxicity
have moved well beyond their specific range of biological attribution, leaking out of nominal and
literal bounds while retaining their affective ties to vulnerability and repulsion: so an advice
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columnist might write Keep a healthy distance from toxic acquaintances, while a senator up for
reelection decries the ‘toxic’ political atmosphere.”581 “Given its rapidly multiplying meanings,”
seeping into discourses on global financial stability, the war on terror, and wellness culture, it is
unsurprising that American vulnerability to toxic threats holds “persistent allure.”582 While
material feminisms reveal all bodies are open to the complications of toxicity, undermining “any
effort to identify a ‘natural’ divide between nature/culture,” 583 toxins within an affective
economy of fear “take on characteristics well beyond their physical properties,” adhering to
“ideas of vulnerable sovereignty and xenophobia,” that demands an “elsewhere,” beyond the
white body, as the origin of toxic threats.584 This fear of toxic exposure marks objects regarded
as toxic as “untouchable,” “unengageable,” and “perhaps even disabling.”585 Using the mid2000s panic over lead exposure from toys imported from China as but one example, Chen argues
that while the “concrete dangers to living bodies of environmental lead,” are ever more present,
“lead as a cultural phenomenon” is not confined to its “material and physiomedical character.”586
In the summer of 2007, Chen writes, a “spate of warnings and recalls of preschool toys, pet food,
seafood, lunchboxes, and other items began to appear in national and local newspapers and
television and radio news.”587 These reports, attached to images of the threatening toys being
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played with by white children, singled out “the dangers of lead intoxication as opposed to other
toxins,” emphasized the “vulnerability of American children to this toxin,” and pointed to a
common threat of origin, China, who is a major supplier of consumer products in the U.S.588 This
fear of invading lead was not paired with any “medical reports of children’s intoxication by lead
content in the indicated toys,” but the “ensemble of images,” Chen argues, “seemed to accelerate
the explosive construction of a master toxicity narrative about Chinese products in general . . .
inanimate pollutants could now ‘invade’ all kinds of consumer products, and other pollutants
could always climb aboard” to threaten vulnerable white bodies.589 During the same cultural
moment, however, the “sustained concerns of environmental justice activists” about the “effect
of lead paint on children in impoverished neighborhoods and the greater levels of lead toxicity
among black children” were disconnected from the “heightened transnational significance of
lead,” receiving only “minor media coverage among U.S. liberal interests.”590
Unsurprisingly, while hoping to protect race and nation through cultivating fear, none of
these commentators talk about the complexity of ecological health, the impact of our desires and
consumptions, or the choices we make as a nation that disregard the poor and their habitual
exposure to environmentally hazardous environments. This should be particularly troubling for
those of us working in religious ecotheory because this economy of fear coupled with
longstanding propensities in religious environmentalism to orient toward ideal environments
with particular affective payoffs, makes it increasingly difficult to one, acknowledge how our
theory and projects habitually contribute to these economies and two, for us to reorient our
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conversations toward the importance of centering environmentally devastated regions,
communities of color, ill and disabled bodies in our scholarship.
In truth, toxins leach, making trouble for our scholarship. They seep, ooze, and leak
frustratingly beyond their expected boundaries particularly any conception of the human as
imperviously in-control of our bodies and environments. In truth, racism shapes our affective
orientations. Sifting through the silt, shards of homes, muddy beloved objects, and the waste
from five compromised superfund sites post-Katrina, bodies already made vulnerable by poverty
and institutionalized racism were implicated together in a “toxic soup” of waste, “prejudgments
and symbolic imaginaries” that rendered the very city itself an unsalvageable contaminant.591
“Toxic bodies,” Stacy Alaimo writes, are a “particularly potent site for examining the ethical
space of trans-corporeality” since “all bodies, human and otherwise, are, to greater or lesser
degrees, toxic at this point in history. 592 Beginning with material, using toxins as our starting
point and then following the trail of exposure we come to understand how very weak the
lingering divisions between nature/culture prove to be:
the same chemical substance may poison the workers who produce it, the neighborhood
in which it is produced, and the plants and animals who end up consuming it . . . the
traffic in toxins may, in fact, render it nearly impossible for humans to imagine that their
own health and welfare is disconnected from that of the rest of the planet or to imagine
that it is possible to protect ‘nature’ by merely creating separate, distinct areas in which
‘it’ is ‘preserved.’ In other words, the ethical space of trans-corporeality is never an
elsewhere but is always already here, in whatever compromised, ever-catalyzing form.593
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Toxins move transcorporeally despite whatever resistances we might put in their way
(nature/culture divisions, conceptions of the sacred, impervious ontologies, racial imaginaries)
but the question of exposure remains political, an environmental justice issue with certain bodies
more exposed than others. Toxic exposure has always been a concern for Cancer Alley, always a
reality for the residents of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast offering a pressing challenge to us in
ecotheory to draw out the racist ontologies at work affectively and materially that conceal these
continual dangers, the materialized ignorance that presses sticky toxic legacies only upon the
flesh of black and brown bodies, and those moments where the background slips a bit and we see
what has always had the potential to seep through the purity myths in our scholarship.

All Together Now
“For now, despite two appalling blows, coastal Louisiana is still alive. All signs are that the
culture, the economy, the people, the very soul of this region, somehow made it up to the attic
and through the roof just ahead of the roaring flood water. And that’s where things now stand.
But, as a place, as a society, coastal Louisiana is still on that battered roof, hatchets and axes
tossed aside, everyone hungry and thirsty and tired and scared, surrounded by perilous flood
waters, waiting for the rest of the country to help implement a rescue plan long on the drawing
board but never before tried. The fateful moment so many of us knew would eventually come is
at last here. Either we are witnessing the death of something truly great in America, or the start
of something even better, something new and blessedly permanent. There will be no second
chance to save this coast and we can no longer wait till tomorrow to act. Those old luxuries are
but rotting corpses left behind on the abandoned, ghostly streets of New Orleans.” Mike Tidwell,
Bayou Farewell594
Habitual affinities/attachments that cultivate an inability to move beyond investing in the
privileges of an assumed healthy environment or the white freedom to move within it makes it
impossible for new cosmology to generatively address areas like the Gulf Coast that are mired in
histories of racist oppression, hateful imaginaries, and environmental destruction. Beginning

594

Tidwell, Bayou Farewell, 344.

179
with an object, a feeling, or an event and digging into our complex relationships with these
materials, feminist affect theory and material feminisms offer jumping-off points, alternatives to
forcing every context and concern to fit within a single ethical narrative. By allowing ethical
practices, as opposed to ethical principles, to germinate from material realities, these approaches
address the hopes in religion and ecology to move beyond anthropocentrism by extending our
concerns to the vital, impactful, presence of nonhuman others but caution that “moving beyond
the human” requires facing which humans we solidified and celebrated in the first place as their
legacies continue to haunt our work. Most importantly, in conversation with one another, Chen
argues that this scholarship offers “alternative means, outside of the strictly political or strictly
emotional, to identify cross-affiliations-affinities-among groups as diverse as environmentalists,
people with autism, social justice activists, feminists, religious believers in nature’s stewardship,
and antiracists, to name just a few” and it refuses “prescriptive closures around the possibility of
metamorphosis, imaginative or otherwise.”595
With a more porous sense of the human and a less certain sense of our emotional life,
what do these relational ontologies free us up to think, collaborate, and imagine? Returning to
my question from the beginning of chapter three, should religion and ecology continue to
encourage affinities and attachments within devastated landscapes? Disasterscapes and their
environmental histories reveal that we are always already intimate with human and nonhuman
others in so many ways that make us uncomfortable by washing away the “should we” and any
lingering patina suggesting these intimacies are always pleasant, benevolent, or transformative.
Asking how we should encourage kinship intimacies with nonhuman others becomes a much
more provocative and ethically rich quandary when we acknowledge that our (dis)regard for
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human/nonhuman others is oriented by legacies of racism and that these kin-creatures and
environments carry toxic inheritances that seep into both our bodies and theory. For many
scholars in religion and ecology the field serves, in part, as religiopoiesis—crafting a possible
civic home for those who feel ethical obligations to care for biodiversity.596 Ursula Goodenough,
and other new cosmology scholars, view this crafting of religion as a “core activity of
humankind,” the cultivation of a “cosmology of origins and destiny” that guides human belief
and behaviors.597 For Goodenough, through opening ourselves up to metaphors that advocate
ecocare in “our traditional religions, those in the poetry and art of past and present times, and
those that emerge from our articulation of scientific understandings,” we will form such a “rich
tapestry of meaning that we have no choice but to believe in it.”598 But scholarship in material
feminisms and feminist affect theory reminds us that all making, as Donna Haraway writes, is
making-with, sympoiesis, “poesis” to make and “sym” as with or together, as “critters-human
and not become-with each other, compose and decompose each other, in every scale and register
of time and stuff in sympoietic tangling, in ecological evolutionary developmental earthly
worlding and unworlding.”599 Like our ancestors, we continue to use nonhuman others to make,
build, fear, hope, dream but only some of us can claim this making is apolitical. How might
religion and ecology make-with disaster and those dispossessed/disregarded by the aftermath?
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For the remainder of this dissertation I work to answer that question by cultivating
resources for kinship affinities and attachment that also embrace legacies of abuse,
disappointment, and estrangement through refusing histories blissfully detached from embodied
inequalities and their affective resonances. This material, particularly scholarship in disability,
critical race, and queer studies, offers alternative visions for what it means to love, care for kin,
and resist that do not assume a background of racial or environmental purity. The Gulf Coast as a
devastated landscape is one place where the background cracks offering opportunities to refuse
conducting business as usual in ecotheory. Many communities that are mired in complex
ecological problems also have long, generative, and inspiring histories of ecological activism
germinating from their material conditions. While the coast unequally bears the material
consequences of environmental racism, it also produces voices furthering environmental
activism. Rethinking kinship ethics in the next two chapters, I craft-with disaster by engaging
sources that negotiate environmental loss, estrangement, and desire for abject bodies.
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Chapter Five
The Shape of This Kinship

Late Summer 2016, it is flooding again in Louisiana. “If you don’t live in or around
Louisiana, you may not know that” writes Sean Illing for Salon, “cable news has mostly ignored
it . . . among other stupidities, Adele’s admission that she can’t dance was deemed more
newsworthy than a drowning American state.”600 After Hurricane Katrina, after Rita, after the BP
oil disaster, perhaps many regard Louisiana as existing in a perpetual state of peril, a lost cause.
“In Louisiana,” Illing writes, “there’s a gnawing sense that the national media seems uninterested
in this disaster . . . the historic floods felt like an afterthought, a throwaway segment sandwiched
between Buick commercials.”601 While media coverage glazed over the destruction, southern and
central Louisiana experienced unprecedented flooding, with homes mostly uncovered by flood
insurance being utterly destroyed. In Baton Rouge Parish, one of the areas that experienced a
significant population spike from dispossessed Hurricane Katrina survivors that were
systematically denied return to New Orleans, flooding damaged upwards of 60,000 residences.
Illing, and others, described the aerial footage of the devastation as “apocalyptic.”602 “Should We
Abandon Louisiana?” Zack Kopplin for Slate Magazine writes, “in some ways, we already
have.” 603 Critics will use this as “one more reason to give up on the state. And they’ll use the
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inevitable next disaster too,” but “because we, as a country, have collectively endangered our
future by overusing fossil fuels, that doesn’t mean Louisiana has sacrificed its right to exist and
its people should leave. Climate change could sink all of our major coastal cities, but Louisiana
is being held to a different standard, because we’ve already been hit with so many disasters.
We’ve suffered so much that people are tired of hearing about us. In fact, we’ve suffered so
much that people outside of Louisiana assume that we want to leave.”604
What would it mean for religion and ecology to begin thinking about affinity and
attachment here, with those “who have no choice but to inhabit intimately, over the long term,
the physical and environmental fallout”605 of histories of investments, abandonments, and
erasures that makes loving-life along the Gulf Coast a very complex question? What would
exploring kinship attachments in devastated landscapes look like? What models can we look to
for claiming unloved others as our cared-for kin? Much like their habitual use of “sacred,” new
cosmology conversations do not dig into the deep scholarly roots of kinship language, long
histories of theorization within anthropology, religious studies, and the social sciences, but
nevertheless rely on kin and kinship to get at the affective stakes, the “deep, driving feelings,”606
they feel are at play in both the cultivation and ethical promise of its new orientating narrative.
Echoing my contentions with their use of sacrality, I argue that new cosmology has a much more
ethically rich concept in kinship than it appears to realize. Borrowing from Elizabeth Freeman,
“my point is not that we need a new set of terms, but rather, a different sense of what kinship
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might be.”607 If we are all part of one sacred family, connected via evolutionary inheritance and
shared destiny, what is our ethical obligation to those that, thus far, never receive invitations to
the new cosmology family reunion? What does it mean to love, care for, and desire intimacy
with those bodies, creatures, communities, and habitats significantly impacted by environmental
degradation? In her most recent work on “multispecies affinities”608 and environmental thinking
for trouble times, Donna Haraway advocates “making-with” or “staying with the trouble” of
environmental degradation in order to resist the “horrors” of the “Anthropocene”—the
geological epoch characterized by tremendous human transformation of the planet.609 “Neither
despair nor hope is tuned to the senses,” she writes, “to mindful matter, to material semiotics, to
mortal earthlings in thick copresence”610 and “we—all of us on Terra—live in disturbing times,
mixed-up times, troubling and turbid times. The task is to become capable, with each other in all
of our bumptious kinds, of response.”611 Becoming-capable, the labor of “shaping,” what she
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terms, “response-abilities,”612 requires making “kin in lines of inventive connection.”613 “Kin,”
Haraway writes:
is a wild category that all sorts of people do their best to domesticate. Making kin as
oddkin rather than, or at least in addition to, godkin and genealogical and biogenetic
family troubles important matters, like to whom one is actually responsible. Who lives
and who dies, and how, in this kinship rather than that one? What shape is this kinship,
where and whom do its lines connect and disconnect, and so what? What must be cut and
what must be tied if multispecies flourishing on earth, including human and other-thanhuman beings in kinship, are to have a chance?614
We have seen some of what domesticated conceptions of kinship like those of new cosmology
occludes—those places, spaces, and bodies outside its familial confines. To develop responseabilities within religion and ecology, we will similarly need to consider what must but cut and
must be tied in order to address uncertain futures. Haraway offers helpful resonances with my
questions about the limitations of new cosmology’s universal ethics, those shadowed bodies,
communities, and encounters not considered in its affective project, by not accepting claims
to/for kinship wholesale. Why this kinship but not that one? Why these kin but not others?
Furthermore, what sorts of responsibilities do these lines of investment compel us toward (and
away from which others)? Why does new cosmology invest in evolutionary kinship over any
other form of kinship? How do we cultivate creative connections that both address the
disinherited outliers and bleak environmental futures? Before moving in the next chapter toward
constructing more radical forms of kinship, I first want to think about some of the habitual
kinship conceptions that religion and ecology should sever and others they should cling-to by
drawing in discussions from other disciplines that unsettle similar themes. Here, I reiterate new
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cosmology’s conception of kinship and how it expects it will be a guiding ethic for planetary
care and then I demonstrate the limitations that need to be addressed within this frame in order
for kinship to be a vital concept for crisis contexts.

What Must Be Cut
New cosmologists use kinship and its affective resonances (affinity, commonality,
intimacy, empathy, concern, care, connection, love) in two ways. First, to describe their
transdisciplinary, cross-cultural, and interreligious community of thinkers and activists, what
Connie Barlow calls “environmentalists of a spiritual bent,” whose traditions may differ but
nevertheless they share a “love of nature” and “green commitment.”615 And second, to describe
their affinities and attachments with and to nonhuman others. First, despite, or for some in-spite,
of religious and cultural differences, new cosmology claims the really-real thing that connects
humans as kin is our spectacular evolutionary inheritance revealed to us through scientific
cosmologies. For example, Loyal Rue writes:
the story of cosmic evolution reveals to us the common origin, nature, and destiny shared
by all human beings. It documents our essential kinship as no other story can do. This is
no contrived shamanistic legend; this is not a bit of clever tribal tattooing— it is more
like the real thing. This story shows us in the deepest possible sense that we are all sisters
and brothers— fashioned from the same stellar dust, energized by the same star,
nourished by the same planet, endowed with the same genetic code, and threatened by the
same evils. This story, more than any other, humbles us before the magnitude and
complexity of creation. Like no other story it bewilders us with the improbability of our
existence, astonishes us with the interdependence of all things, and makes us feel grateful
for the lives we have. And not least of all, it inspires us to express our gratitude to the
past by accepting a solemn and collective responsibility for the future.616
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Here, Rue uses kinship to assert the biological unity of all humans. New cosmology’s appeals to
the “language of metaphor and myth” to shape science—with its “potential to arouse and direct
the emotional regulators of behavior”—serve as a corrective to what it views are culturally and
religiously misguided morals that counter green sentiment.617 Consider “examples taken from
ancient wisdom traditions,” Rue writes:
the Hebraic tradition emphasizes the majesty and awesome power of God,
the creator of the universe and ultimate judge of human righteousness. Almighty God
enters into a covenant with Israel, promising viability and prosperity on the condition that
Israel obey his commands. Blessings if they do, suffering and hardship if they do not.
God’s people are made to feel humble and awestruck in the presence of absolute power
and authority. They are made to feel grateful for the undeserved bounty from God, and
duty-bound to observe his Law. The logic of reciprocity could not be more obvious. The
imagery of the story activates the social emotions, creating a deficit state that seeks to
repair in obedient service. Similarly, see how the central images of the Christian story are
designed to arouse the social emotions. Affection is elicited by images of the infant Jesus,
mother and child, the caring shepherd; sympathy is aroused by the image of a helpless
and innocent man suffering on a cross at the hands of merciless authorities; gratitude is
called forth by the reminder that Jesus’ death was a selfless act undertaken of the sake of
others; guilt is instilled by the insinuation that it is we who deserve the punishments of
the cross; resentment or moral outrage is aroused against those, like Judas, who betray
the altruistic Jesus. By such imagery the emotional effectors are set to work in motivating
a life of service to Christian virtues.618
Epic retellings of scientific cosmologies have the same affective power as the evocative Jewish
and Christian narratives in their ability to direct ethical behavior, Rue and others claim, through a
combination of the best of both science and religion—knowledge that is “authentically real” via
science with religions’ “rich poetic and mythological language” forming an “integrated story”619
that taps into our evolutionary need for ethically guiding myths.620 Once we obtain knowledge of
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these tremendous kinships and give them their appropriate due via feelings of awe, wonder, and
reverence, life-revering practices will follow. Part of the problem with this perspective is “Rue’s
fixation with religions as mythic projects” that “effectively ‘trigger’ appropriate feelings and
behaviors” without any consideration of religions’ other functions nor the continual sociocultural production, embodied practices, and normative policing that make them powerful.621
Furthermore, Rue’s co-option of science to work as an emotional regulator emphasizes “human
solidarity and kinship” with a particular ahistorical and apolitical conception of “human” in
mind. 622 “By no means,” Lisa Sideris writes, “does Rue’s emphasis on diversity in biological
systems translate into an affirmation of cultural diversity.”623 If anything, this assertion flattens
and homogenizes the notion of “the human” in ways that might threaten an affirmation of
cultural diversity.
Furthermore, Sideris points out, “as anyone who has raised a child can attest, people
seldom feel gratitude simply because they are instructed that they should, in light of certain facts
about their existence.”624 Sideris is skeptical that new cosmology can shape emotions like
religions do, but Rue insists evolution is on his side. Rue writes that religious traditions tap into
the “millions of years of evolution” that:
have equipped our species with a range of specific emotional systems that were selected
for their powers to produce adaptive behaviors. Together, these systems may be seen to
constitute a primitive system of morality. Emotional traits operate according to inherent
rules—an ‘if-then’ logic—such that if an individual is presented with a stimulus (say, an
act of generosity by a conspecific), then he or she will be likely to experience gratitude
and will respond accordingly. The emotional toolkit of humans is much debated, but
there is something approaching a consensus that it includes sympathy, resentment,
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gratitude, affection, guilt, disgust, anger, jealousy, and various shades of fear (e.g., awe,
respect, humility). These are the systems exploited by the ministrations of a religious
tradition . . . The power of religious traditions to redirect and regulate the social mobile
rests on their ability to manipulate the emotional toolkit by symbolic means. Consider,
for example how the image of an innocent man being tortured elicits a sympathetic
response, or how images of an infant elicit affectionate responses, or how the bounty of
creation elicits gratitude, or how images of heaven and hell inspire hope and fear.625
Shortly I will consider a conversation on religious emotions and the influence of evolutionary
biology, and if evolutionary inheritance trumps the sociality of affects as Rue suggests,626 but it
is important to note that Rue’s reflection on the evolution of religious emotions is completely
uncited with no mention of the work of his contemporaries in cognitive science of religion nor
anything in affect studies that might support his trajectory. It is clear, though, that this
understanding of ethical emotions has no conception of the inherent sociality and historical
contingency of affect that I discussed at length in the previous chapter. What is most
problematic, I find, is the expectation that all humans ought to align with one narrative and direct
their emotional investments accordingly without any recognition of the complexity of emotional
life. Yes, many people would feel sympathy for the image of a tortured man but, as Sedgwick,
Tomkins, and Ahmed suggest, it depends on who the man appears to be—if he is “counted” as a
man who the audience viewing the image deems worthy of sympathy. Or, as Fanon so deftly
illustrates, if he is considered a man at all. Affects’ peculiar plasticity, its’ surprising ability to
slip beyond our hopes for encounters revealing influences and desires that are not always
expected or we might wish to ignore, means any combination of emotions could be expected.
The pain, loss, and degradation of certain bodies is not always felt or recognized as pain and loss
by others depending upon the histories of associations and encounters between these bodies.
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If new cosmology kinship cannot embrace the benevolent conceptions of difference that
any Kindergartener is taught to socially celebrate (my, what a diverse world it is) it seems unwise
to expect it to embrace the ramifications of disposability and the complexities of slow violence
we see unfolding in the national denial of Louisiana’s disaster. Again, seeming to do little to
address social injustices, counter to Bron Taylor’s hopes that the kinship ethics of new
cosmology would likely erode supremacist ideologies, kinship in this sense ignores the other
sedimented affective bonds we share, but share in ways that isolate us from others. This affective
narrative Rue and others hope will be our ethical guide works best when we pretend we inherit
nothing but this evolutionary legacy erasing any embodied differences (race, class, gender,
sexuality, ability) that might impact our experiences. Bodies carrying alternative environmental
histories, those black, brown, female, and (as I will explore further in chapter seven) queer, and
disabled bodies that have not inherited the salvific nature of white American investment, nor the
ability to hold this “nature” as an object of desire, or even the ensured safety to experience its
pleasures, might understandably bristle at Rue’s reverence and gratitude for a narrative of
interdependence that so clearly does not reflect their experiences and encounters. If these bodies
and communities are still our “sisters and brothers,” then how do their experiences, concerns,
and hopes become part of our scholarship?
Second, new cosmology writers use the affective language of kinship to describe their
connection, or longing for connection, with nonhuman others. For example, Thomas Berry and
Brian Swimme’s perspectives on our “new view of the universe,” are that “we now have the
wonder, not merely that we are related to and intimate with everything about us, but that we have
a cousin relationship with every being in the universe, especially the living beings of the planet
Earth. We have not descended to a lower level; they have, as it were, been recognized at a higher
level. Both their lives and ours are infinitely expanded by this intimate presence to each
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other.”627 Berry and Swimme acknowledge both intimacy and reciprocity within these kinships,
an exchange of value that hurts both humans and nonhuman others when humans do not
acknowledge these connections. However, while they do recognize both environmental
degradation and species erasure as pressing realities,628 new cosmology kinship asserts a
biological connection with all life but does not consider any radical notions of intimacy or
reciprocity. It does not question if these pressing realities might seep into and alter our
conceptions of intimacy and reciprocity themselves. Considering these vulnerabilities however,
how our scholarship should meet and address the affective intersections of environmental and
social degradation, I contend is the only way to hold onto environmental kinship as a vital
concept. Before I move to discuss reshaping our theory around these concerns, I consider some
of the stakes involved in reconceptualizing kinship. First, I will address and complicate new
cosmology’s appeal to evolutionary affects. Then, I survey kinship studies to look at reservations
with and re-articulations of “kinship” in other disciplines that new cosmology habitually does not
engage.
One of the reasons new cosmology is able to side-step environmental degradation and its
uneven consequences for the poor in its conceptions of kinship is new cosmology’s habitual
tendency to equate nature with science. Its focus on “expert” knowledge about the material world
over the quotidian realities that continually shape these worlds allows new cosmology to avoid
addressing multiplicities of experience and be very selective about who does and does not count
as an “expert.” Furthermore, the “scientific mythmakers” of new cosmology “frequently deploy
generic and uncritical categories of science” insisting that “modern discoveries in cosmology or
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evolutionary biology point to some particular or objective meaning, purpose, or value in the
universe or for human life generally”629 while ignoring all critiques of the social construction of
scientific knowledge coming from material feminisms, philosophy and history of science, and
feminist science and technology studies (STS.)
Since the early eighties, ongoing work in feminist STS (and other philosophies of
science) from theorists like Evelyn Fox Keller, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Helen
Longino, and Karen Barad, offer three general critiques about the production of scientific
knowledge that new cosmology authors habitually ignore. First, is the “reminder that science and
technology are importantly social,” that what humans claim is true or real about our material
world is only “contingently real” and open to resistance from other scholars and the power
politics of funding which carry their own gendered and raced implications.630 “Claims do not just
spring from the subject matter into acceptance, via passive scientists, reviews, and editors.
Rather, it takes work for them to become important,” funneled through “political, social, legal,
ethical” and bureaucratic interests. 631 Which bodies are allowed to produce this knowledge,
which material, communities, ideas, theories are worthy of study, how these “objects” of study
should be ethically procured or treated, all continue to be political struggles. Furthermore, as
Helen Longino’s work on the role of values in science makes clear, “what a fact is evidence for
depends on what background assumptions” we hold socially allowing “people to agree on facts
and yet disagree about the conclusion to be drawn from them. At the same time, which
background assumptions people choose, and which ones they choose to question, will be
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strongly informed by social values” with the most prevalent suspicions and resistances toward
perspectives from those groups already marginally represented in the sciences.632 Haraway’s
body of work could, arguably, be described as careful attention to all the ways scientists have
“carried with them the marks of their own histories and cultures,”633 into their fields of study,
affinities for creatures, and love-affairs with habitats. However, the science narratives that new
cosmologists choose to embrace are not regarded as choices because they never locate their
embrace of science within a contested field with numerous voices, perspectives, biases, and
desires wrestling with each other for financial, political, and intellectual recognition. New
cosmology’s “almost hagiographic devotion” to particular scholars, like E. O. Wilson and
Richard Dawkins, “discourages and deflects critique and critical exchange” and fashions a
“vision” of science that makes “selective use of particular scientific claims and discoveries,
carefully arranged and narrated so as to support meanings and messages desired by some,” but
does not include deep critiques of these scholars either within scientific communities or the
humanities. 634 Consequently, there is no interrogation of which communities, bodies, and
habitats these narratives serve or benefit.
Second, despite assumptions that science reveals the realities of nature, feminist STS
argues not only that representations and social realities constructed, but many of the things that
scientists study and work with decidedly not “natural.” Sociologist Karin Knorr Cetina reminds
us that “nature is not to be found in the laboratory” with the laboratory as a “site of action from
which ‘nature’ is as much as possible excluded rather than included.”635 For the most part, Sergio
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Sismondo points out, “the materials used in scientific laboratories are already partly prepared for
that use before they are subjected to laboratory manipulations. Substances are purified, and
objects are standardized and even enhanced. Chemical laboratories buy pure reagents, geneticists
might use established libraries of DNA, and engineered animal models can be invaluable. Once
these objects are in a laboratory, they are manipulated. They are placed in artificial situations, to
see how they react” and “the result of these various manipulations is that knowledge derived
from laboratories is knowledge about things that are distinctly non-natural. These things are
constructed, by hands-on fully material work.”636 Echoing my arguments in chapter one, new
cosmology does not regard nature as a social construction, so it pays little attention to the vast
divide between “nature,” as a lab-created or theoretical ideal, and nonhuman others struggling
for survival in habitats impacted by humans in so many ways. Thus, they see no need to reshape
the environmental ethics they claim draw from scientific fact to address a rapidly changing
planet.
Third, critiques of scientific knowledge production argue that “science and social order
are ‘co-produced.”637 Networks and genealogies that are assumed to be orderly and stable are,
what Sismondo calls a “heterogeneous construction” of “isolated parts of the material and social
worlds: laboratory equipment, established knowledge, patrons, money, institutions” and where
“no one piece of a network can determine the shape of the whole” and “not all of whom may be
immediately compatible.”638 But because the scientific and the social are co-produced, where
“good” science is shaped by policy concerns, and the criteria for good policy is shaped by what
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is determined to be “good science” in a “process of ‘mutual construction,’” feminist STS
scholars question perspectives that separate the two or fail to question the underlying desires and
motivations of either.639 These realities are not intended to deflect from the agentic capacity of
our material world, implying that nature is purely a social construct, rather these reminders
illuminate the contingent and heterogeneous qualities of scientific knowledge production—that
“science and technology are social, that they are active, and that they do not take nature as it
comes.”640 New cosmology does not question the desires, values, and ways of being that
consecrated science validates, celebrates, and rewards. It does not need to consider: the gendered
or raced implications of any of the scientific material they embrace, the complexities of
catastrophic events or crisis conditions, or any of the voices wrestling with scientific knowledge
production when working with such idealized frames.
Ignoring the cautions of critical science studies and carrying numerous assumptions about
the scientific and the social into work that conflates “science and religion” or makes “science
into a religion” as Sideris argues, the “consecrated science” of new cosmology “is not science
that is obviously in the service of nature and its goods,”641 and its use of biophilic kinship
functions similarly—support for their ideals about humanity, religion, and science but less
helpful for contemporary environmental ethical concerns. As I have addressed, while often
unreferenced new cosmology thinkers draw from a conception of biological kinship that
extrapolates from Darwin’s life work to emphasize that all life-forms are connected by sharing
common ancestry. Bron Taylor identifies this conception of kinship as present in many core
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environmental thinker’s work including John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson all
anticipating Wilson’s eventual biophilia hypothesis theorizing that “our affective, aesthetic, and
moral appreciation of nature, and our sense of kinship with other organisms, can be understood
as evolutionary outcomes that generally promote environmentally adaptive behaviors.”642 Berry,
Wilson, Rue, Tucker, Grim, Barlow, and Taylor all put quite a bit of stock in the ethical
possibilities of this kinship. There “is no obstacle to kinship ethics as a basis for caring about the
entire web of life,” Taylor writes, an “evolutionary worldview leads quite logically to a
commitment to discern and pursue social arrangements that promote flourishing and resilient
biocultural systems.”643 Tucker uses language like heritage, fraternity, relatedness, ancestry,
belonging, “extending our desires and affections for others,” and “widening our circle of
compassion”644 beyond the human but she (and others) does not go much beyond wonder at and
or for the scientific knowledge of these evolutionary connections.645 The persistence of
tremendous diversity, both human and nonhuman, and its benefits seems to be enough of an
ethical gesture for many of these authors. However, I find this use of kinship as a nod toward
ethical concerns lacking complexity making it difficult to find resonance for devastated
landscapes.

642

Bron Taylor, Dark Green Religion, 152.

643

Bron Taylor, “Evolution and Kinship Ethics,” Center for Humans and Nature, web
blog post. https://www.humansandnature.org/evolution-and-kinship-ethics.
644

Mary Evelyn Tucker, “Ethics in an Age of Extinction,” (web lecture, Journey of the
Universe: The Unfolding of Life, Yale University, accessed November, 4th 2018,
https://www.coursera.org/lecture/journey-of-the-universe/tucker-ethics-in-an-age-of-extinctionnYEYZ.
645

For deeper discussion of the uses of wonder in mythopoeic science, see Lisa Sideris,
Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge, and the Natural World.

197
How strong are these biophilic tendencies and do they do all the work that is needed for
robust affective kinship ties? We should remain skeptical as numerous voices, including Sideris,
Donovan Schaefer, Karen Barad, and Stephen Jay Gould, frequently unsettle easy correlations
between evolutionary inheritance and ethical guidance. In his integration of evolutionary biology
and affect theory into religious studies in Religious Affects, Schaefer allies with Gould and
Richard Lewontin to resist claims that evolutionary biology rationally explains bodies and
behavior. The “view that ‘natural selection is so powerful,’” Schaefer writes, “and the constraints
upon it so few that direct production of adaptation through its operation becomes the primary
cause of nearly all organic form, function, and behavior,’ is, at best, a selective reading of
Darwin.”646 Pluralist approaches to Darwinism, like Gould, Lewontin, and Schaefer’s, position
embodied life as “deeply complicated” and assessing everything “according to what is ‘rational’
for a given situation,” or to fit within a narrative of evolutionary legacy “doesn’t get at that
complexity.”647 Specificities, like history, habitat, culture, and embodied difference all swirl
within this complexity to shape our affective lives and relationships.
For example, as Barad, Jane Bennett, and Schaefer illuminate, while natural selection “is
and remains a powerful force of evolutionary transformation, it is not the only source.”648
Landscapes matter and often in unpredictable ways. “Landscapes,” Schaefer writes, “are rogue
agents, actively impressing themselves into the embodied histories of organisms. In Karen
Barad’s term, they are intra-active—material forces as upstart actants rather than inert
background features. Or they are invested with what Jane Bennett calls vital materiality,
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nonpersonal agents that nonetheless take an active role in conditioning fields of possibility.”649
Furthermore, organisms do not respond to the shifting material forces of landscapes in real time.
Instead, “there is play in the system, a lag time in the reorganization of features, as well as the
intransigence of existing structures.”650 “Rather than sleek, polished, high-functioning
machines,” Schaefer contends, “bodies are messy, heterogeneous, and archaic, scrap heaps
advertising contraptions of old, broken, fortuitous parts. Evolution leaves remnants, remainders,
fixtures jutting out at odd angles” and evolution “as the production of embodied histories is an
awkward sedimentation of accidents.”651 Responding to the “nature-nurture” question from a
different perspective, Schaefer argues that affect theory in conversation with evolutionary
biology emphasizes that embodied life is always a “hybrid system of quickly changing and
slowly changing forces.”652 Consequently, while evolutionary biology illuminates how and why
humans might feel affiliation with other creatures, religion and ecology should be less certain
about how these compulsions play out in real time and more curious about those places, spaces,
and events where affinities and attachments do not play out as we hoped. While new cosmology
points toward biophilic remnants as evidence for our capacity for kinship compulsion, it has not
speculated much about what impact the weight of history or ecological devastation may have on
these capacities.
Furthermore, drawing in my conversation with work in affect theory, humans do not
come to encounter with nonhuman others blissfully neutral. “Bodies,” Schaefer writes, “are not
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inert physical objects that choose to enjoy, feel, or experience. They are constituted inside a
current of affects pulling them into networks of affectively mediated relationships.”653 Affect
theory “corrects the presupposition that we are angels, that we can dictate to our bodies how to
feel about our world” and “highlights how animal forces disrupt the abstract prerogative of the
reasoning, calculating, talkative subject and attach bodies to complex structures of feeling that
cut against not only external appraisal of the right things for bodies to do, places for them to go,
ways for them to believe and feel, but the sovereign self’s own assessment of its best course of
action.”654 Affective economies, Schaefer argues, are “queer economies that are driven by the
uneven circulation of pleasures and desires rather than a disembodied logos.”655 New cosmology
hopes for a “clear link between our evolutionary endowments and an environmental ethics,”656
but as Ahmed and Schaefer illuminate, affects “do not proceed along straight, clear-cut paths
from objects to subjects, but rather circulate within and between bodies and worlds, intersecting
at multiple levels and reshaping objects as they swerve.” 657
I will expand more on the possibilities of queer biophilic intimacies in chapter seven, but
it is important to recognize what critiques of evolutionary affinities unsettle. Thinking with
encounters in areas marked by environmental injustice and destruction, any lingering biophilic
compulsions would meet the push and pull of competing tensions. Affects are not painted onto a
blank slate but are vibrant in and through the bodies that encounter them and affect others.
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Bodies may or may not feel awe or reverence for the nonhuman world based on sedimented
histories of power, the unpredictable encroachment of landscape, and the reverberations of
environmental racism.658 Despite our ethical intentions, it seems difficult for biophilic
engagement to work so rationally in these economies. It is also possible biophilic compulsion
will morph after disaster when the panic, silt, sludge, fear, vitriol, and flashes of hope all settle
into our bodies in unpredictable ways. While religion and ecology should remain skeptical about
biophilic tendencies to coalesce rationally into onto-ethical arguments, we might also remain
open to the possibility for our biophilic remnants to form surprising intimacies.
In sum, new cosmology writers cultivate an ideal conception of nature, one they argue is
the really-real revealed to us through scientific marvels, as set-apart from the material
complexities of daily life in environmentally precarious locations like the encroaching
complications of pollution, degradation, disaster, and loss. Hence, new cosmology can encourage
kinship “intimacy” and “reciprocity” with a nature that its authors may not experience, that many
may never experience, in their daily lives. They profess and encourage a love for a nature they
claim is true but remains a construction that reflects the needs, interests, desires, and hopes of
particular populations at the expense of others. Since it explores intimacy and reciprocity solely
within a nature of its own making, ignoring other encounters and imaginaries, new cosmology
models for kinship with one another and with nonhuman others cannot map onto intimacies and
attachments with and to many bodies and environments in their current conditions like the
nationally denied suffering of Gulf Coast communities. If appeals to evolutionary affects
function more as thought-experiments than definitive ethical drives, then other constructions of
kinship can hold as much value for religion and ecology to think about affinities and attachments
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with nonhuman others. I see no reason to rely solely on evolutionary kinships. Uncertain that
biophilia works as rationally as new cosmology intends and compelled to regard biophilia more
for its speculative potential, I advocate for holding onto the obvious resonance kinship concepts
hold for theorists in religion and ecology but encourage less fidelity to evolutionary kinships via
opening our use of kinship to the plurality of shapes it takes in other avenues.
Questions like the following demonstrate both the provocative power of kin concepts
and the trouble facing us: do creatures and environments negotiating mutations change our
conceptions of relatedness or belonging? What does it mean to extend our desires and affections
toward incredibly damaged environments? What does compassion for eyeless shrimp, clawless
crabs, oily hermits, and displaced Gulf communities really entail? Responses to these questions
and the pressing difficulties that meets us in contemporary religious environmental ethics could
be numerous from the practical to the speculative but considering kinship both as affective
encounter and ethical directive, I argue that focusing on some of the overlooked complexities of
kinship models, what might be seen as the murkier elements of intimacy, will help set religion
and ecology up to cultivate more potent ideas about kinship.

What Must Be Tied
Kinship, kinship language, and kinship systems, Patrick McConvell argues, is the
“bedrock of all human societies that we know,” and of importance to disciplines that study the
“matrix into which human children are born” like anthropology, sociology, history, linguistics,
and religion.659 Noting that the systematic study of kinship has fallen out of favor within his own
field of anthropology, McConvell acknowledges how language and kinship remain significant
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for cultural studies.660 Loosely defined as “the set of possibilities for social relations in any given
culture,”661 kinship in state-centered societies, Elizabeth Freeman writes, “consists of the social
policies that recognize some forms of lived relationality” and “demand certain responsibilities
between recognized relatives.”662 Kinship theory “is the body of knowledge emerging from
attempts to abstract the governing principles of relationality” from the “practices of intimacy
observed in a given culture.”663 In “kinship’s most conservative meanings and functions,”
however, kinship itself is “fundamentally exclusive, depending as it does upon the distinction
between those who are kin and those who are not kin.”664 For example, Freeman contends, any
good study of “gendered and sexualized social life,” should recognize the inherent exclusionary
functions of much of the “dominate lexicon of kinship.” 665 Critiques of kinship studies primarily
illuminate, I argue, that human relational life continually exceeds the language and limitations of
state and religiously sanctioned intimacies. As just two examples that I will consider in this
chapter, any comprehensive theory of kinship must “answer to the paradox that lesbians and gays
both inhabit and exceed the matrix of couplehood and reproduction,” as well as the historic and
contemporary reverberations of the reality that “captive persons of African descent were wrested
from their kinship structures” and “denied access to the kinship systems of the United States and
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other imperial powers.”666 Thus kin and its affective resonances are corporeally, historically, and
politically complex in ways currently unrecognized by religion and ecology.
While it might seem like these discussions are outside the umbrella of religious
environmental ethics, wrestling with the criticisms and extensions of kinship theory is important
for religion and ecology because these conversations are raising concerns that are pivotal to the
ignored contexts I am addressing in this project. For example, religion and ecology’s hopes to
nurture kinship with nonhuman others does not respond to the racism shaping encounters
between bodies and their environments in the American south. Religion and ecology has not
considered what it means to cultivate kinship with and between abject bodies. Drawing from
critiques of kinship arguments in other arenas can help us to unsettle our habitual kinship
appeals.
Carving a small slice of the lengthy and contentious legacy of kinship studies,667 “kinship
was foundational for ethnographic study of social structures and cultural practices throughout
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much of the 20th century,” Robert A. Wilson summarizes, but “conceptualized as distinctively
biological, genealogical, or reproductive (or bio-essentialist.)”668 In a fundamental shift, David
Schneider’s 1984 A Critique of the Study of Kinship asked “whether kinship itself is in fact a
modern Western paradigm,”669 by contending kinship studies of the past, even when they
expanded beyond consanguineous connections, translated all “putative kinship terminologies via
a biological-genealogical-reproductive grid” conceptualizing “kinship bio-essentially in any
ethnographic context.”670 This narrative, Schneider argues, was an “ethnocentric projection,”
imposing a “peculiarly American-European conception of kinship onto other cultures” without
questioning if these intimacies challenged or fundamentally resisted Western paradigms.671
Following Schneider’s critique was what Wilson calls a “dumbfounded lull in work on kinships
(especially in North America.)”672 More contemporary kinship theory, responding to Schneider’s
work and integrating scholarship from Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault, drifts from the
language of “kin and kinship” toward “relatives and relatedness,” or “relationships of intimacy,”
focusing on the “performativity and lived experience of kinship” opening kinship theory to a
“novel array of topics—reproductive technologies, chosen families, autoethnography, gay and
lesbian intimacy, invented communities, the body and personhood, artificial life, Internet dating,
identity politics, disability activism, ethnicity, and adoption practices.”673
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Particularly productive for my concerns is how scholarship in feminist and queer
studies674 challenges these frameworks by taking up relatedness and the “concept of intimacy
both as a subject and as an analytic rubric.”675 Some queer and feminist scholars argue kinships’
historical “lack of ‘extendability’ has often meant that sexual minorities are stranded between
individualist notions of identity on the one hand and on the other a romanticized notion of
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community” encouraging the position that “any genuinely democratic culture needs to abandon
the notion.” 676 Elizabeth Freeman, however, compellingly argues that sexual and racial
minorities should pay attention to kinship as a “process by which small-scale relationships
become thinkable, meaningful, and/or the basis for larger social formations” and the possibilities
for “non-procreative contributions of the body itself to such a process, are of crucial interest.”677
Kinship matters for queer theory, Freeman writes, “in the way that Judith Butler reminds us that
‘bodies matter’”:
(1) a culture’s repetition of particular practices actually produces what seem to be the
material facts that supposedly ground those practices in the first place, and (2) when
those repetitions are governed by a norm, other possibilities are literally unthinkable
and impossible. Heterosexual gender norms therefore ‘make’ kin relations, in that
they regulate human behavior toward procreation while appearing to be the result of
some primal need to propagate the species. Meanwhile, whatever connections forged
by queer gender performances and other embodied behaviors ‘make’ remains
unintelligible as kinship.678
Linking kinship with queer theory, Freeman suggests three modalities, or queer readings, of
kinship that both resist normative limitations and prove useful for thinking intimacies both with
abject bodies and the weight of racist histories. The first, considers kinship as embodied practice.
The second, thinks about kinship as cultural, rather than just genetic, futurity. And the third,
regards kinship as kinetic relationship or continual activity between subjects in relation. First,
Freeman contends, thinking of kinship as embodied practice, we must recognize it as “resolutely
corporeal.” Freeman continues:
its meanings and functions draw from a repertoire of understandings about the body, from
a set of strategies oriented around the body’s limitations and possibilities . . . And if
kinship is anything at all—if it marks a terrain that cannot be fully subsumed by other
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institutions such as religion, politics, or economics—this terrain lies in its status as a set
of representational and practical strategies for accommodating all the possible ways one
human being’s body can be vulnerable and hence dependent upon that of another, and for
mobilizing all the possible resources one has for taking care of another.679
Thinking about kinship as corporeal practice, as things we do with and between bodies, helps us
recognize our fundamental vulnerabilities as material beings and “marks out a certain terrain” for
studying corporeal dependency.680 Queer activists have historically negotiated how American
culture obfuscates the reality that kinship often functions as “private, unevenly distributed social
security” relieving the government of “the burden of caretaking onto kin as if this caretaking
were a natural expression of preexisting biological ties.”681 Queer intimacies simultaneously
exceed heteronormative assumptions about these care roles, illuminate “unequally
institutionalized” forms of care, and demonstrate that care can come in many different forms
beyond “the dominant kinship grid.”682
Second, Freeman argues that kinship as embodied practice not only recognizes modalities
of dependence but also functions as a “technique of renewal,” the “process by which bodies and
the potential for physical and emotional attachment are created, transformed, and sustained over
time.”683 Furthermore, this reading of kinship as technique of renewal illuminates how queer and
black communities continue to be denied kinship recognitions. The most “systematized example
of kinship as a technique of renewal, of course, is the domestic labor that women are expected to
do to transform the raw material of a worker’s wages into what he needs to labor for another day:
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a bed, food, clean clothes, etc.”684 But kinship also “reproduces the cultural” recreating and
recharging “bodies towards ends other than labor, such as play, love, and even violence.”685
While Freeman recognizes the vocabulary is yet to be fully explored, “queer life” reproduces the
cultural.686 Even as “lesbian and gay activism demands that we continue to fight for access to
fully institutionalized systems of social reproduction such as churches, hospitals, the military,
and so on, queer theory needs,” she writes, “theories of how our renewal happens on a
microsocial level. Especially, it needs to continually identify practices of renewal that exceed the
state’s major form of ‘recognition’ and collateral entitlements.”687 Thinking about kinship as a
technique of renewal from the perspectives of queer and black experiences demonstrates both
kinship’s inherent relationship to time (the governance of past, present, and future concerns) and
the positioning of queer and black bodies outside the normative frameworks of extension and
inheritance. “Queer belonging,” Freeman argues, “names more than the longing to be and to be
connected” it also “names the longing to ‘be long,’ to endure in corporeal form over time,
beyond procreation” encompassing desires to “preserve relationships that will invariably end, but
also to have something queer exceed its own time, even to imagine that excess as queer in ways
that getting married or having children might not be.”688 Drawing from Hortense Spillers,
Freeman reminds us that the U.S. racial caste system was “coextensive with the denial of kinship
rights,” by “destroying indigenous African kin networks,” refusing “any legal standing to the
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intimate associations that African Americans did form, and turning enslavement into a stigmatic,
quasi-biological ‘property’ passed on by the mother.”689 Under the slavery system, Freeman
writes:
racialization also depended upon kinship in ways that are crucially different from the
system of gender. Rather than naturalizing bodies for the marriage market, race slavery
destroyed, distorted, and misrecognized indigenous regimes of alliance and descent to
produce bodies that, by virtue of seeming without kin, were marketable, and that by
virtue of being marketable, seemed bereft of kin. And even while slave owners
accomplished this, they justified their actions with another familial discourse,
paternalistically claiming that their slaves were children who could not survive without
them.690
Black people were “dispersed into a kind of horizontal relatedness and hence into ‘certain ethical
and sentimental features’ that have both defined and connected African Americans across space
and through time.”691 Given all this, bodies have been central to “conceptualizing the renewal of
African American individuals and collectivities beyond the dominant kinship grid.”692 A
“powerful example,” Freeman highlights, is “Toni Morrison’s sense of historical ‘remembering,’”693 that takes up this “legacy of bodily stigma unwillingly endowed over time” as
“grounds for imagining African American futurity in terms of new corporeal potentialities. The
very term ‘re-membering’ suggests that the knitting together of individual bodies that have been
ideologically and physically objectified, fragmented, or shattered is linked to the renewal of
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collective life. Again, it suggests an embodied but not procreative model of kinship” with
powerful resonances.694
Third, drawing from Corinne Hayden, Judith Butler, Claire Riley, and Kath Weston’s
abiding Families We Choose (1991), Freeman suggests thinking of queer kinships as “kinetic”
rather than “genetic,” to recognize in lesbian parental care models that birth mothers may gestate
but “co-mothers generate.”695 Hayden’s phrase “‘kinetic kinship’ resonates with Butler’s
eventual call for a theory that could make good on David Schneider’s 1984 statement that
kinship consists of ‘doing’ rather than ‘being.’ The crux of the issue for queer theory,” Freeman
writes, “might be this: what would it mean to ‘do kinship?’ How could that be separated from
hetero-procreation without losing sex, eroticism, and other bodily modes of belonging, exchange,
and attachment?”696 Thinking of kinship as dynamic, active, practical, as a “set of acts that may
or may not follow the officially recognized lines of alliance and descent” might speak to a “way
of thinking about queer belongings in a temporal as well as a spatial sense: as modes of duration
not only for otherwise mortal bodies, but between bodies separated in time.”697
It seems invaluable to think about kinship intimacies698 in and with the Gulf Coast in
conversation with these kinship critiques since this area has failed to inherit the benefits of
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evolutionary kinships while being abandoned to carry discrimination, dispossession, and erasure.
Indeed, the Gulf offers a paradigm for negotiations (queer resistances) with the dominant lexicon
of kinship taken-on by queer and black communities. Black and queer communities continue to
participate in kinship networks denied to them revealing further how human emotional life
always exceeds the dominant language and recognitions of normative kinship. Thinking with a
landscape ripe with historical significance, changed by destruction, and facing uncertain futures,
we need to conceptualize kinship within devastated landscapes similarly. Kinships along the
Gulf exist outside the horizons of normative environmental kinship while exposing normative
kinship’s inherent limitations.
Paying attention to both historicity and futurity, embodied but not necessarily procreative
in the tidiest or conservative sense, to think queer kinship in the Gulf’s devastated landscapes is
to think outside of normative intimacies in ways that are, that feel, queer in the sense Mel Chen
engages where queerness does not “merely indicate embodied sexual contact among subjects
identified as gay and lesbian,” but rather “social and cultural formations of ‘improper affiliation,’
so that queerness might well describe an array of subjectivities, intimacies, beings, and spaces
located outside of the heteronormative.”699 Affinity and attachment with or to bodies (human and

weighty associations that adhere in concepts of kinship. The ethnographic use of intimacy
resonates with the concept of relatedness parlayed by new kinship studies. The use of relatedness
‘in opposition to, or alongside, ‘kinship’ flags an intent to discover, rather than assume, which
modes of relatedness given peoples find salient and to displace the biological’/social binary of
kinship concepts… For now, intimacy allows analysts to look at relational life—including the
feelings and acts that comprise it, in relation to political and economic regimes—in conventional
sociological terms and to consider both micro and macro levels, although of course the critical
study of intimacy eschews this neat division. The term intimacy is intended to resist ideological
reifications of family, sexuality, or community—that is, to avoid recreating forms of knowledge
that perpetuate global inequality. As a placeholder, intimacy allows critical accounts of colonial
empire or capitalist modernity because it is a flexible, provisional reference that emphasized
linkages across what are understood to be distinct realms, scales, or bodies.” (48)
699

Chen, Animacies, 14.

212
nonhuman) that are impacted by environmental degradation are not discussed because they are
improper affiliations, queer intimacies that trouble more tidy relations. To address these
abandoned kin, I argue we must pursue impropriety— improper relations to time, to purity, to
disciplinary fidelity, to love. Cultivating impropriety, sitting-with intimate encounters that
frustrate seemingly straight-forward conceptions of affinity and attachment, may be biophilic
love in and through our evolutionary leftovers for these unloved others left behind.

For Multispecies Flourishing
The evolutionary kinships of new cosmology have radical hopes. In the sense that new
cosmology and other conversations in religion and ecology seek to include nonhuman others into
normative conceptions of kinship, “official” or shared biogenetics, these kinships seem
somewhat persistent in their extension. It is commonplace within the field to acknowledge
nonhuman others as evolutionary kin. But in the sense of kinship as corporeal practice in realtime, of kinetic extension for all bodies, new cosmology falls into the same problems as other
conservative forms of kinship offering few pathways for unloved others. New cosmology
intends for evolutionary kinship to function as a corrective but does not do the labor required for
this kinship intervention to resonate. To think kinship requires thinking the politics of kinship, or
who and or what can claim to be family, and it requires dwelling with the weight of heavy affects
sticking to the disinherited that are the fallout from these politics. As Heather Love writes:
a central paradox of any transformative criticism is that its dreams for the
future are founded on a history of suffering, stigma, and violence. Oppositional criticism
opposes not only existing structures of power but also the very history that gives it
meaning. Insofar as the losses of the past motivate us and give meaning to our current
experience, we are bound to memorialize them (‘We will never forget’). But we are
equally bound to overcome the past, to escape its legacy (‘We will never go back’). For
groups constituted by historical injury, the challenge is to engage with the past without
being destroyed by it. Sometimes it seems it would be better to move on— to let, as Marx
wrote, the dead bury the dead. But it is the damaging aspects of the past that tend to stay
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with us, and the desire to forget may itself be a symptom of haunting. The dead can bury
the dead all day long and still not be done.700
Here, Love articulates two problems we need to continually wrestle with while hoping to
extend kinship beyond its typical borders. First, extension requires recognizing why kinship was
and is denied to particular bodies and ways of being in the first place and this subsequently
requires not just recognition of the existing structures of power that locate particular bodies and
communities outside kin boundaries, but the very histories that gave normative kinships their
power. Which desires and intimacies were normalized and rewarded by the process of
acknowledging this body but not that one, this history but not these, as kin? Looking toward
communities and discourses that position kinship as an ongoing affective process with political
implications and material consequences will help us puzzle out our responses. Second, if religion
and ecology wants to recognize those historically disregarded within the boundaries of kinship
we would need to acknowledge the affective weight of these histories. New cosmology’s
“elevation of abstract, expert knowledge above our lived experience of the world,” Sideris
argues, “cuts us off from the strongest source of our felt connection to the more-than-human
world. It calls us away from much of what it is to be human: a living, breathing, bodily,
earthbound—and ultimately death-bound— creature, surrounded by and enmeshed with other
living and dying beings whose own worlds and realities remain somewhat opaque and
mysterious to us.”701 It is not just sensorial connection that new cosmology denies, I argue. They
primarily absolve themselves of having to reckon with “bad” feelings—all the encounters with
nonhuman nature that do not fit into the tidier emotional relations new cosmology celebrates and
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what responsibilities we might have to these communities. The turn to “bad” feelings in
contemporary social-political theory, notably the work of Sara Ahmed (2004; 2010), Lauren
Berlant (2011), and the embrace of the feminist killjoy figure in feminist theory and the work of
Jack Halberstam (2011), Lee Edelman (2005), Ann Cvetkovich (2003; 2012), and anti-social
trajectories in queer theory, provide models for religion and ecology to think about the creative
possibilities in embracing refusal, disruption, dissatisfaction, indifference, and rage. This
scholarship, as my attention to Ahmed demonstrates, disturbs the normative affective
orientations that become ideal for privileged cultural positions by illuminating the communities
and bodies that are out-of-step with these acceptable affects. Attention to negativity demands
recognizing “how the internal experience of affect is mediated by different bodies and subject
positions,”702 revealing that claims to normative emotions “make certain forms of personhood
valuable”703 by rewarding compliance with, or conformity to these affective norms. Ignoring
“bad” feelings further stigmatizes these emotions and the communities attached to them, as I’ve
outlined, but it also closes us off from the wealth of connection “bad” feelings can unfold. Socalled “negative” emotions can be tremendous resources for environmental thought and activism.
Religion and ecology as a whole encourages folding nonhuman others within our sphere
of kin concern but offers very few resources for negotiating what it means to care for populations
on the edge of extinction, all those dead and buried by the weight of history, bodies and
populations facing precarious futures. In short, religion and ecology asks us to care for
nonhuman others like kin while ignoring that this kin-love means encountering tremendous
trauma, grief, and mourning. Kin care that acknowledges the trouble we find ourselves in, both
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uncertain futures and presents haunted by the ghosts of environmental degradation, will have to
engage these feelings as part of our response-abilities. One way to remain with the trouble would
be to ask how our scholarship can develop and articulate better understandings of affects like
grief, loss, fear, and anguish by weaving environmental degradation and its complex intimacies
into part of what we do rather than a spectacular exception. We must learn to “grieve-with,”
Haraway writes, to do the “difficult cultural work of reflection and mourning” that would
recognize “our dependence on and relationships with those countless others being driven over
the edge of extinction.”704 Avoiding these emotions means avoiding tremendous environmental
trouble. “We are in and of this fabric of undoing,” Haraway writes, “without sustained
remembrance, we cannot learn to live with ghosts and so cannot think.”705 The next two chapters
outline what it means to craft-with the ghosts of environmental degradation and to stay-with
damaged habitats, communities in pain, and bodies changed by catastrophe. In chapter six, I will
cultivate what I call a kinship of remainders which resists new cosmology assumptions that one
must follow a singular narrative with an orienting awe, wonder, and reverence for the natural
world in order to find community or to further green sentiment. It is imperative that scholars
refuse to inherit white environmentalism, and I attempt to contribute to this refusal by
articulating complex, often deeply painful, emotional relationships with nature that recognize the
inherent grief attached to long histories of social injustice. I draw on scholars who do not put
environmentalism at the center of their work, like Ann Cvetkovich, Toni Morrison, Natasha
Trethewey, Avery Gordon, Jennifer C. James, and Kara Walker, yet I argue they provide better
pathways for religion and ecology to give attention to the slow erosions of environmental justice
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and to help articulate an understanding of environmental trauma as historical, embodied, and
present. Furthermore, moving from experiences of negation—feeling out of place and
uncomfortable at home—toward collective work, these theorists model how powerful
counterpublics can form from “negative” affects. Finally, in order to resist the foreclosure of
possible futures for devastated environments, in chapter seven I explore queer eco-crip
affinities—scholarship that illuminates how compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory ablebodiedness and able-mindedness within religion and ecology shape not just our “cultural
constructions of nature, wilderness and the environment”706 but the nature of desire itself limiting
what sorts of affinities, attachments, and care are proper or even possible, and thus, what ethical
futures we might imagine together as oddkin.
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Chapter Six
Kinship of Remainders
THE OLD VANDALS WERE FLOODS AND BOATS
eroding the banks. The islands that once dotted the bays
have sunk, disappearing into silverfish grit, thinned
into algae and filament now being made
quiet by plumes. Despite ourselves
we are made quiet. The death of the sea
a thing we must lower ourselves into
to imagine. I will stay with you here
inside the sheen of orange that quickly kills,
not like the saltwater slowly starving the freshwatermarshes and grasses that knit this green-wet
world together. The two breathless gannets
found covered in oil are not unlike you,
at the mercy of a mercy that moves in plumes,
that insists certain fates remain
invisible. What existed before the oil arrived
was delicate and mired, a broom of moonlight
swept through half-choked waves. I trust you
if you wish for what it, too, might have been.
Joanna Klink, excerpt, “Terrebonne Bay,” Excerpts from a Secret Prophecy707
“When a ghost appears, it is making contact with you; all its forceful if perplexing enunciations
are for you. Offer it a hospitable reception we must, but the victorious reckoning with the ghost
always requires a partiality to the living. Because ultimately haunting is about how to transform a
shadow of a life into an undiminished life whose shadows touch softly in the spirit of a peaceful
reconciliation. In this necessarily collective undertaking, the end, which is not an ending at all,
belongs to everyone.” Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological
Imagination708
Thus far, I demonstrated how new cosmology’s ontoethical project is an investment in
white environmentalism—whiteness as a way of knowing becoming “the way of understanding
our environment” through habitual investments in the normativity of white encounters with
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nature in representation, rhetoric, and affective economies.709 Carolyn Finney reminds us that
“stories, or narratives, about our ‘natural environment,’” work to inform “our environmental
interactions” and shape “the institutions concerned with environmental issues,” but what is
missing from many environmental narratives is the multitude of encounters “influenced by race,
gender, class, and other aspects of difference that can determine one’s ability to access spaces of
power and decision making.” 710 Pivotal for understanding the affective economies of the
devastated Gulf landscape, what is glaringly absent within new cosmology’s narrative is an
“African American perspective, a nonessentialized black environmental identity that is grounded
in the legacy of African American experiences” and “mediated by privilege (both intellectual and
material).”711 I outlined how the comprehensive common story that new cosmologists hope will
act as an ethical guide for ecological concerns, the affective reorientation they hope will lead us
to treat nonhuman others with reverent care as our evolutionary kin, is impervious to concerns
evoked by quotidian encounters in environmentally degraded regions by articulating how this
narrative is unable to relate to disaster, toxicity, and environmental racism. I have insisted that in
order to address suffering and prepare for complex futures, we resist the many privileged
singularities engrained within new cosmology perspectives: its championing of a single orienting
narrative, its embrace of uncritical forms of science as really-real knowledge, its reliance on
“expert” perspectives to trace the true shape of Nature, its investment in one conception of what
it means to be human, its cultivation of one normative affective relationship with nonhuman
others, and its insistence on one route toward environmental change.
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This chapter leans into this resistance through readings of different narratives, altogether
different relationships with the nonhuman world, that I argue compel us to fundamentally rethink
our conceptions of environmental intimacy. These narratives are shaped by disaster and
environmental racism along the Gulf Coast and demonstrate the diverse, rich, ambiguous,
painful, and frustrating bonds many humans have with their environments in the South. I argue
they model a kinship of remainders—the shaping of affinities and attachments amongst
disposable bodies, communities, and habitats through affects other than awe and wonder and
beyond the prescriptions of new cosmology that give little attention either to the being-long of
the disinherited and disposable or the reverberations of American racial violence. These
narratives insist on a historical sense of the land where cultivating kinship with these spaces,
places, creatures, and communities requires reckoning with the long histories of abuse and
abandonment that continue to shape intimacies in devastated landscapes. Illuminating the
realities that marginalized communities “can seldom afford to be single-issue activists”712 or
single-narrative advocates, these stories move beyond kin as tied solely to evolutionary “ancestry
or genealogy” and toward cultivating and honoring odd couplings, “ontologically inventive . . .
care of kinds-as-assemblages” with kinships that recognize historical and contemporary
environmental trauma.713 These affinities negotiate representations of the material and affective
changes wrought by the trouble we find ourselves in, what Rosi Braidotti reading Foucault and
Deleuze might call “creative figurations” or adequate “cartographies” for advanced capitalism.714
They are kinship figurations that “collect up hopes and fears and show possibilities and dangers”
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to “guide us to a more livable place,” one Haraway calls an “elsewhere” in their abilities to move
beyond normative inheritance—“keeping the lineages going, even while defamiliarizing their
members and turning lines into webs, trees into esplanades, and pedigrees into affinity
groups.”715
To help religion and ecology begin to attune to the realities of environmental trauma, first
I will guide “critical intimacy scholarship” or “cultural studies of the politics of intimacy,”716 on
trauma and melancholy into conversation with nascent negotiations with environmental trauma
and loss. Then I will closely attend to the work of two artists and scholars that model thinking
through the trouble at the intersections of historical and continual anti-black violence717 and
environmental decline along the Gulf Coast. Natasha Trethewey’s (2010) memoir Beyond
Katrina: A Meditation on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and Kara Walker’s (2007) “rumination” on
Hurricane Katrina in her visual essay After the Deluge, both explore complex “aesthetics of
attachment” voiced by “minoritized subjects,” what Lauren Berlant drawing from Deleuze and
Guattari calls “minor intimacies,” as occasions to rethink intimacy in ways that do not just reify
the white, enclosed, rational, sovereign subject of new cosmology.718
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Environmental Mourning
While there is a “surprising lack of discussion around mourning related to environmental
loss or dispossession in broader discursive frameworks or public dialogues,”719 there is
increasing interest in the environmental humanities, with glimmers from religion, in unpacking
environmental trauma, grief, loss, and mourning.720 These authors interrogate what it means to
be passionately immersed in the lives of human and nonhuman others in a time of extinctions721
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or of particular interest to this dissertation, to what the entangled encounters of becoming-with
might feel like when confronting the loss of species and habitats. Often this material is sparked
by “personal experiences with deep and profound moments of grief for non-human entities and
degrading landscapes and ecosystems.”722 Building from Judith Butler’s723 questions regarding
“what, then, may be gained from ‘tarrying with grief, from remaining exposed to its
unbearability and not endeavoring to seek a resolution for grief,’” current work on environmental
grief: asks “what counts as a mournable body (and what does not),” it thinks “beyond the human
to extend the work of mourning to non-humans to think about other possible futures, other
possible mournings,” and it recognizes “our shared vulnerabilities to human and non-human
bodies” embracing “our complicity in the death of these other bodies—however painful that
process may be.”724
“To mourn is always an expression and fulfillment of kinship,” Sebastian F. Braun
writes, “implicit in the practice of mourning” for nonhuman others, he argues, is that:
we relate to our environment through kinship relations. Mourning is a social activity,
extended to close friends and relatives. My contention, then, is that people mourn for
specific parts of their environments because they feel related to them. Judith Butler wrote
that, in mourning, ‘something about who we are is revealed, something that delineates the
ties we have to others, that shows us that these ties constitute what we are.’ Mourning for
the environment, in other words, shows what kinds of kinship relations we create and lose
with our environments.725
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Though kinship with nonhuman others is “often perceived as metaphorical, a mere cultural
invention, a symbolic relation at best,” Braun argues that these relationships are “as real as any
other kinship relation.”726 Braun, and others like Michael Jackson and Karen Warren,727
acknowledge that kin relations with nonhuman others do not prevent violence to land or animals
yet they can shape more sustainable relationships. For example, Braun resists an overly
romanticized trope of harmonious native peoples by gesturing toward the kinship systems with
nonhuman others formed by indigenous peoples (Lakota relationships with buffalo in particular)
that do not prevent the killing of animals for sustenance but presses that these kinship relations
do “impose obligations” such as responsibility for what and how much is “sacrificed,” rituals of
thanks for sacrifice that resist detached slaughtering of nonhumans, and mourning for population
losses.728 While Braun is skeptical that mourning for the environment would “necessarily
indicate a greater respect for life,” mourning “as a social practice,” he argues, reveals that
“environmental relations are social relations and, therefore” if “we want to create more positive
relations with our environments we cannot do so in isolation from other social relations.”729
Thinking of mourning along with other social relations, mourning nonhuman others as
kin comes in different forms. For example, Sarah M. Pike’s work on radical environmental and
animal rights activists’ feelings of loss and grief for species and habitat extinction positions grief
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as both a “central motivating factor in conversion and commitment to activism” for members of
these groups but also as forms of resistance through ongoing processes of “remembering the
dead and disappearing” as intimates.730 Mourning old growth trees and animal species, these
“rites of mourning” function, Pike argues, as “both an expression of deeply felt kinship bonds
with others species and a significant factor in creating those bonds” by illuminating losses that
are ignored and generating fuel for their continued activism through “speaking to their beloved
dead, keeping them present.”731 As another example, in her essay “Climate Change as the Work
of Mourning,” Ashlee Cunsolo describes both her grief for her Inuit colleagues and friends
across Canada’s North and their grief for the progressive losses of land and sea ice that is
threatening the “basis for their livelihoods, culture, and survival.”732 In conversation, her Inuit
colleagues described “the land as a close intimate, a mother figure and spiritual entity capable of
response and reciprocity,” and expressed “intense feelings of sadness, disorientation, grief, loss,
and lament for a rapidly changing land.”733 Furthermore, these colleagues also “shared a sense of
anticipatory grieving for losses expected to come, but not yet arrived,” lamentation for their
beloveds and communities as these conditions “will most likely worsen in severity and
impact.”734 These examples demonstrate that feelings of loss related to environmental
degradation are complex but, echoing Kay Milton’s work, they also reveal that while our
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scholarship is not catching up, many humans already do cultivate these emotional ties regarding
nonhuman others as kin and are actively negotiating how environmental decline is impacting
these relationships.
There is much to admire in these nascent explorations of emotional responses to
ecological degradation and loss, not least the labor of working through how our time is one of
mourning. What is not theorized, however, is the tricky kind of mourning I want to sit with here
that is still tied to species and habitat loss and mutation but is truly a mourning for what might
have been but never was—a relationship with the land and nonhuman others that is free from
oppression, toxicity, and fear. While puzzling through mourning for lost species and habitats is a
growing interest, what is not explored is loss and mourning in relation to the racial violence that
is endemic to environmental emotions in America—a mourning for the potentiality of the places
and communities that is continually stopped by violence and toxic investments.735 Reiterating
Carolyn Finney’s arguments, we must:
challenge the universality that denies the differences in our collective experiences of
nature in the United States . . . how key moments in U.S. history that in many ways have
come to define human/environment interaction in the United States bump up against
collective experiences of black people navigating the social, cultural, and psychological
minefields of slavery and segregation . . . What is the emotional and psychological
‘trickle down’ effect of the way in which these movements/ideas impacted black people
over the long term? How do we challenge, to paraphrase Haraway, a nature that seems
innocent of black history?”736
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sources on race in the trendiest discussions of the troubles of the Anthropocene) incredibly
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Dorceta Taylor, Carolyn Merchant, and Kevin DeLuca’s scholarship737 reminds us about
all the ways nature is violently reinforced as a “‘white’ space and a white concern” illuminating
how “African Americans have historically undergone repeated cultural interrogations regarding
their status as humans within the larger society. The legacy of these cultural constructions
reveals a thinly veiled contempt for black people that continues to be expressed in intellectual,
political, and cultural sites.”738 There are “many complexities involved in African American
attitudes toward the natural world” including ambiguous feelings connected to the denial of
“comparable access to those locations celebrated by nature writers,” and negotiations with
“oppressive poverty and the threat of physical violence” that “historically worked in tandem to
create the sense that nature is off-limits and the purview of a distant culture in a distant
landscape.”739 Kimberly N. Ruffin writes that often “the force of oppression in the social world
has left African Americans so limited as ecological agents that relationships with nonhuman
nature becomes unfathomable, undesirable, or impossible.”740 While conceptualizing and or
negotiating these relationships is complex, that what is or seems possible is limited conceptually
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and materially through violent reinforcement, to deny or ignore that African Americans have
always had emotional attachments with American land conveniently sidesteps addressing the
continual discriminations that shape these attachments. Finney highlights how universal
narratives about our collective experiences of nature ignore both the violence and erasure pressed
on black bodies (historical realties for black Americans during the birth of environmentalism and
their reverberating legacies for more contemporary events like Katrina) and that these same
bodies have always had intimate relationships with American landscapes through material and
political labor. While “African Americans were barred from contributing to the larger narrative
of American progress, what cannot be denied is the physical labor and mental ingenuity of
African Americans, both those whose backbreaking work in the fields propelled the nation’s
economy forward, and those whose deep-seated belief in civic engagement changed our political
and social landscapes.”741 In truth, “representations and racialization inform the way we
approach the ‘business,’ the ‘science,’ and the ‘conservation’ of the natural world,” Finney
argues, and they “affect the way these spaces and places are constructed and the institutions that
maintain these constructions.”742 By excluding black environmental experiences, black
environmental imaginaries, either “(implicitly or explicitly), corporate, academic, and
environmental institutions” like new cosmology, “legitimate the invisibility” of African
Americans “in all spaces that inform, shape, and control the way we know and interact with the
environment in the United States.”743 As I have demonstrated, if to be human is to be intimate
with nature in only the affective frames of white environmentalism—to feel the appropriate awe,
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wonder, and reverence while ignoring sorrow, anger, fear, loss, and frustration—then new
cosmology’s affective prescriptions dangerously weave into and legitimize the environmental
histories that dehumanize black Americans.
It is important, however, to recognize that as we consider how environmental trauma
impacts the affective orientations of black communities we must resist two racist misdirects.
First, is the persistent myth that people of color are not concerned with environmental issues
because they are alienated from the environment post-slavery and Jim Crow encounters or that
they are only concerned with social equality. Covering two decades of sociological data, Robert
Emmet Jones’, “Black Concern for the Environment: Myth Versus Reality” clearly demonstrates
how normative media, academia, and policy makers continue to position black communities as
unconcerned about the environment despite research that points to this being a complete
fabrication.744 On the whole, blacks and whites maintain a similar level of interest in
environmental concerns with, at times, concerns about different environmental problems.745
There is some evidence that “people of color,” Jones writes, “appear to be more concerned about
the safety and health effects associated with nuclear power and solid, toxic, and nuclear wastes,
whereas whites appear to be more concerned about ozone depletion and global warming,” and
with good reason.746 Echoing Robert Bullard and Giovanna Di Chiro’s long work in
environmental justice, the habitual restriction by myopic environmental policy makers and
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theorists to limit “environmental concern” solely to matters of “environmental impacts related to
air, water, land, and species other than Homo sapiens” tends to ignore the “critical impacts to
sociostructural and cultural systems” that people of color facing environmental racism must
negotiate. Furthermore, it obscures and erases how these communities often engage in
environmental action positioning black Americans as unconcerned about the environment while
conveniently side-stepping their environmental concerns through further entrenching problematic
nature-culture divides within our theory.747 To resist this fallacy we must continually question
who gets to decide what is an “environmental concern” while advocating for recognition of
racism as a pervasive issue.
Second, particularly worrisome for a project like this one, are the insidious possibilities
that discussions of environmental trauma and toxicity can be used to further support arguments
championing the unrecruitability of black people in the moral cause of American white futurity.
Much like racist talking-points post-Katrina that mark black communities as socially corrupt and
thus unworthy of environmental intervention or incapable of articulating environmental
concerns, I can see my efforts to further address toxicity and environmental trauma being coopted to position black and disabled bodies as inhuman, damaged animals, symptoms and
victims of the depravity of urbanity in need of “benevolent” paternal intervention. 748 We must
pay attention to how the toxic fall-out from long histories of environmental racism is further used
to position bodies of color as fundamentally flawed objects of fear. These traps are so easy to fall
into for religion and ecology if we do not keep a pulse on the histories of how “nature” and
nature-care have been constructed and normalized particularly within forms of religious
environmentalism that refuse to decouple from an ontological reliance on universal narratives
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and continue to cultivate an “authentic” encounter between humans and nonhuman others that
we must “get-back to.”
One example of how this is already happening in circles that share similar archives is the
disturbing lack of critique of the racist and ableist implications in “nature-deficit disorder”
theories particularly in their popular culture forms. Drawing from Wilson’s biophilia hypothesis,
conversations in ecopsychology, and popular material on attention deficit disorder (ADD) and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Richard Louv’s (2005) national bestseller Last
Child in the Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder is one of many
contemporary discourses (like new cosmology) that position humans as alienated from nature
resulting in a number of health and social-ills, and it advocates for returning to a pre-WWII
childhood model with more free-range nature encounter.749 Nestled within interdisciplinary
conversations750 about “child-nature relationships and disconnection,” Louv contends that
nature-deficit disorder (NDD) is a metaphor rather than medical diagnosis (though the pop
culture interest in his work habitually translates it as a diagnosis) but nevertheless argues that
contemporary children have “detached from nature and pay a heavy” emotional and material
“price” particularly “dulled senses, behavioral difficulties, obesity, stress, declining academic
performance, and decreased emotional and physical well-being.”751 For Louv, NDD “stems from
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and is contextualized by ADD/ADHD” and he promotes teaching children science and advocates
“nature therapy— ‘nature’s Ritalin’” to reduce ADHD symptoms and other NDD problems.752
While the compassionate focus on children’s environments and the interest in play-based
therapies are commendable, Elizabeth Dickson argues, in one of the few critiques of NDD, that
in the absence of deeper cultural criticism, NDD and other conversations like it is an incredibly
problematic environmental discourse. Louv “idealized Muir, Leopold, Roosevelt, Darwin,
Thoreau, D. H. Lawrence, Davy Crockett, and Woody Guthrie” and while “these men are
admired environmental advocates,” Dickinson writes, “they offer predominately White, male,
and Western perspectives. The desire, then, appears to be to return to a ‘normal,’ particularly
White, middle-class, male, heterosexual cultural past that obscures race, class, and gender
politics.”753 “Human-nature estrangement is exceptionally complex and involves underlying
issues of power that result in environmental destruction, classism, racism, sexism, and
homophobia,” Dickinson argues, yet this scholarship mainly ignores these issues and largely
speaks “for and to affluent white audiences.”754 Consequently, Louv and educators “prescribe
returning to nature mainly through physical activities, such as hiking, camping, fishing, hunting,
and bird watching” but fail to recognize both that “these activities do not automatically create
connection, affect, or emotional attachment” and that they “may pose challenges and obscure
environmental issues” via the “mindset and assumptions that undergird them.”755 For example, as
Dickinson and others remind, “spending time in the outdoors in the way Louv and educators
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propose typically requires transportation, time, money, consumption, and a particular lifestyle
and mindset.”756 For “single, financially constrained, and geographically (and often racially)
segregated families, taking children outside or traveling to designated nature areas can be
difficult.”757 Moreover, these activities “frequently require an element of physical and social
access; even if one does have the resources, people of color, women,” queers, and “youth may
not have the same kind of safety in their access” and by “focusing on certain activities and
assumptions, adults ignore deep ecologists, ecofeminists, environmental justice activists,
American Indian/Native American advocacy groups, and others who work tirelessly to expose
environmental degradation, racism, sexism, and classism.”758 Finally, one element overlooked by
Dickinson that I will explore more in the last chapter, by ignoring how these activities also pose
immense accessibility issues for disabled bodies this discourse positions disabled and ill bodies
as an environmental problem, victims or collateral damage within environmental and social
degradation, thus resisting any efforts by disabled and ill persons to determine their own
relationships to nonhuman others and their own conceptions of embodied differences that may or
may not be the result of environmental degradation. Consequently, it is not difficult to see how
NDD fuels into the same mindsets that position black youth, particularly ill and disabled youth,
as difficult to educate, plagued by attention and discipline problems, easier to incarcerate, easier
to ignore in disaster protection and environmental restoration.
Keeping these complications in mind, I argue it is possible to talk about environmental
trauma and toxicity without positioning it as detrimentally foundational if we recognize both that
ideal reciprocity with the environment is a continually cultivated myth fueled and enjoyed by
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only particular interests, and the reality that we are all politically entangled and negotiating what
it means to live within environmental degradation. One way to stay-with this trouble, therefore,
is to resist universal narratives and their role in structural racism by looking toward narratives
addressing the complexity of environmental experience. While there is “no monolithic African
American environmental experience,” Finney writes, and “it is important not to confuse or
conflate the historical need of African Americans to privilege race in order to address major
issues (e.g., segregation) with the belief that all African Americans experience day-to-day life in
much the same way,” when people responded to Finney’s questions about frustrations with the
“practices of environmental organizations” and their involvement, “commonalities in their
responses outweighed their differences.”759 “While it was tempting, for example, to fall back on
the rural/urban dichotomy to frame their responses,” Finney writes:
what became exceedingly clear was that the experience of being black
trumped any place-based assertions related to environmental engagement. For many
African Americans I spoke with, their economic mobility status was fluid; they may have
grown up on a farm, but lived in a city as an adult. They may have raised their kids in a
suburb, but retired to a rural area. But no matter where they found themselves, they were
always black. And while the meaning of blackness in all of its complexity and real-life
manifestations has arguably shifted over time, the collective historical experience of
being black in America has not. These similarities in attitudes and perceptions drawn
from a collective history and consciousness that is reinforced and remembered through
media, textual representation, and experience. ‘The collective experience of pain and
hardship, suffering and sacrifice has given African Americans a unique perspective from
which our consciousness has been forged.’ In addition, regardless of where one stands in
the race debate, the history of white supremacy in the United States and how it has been
articulated on the landscape is difficult to dispute, though some charge that ‘historical
amnesia’ does make it easier to deny or forget.760
It is this collective affective experience, continually reiterated through space, place, and
encounter, that environmental movements (including much of religion and ecology) continue to
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either treat as “special topics” or outright ignore. Finney’s African American interlocutors
describe patterns of behavior within environmental movements that demonstrate resistance to
talking about racism, or to “provide continued financial support for diversity programs.”761
Furthermore, for those that work within environmental organizations (despite a “lot of lip service
about diversity,”) they usually find themselves as the sole black person within the group.762 “One
of the biggest challenges for individuals whose work is considered ‘environmental,’” Finney
writes, “is how quickly anything related to African Americans and the environment gets
designated as an ‘environmental justice’ concern:
There is usually no discussion about the particulars—just the mere fact that
‘race’ or ‘black people’ are involved usually relegates African American environmental
interactions to a particular point on the environment spectrum—environmental justice. In
fact, the field of environmental justice has done a stellar job at highlighting the
complexity in framing any EJ discussion by drawing attention to three key debates within
the EJ literature: whether environmental injustice is cause primarily by racism or
capitalism; the value and importance of layperson knowledge vs. ‘expert knowledge’; and
the ‘different ways to make the particular legible in reference to the abstract and the
abstract accessible with reference to the particular.’ However, my concern is with the
assumption that the best framework to understand any environmental issue or experience
had by African Americans is an environmental justice framework. Is EJ the best way to
frame the black environmental experience? Is it the only way? What are some of the
limitations of always using an EJ framework? Are we ‘shrinking our ledge’? What kinds
of questions are we not asking as a result of always using EJ?763
One of the limitations of designating any intersection of race and environment as an
environmental justice concern, the “kinds of questions we are not asking,” is the resulting failure
to recognize how the collective experience of race in America unsettles the foundational values,
concerns, keywords within environmental theory itself. What is overlooked, particularly by
religion and ecology, is how much of our conceptions of nature, human, relationship, kinship,
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intimacy, reciprocity, and love are rooted in the continual negation of black experience in what
remains a racist nation. Amnesia about this collective experience within religion and ecology
makes it easier to advocate for an uncomplicated kinship with nonhuman others by ignoring
voices that disturb these normative emotions. Insisting that all environmental issues are
environmental justice issues can help us rethink these habitual terms.
Finney highlights two affective elements within her interviews that I find particularly
important to recognize in the context of devastated landscapes. First, what Finney settles on
calling “fatigue,” (that is, like any emotion, a combination of other emotions like frustration and
anger) or a weariness, exhaustion, and resistance to being the sole black voice, always being
positioned as having to represent black voices, habitually having to explain to “white folks”
about black experiences, and continually experiencing the erasure and avoidance of black
environmental concerns as either not “environmental” nor informed by “expert” knowledge.764
Second, is the amalgamation of fear and complex mourning African Americans describe when
talking about environmental encounters. “Many African Americans who work with community
members felt that many of their constituents were afraid of two things,” Finney relays, “the
unknown (primarily wildlife) and white people:
while both wildlife and white people provoke fear in some constituents, the basis for, and
the subsequent responses to, these fears are decidedly different. Wildlife is largely an
unknown—many urban-dwelling African Americans have never had any real contact
with wild animals outside of the zoo or dealings with raccoons or rabbits. Anything they
have learned about wildlife they acquired from mass media or books. When visiting an
area touted to have ‘wildlife,’ people tend to rely on those more knowledgeable (like park
rangers) to guide them through the experience. On the other hand, most African
Americans have had lifelong contact with white people. Fears about such contact are
based on something that has happened to them, their family, their friends, or someone in
their neighborhood. In addition, living with the knowledge of slavery, lynching, and
racial profiling has meant that African Americans have had to develop survival skills in
order to confront potentially life-threatening situations. They do not need to turn to an
expert in order to deal with any given situation; they are the experts. While trust is
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needed to convince someone that they will be protected and secure while experiencing
the outdoors, it is arguably more difficult to gain that trust in relation to fears held about
white people than it is concerning fears about wild animals.765
While white Americans revere the landscapes that environmental movements are particularly
fond of, like areas of natural beauty, we should remember that “these places are overlaid with
histories seen and unseen; geographies of fear that can make a ‘natural’ place suspect to an
African American. The experience is further enhanced by other aspects of difference, including
gender, age, sexual orientation, geography, and experience” and the lack of wider recognition of
these realities generates feelings of ambivalence, fatigue, and frustration.766 “Fear and mistrust”
of “forests and other green spaces,” Finney writes, reveal a “fear and mistrust of what these
spaces represent in the eyes of a black person hobbled by repressive rules, cultural norms, racist
propaganda, and the possibility of death.”767 Like the song “Strange Fruit,” made famous by
Billie Holiday and Nina Simone demonstrates, the southern tree “becomes a symbol for the
violence done to black bodies, manifest as ‘strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees. The
significance of this symbol—the tree as a harbinger of death for black people—persists in
contemporary culture whether in song, imagery, or as part of the news of the day.”768
In “Black Women and the Wilderness,” Evelyn C. White’s (1998) moving experiences in
the foothills of Oregon’s Cascade Mountains further describe these complex emotions. Invited to
a women’s writing workshop in this picturesque location, White writes, “I wasn’t fully aware of
my troubled feelings about nature,” until she experienced the fear of going out and joining the
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other women in nature.769 “I wanted to sit outside and listen to the roar of the ocean,” she writes,
“but I was afraid. I wanted to walk through the redwoods, but I was afraid. I wanted to glide in a
kayak and feel the cool water splash in my face, but I was afraid.”770 “For me, the fear is like a
heartbeat, always present, while at the same time, intangible, elusive, and difficult to define. So
pervasive, so much a part of me, that I hardly knew it was there . . . While the river’s roar gave
me a certain comfort and my heart warmed when I gazed at the sun-dappled trees out of a
classroom window,” she writes,
I didn’t want to get closer. I was certain that if I ventured outside to admire a meadow or
to feel the cool ripples in a stream, I’d be taunted, attacked, raped, maybe even murdered
because of the color of my skin. I believe the fear I experience in the outdoors is shared
by many African-American women and that it limits the way we move through the world
and colors the decisions we make about our lives. For instance, for several years now,
I’ve been thinking about moving out of the city to a wooded, vineyard-laden area in
Northern California. It is there, among the birds, creeks, and trees that I long to settle
down and make a home. Each house-hunting trip I’ve made to the countryside has been
fraught with two emotions: elation at the prospect of living closer to nature and a sense of
absolute doom about what might befall me in the backwoods. My genetic memory of
ancestors hunted down and preyed upon in rural setting counters my fervent hopes of
finding peace in the wilderness. Instead of the solace and comfort I seek, I imagine
myself in the country as my forebears were—exposed, vulnerable, and unprotected—a
target of cruelty and hate.771
The fear White describes “was largely informed by a collective history of violence against
African Americans at the hands of white people,”772 particularly how thoughts of the images of
Emmett Till and the deaths of Denise McNair, Addie Mae Collins, Cynthia Wesley, and Carol
Robertson at the Sixteenth Street Church in Birmingham, Alabama left her “speechless and
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paralyzed” with “heart-stopping fear” whenever she visited the outdoors.773 Emmett Till’s death
particularly “seemed to be summed up in the prophetic warning of writer Alice Walker, herself a
native of rural Georgia: ‘Never be the only one, except, possibly, in your own house.’”774 White
also conveys a sadness about what she loses in and to these fears, how they determine particular
paths for her life despite her frustrations, and she writes about actively engaging these feelings to
wrestle out a different relationship with the environment. “I concealed my pained feelings about
the outdoors,” she writes, “until I could no longer reconcile my silence with my mandate to my
students to face their fears. They found the courage to write openly about incest, poverty, and
other ills that had constricted their lives: How could I turn away from my fears about being in
nature?”775
The re-membering process she describes I read as doing environmental kinship by not
ignoring these “negative” emotions or the affective power of her cultural memories nor
conceding that the natural beauty or her love for the land overpowers this pain. Instead White
remains-with these feelings, however painful remaining proves to be, by embracing this history
to negotiate her fears and desires. “In an effort to contain my fears,” she writes:
I forced myself to revisit the encounter and to reexamine my childhood
wounds from the Birmingham bombing and the lynching of Emmett Till. I touched the
terror of my Ibo and Ashanti ancestors as they were dragged from Africa and enslaved on
southern plantations. I conjured bloodhounds, burning crosses, and white-robed
Klansmen hunting down people who looked just like me. I imagined myself being
captured in a swampy backwater, my back ripped open and bloodied by the whip’s lash. I
cradled an ancestral mother, broken and keening as her baby was snatched from her arms
and sold down the river . . . Determined to reconnect myself to the comfort my African
ancestors felt in the rift valleys of Kenya and on the shores of Sierra Leone, I eventually
decided to go on a rafting trip. Familiar with my feelings about nature, Judith, a dear
friend and workshop founder, offered to be one of my raftmates. With her sturdy, gentle
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and wise body as my anchor, I lowered myself into a raft at the bank of the river. As we
pushed off into the current, I felt myself make an unsure but authentic shift from my
painful past . . . About an hour into the trip, in a magnificently still moment, I looked up
into the heavens and heard the voice of black poet Langston Hughes: ‘I’ve known rivers
ancient as the world and older than the flow of human blood in human veins. I bathed in
the Euphrates when dawns were young. I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me to
sleep. I looked upon the Nile and raised the pyramids above it. My soul has grown deep
like the rivers.’ Soaking wet and shivering with emotion, I felt tears welling in my eyes as
I stepped out of the raft onto solid ground. Like my African forebears who survived the
Middle Passage, I was stronger at journey’s end. Since that voyage, I’ve stayed at country
farms, napped on secluded beaches, and taken wilderness treks all in an effort to find
peace in the outdoors. No matter where I travel, I will always carry Emmett Till and the
four black girls whose deaths affect me so. But comforted by our tribal ancestors—
herders, gatherers, and fishers all—I am less fearful, ready to come home.776
What White offers us here is a very complex encounter. She knits together the traumas and loses
from the past in order to understand her emotions in the present, negotiating with the fear that
shapes the course of her future, resisting the sedimented histories of violence that make nature
encounters so very terrifying for her by invoking other pasts and possible futures where
landscapes carry different affective encounters for black bodies. It is important to recognize that
she identifies these traumas as something she “will always carry,” a shouldering of the violence
that reverberates. It is not something she just gets over. What White works out is a complicated
kinship of remainders by wrestling with the weight of inheritance, remembering lost bodies,
families, ways of being, and cultivating a tentatively-raw embracing of both the nonhuman and
the memories. The kinship of remainders White models is dynamically present via working in
and through her affective everyday encounters in her environment as well as resolutely corporeal
in her struggle to listen to the historical and present fears her body feels in her desire to take to
the water. Sitting with the kinship White offers us, I want to think more about the negotiation of
past and present fears, pain, trauma, environmental degradation, and alternative paths to consider
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environmental agency, care, creativity, and futurity along the Gulf Coast. First, I will look at
some resources working through cultural memory and trauma and loss and then Natasha
Trethewey and Kara Walker’s work that take up these elements in devastated landscapes.

Trauma, Haunting, and Melancholic Kin
Exploring affinities and attachments in devastated landscapes is, unavoidably, an
encounter with trauma and loss. How religion and ecology will theoretically negotiate these
realities is a pressing open question.777 The response-abilities we will need to develop are
numerous. For example, as Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands asks, “how does one mourn in the
midst of a culture that finds it almost impossible to recognize the value of what has been lost?”778
How do we talk about trauma, loss, and feelings of mourning when what has been lost is difficult
to articulate? How do we think about environmental trauma experienced by diverse groups of
people in different ways? Furthermore, in relation to the contexts I am addressing here, we will
need to puzzle out how to encourage recognition of emotional investments like mourning the loss
of homes, communities, and histories as environmental concerns particularly when these
beloveds are urban, damaged, degraded, toxic, “minor” histories, sacrifice zones, and
dispossessed communities.
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I find tremendous value for environmental theory in scholarship that defines trauma
“culturally rather than clinically,” where trauma “becomes a central category for looking at the
intersections of emotional and social processes along with the intersections of memory and
history” with a particular focus on how “trauma digs itself in at the level of the everyday.”779
Ann Cvetkovich’s work in affect, queer, and cultural studies, An Archive of Feelings: Trauma,
Sexuality and Lesbian Public Cultures (2003) and Depression: A Public Feeling (2012), and
Avery Gordon’s work in affect and sociology, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological
Imagination (1997) resist assumptions that “good politics can only emerge from good
feelings”780 by thinking about how “abusive systems of power make themselves known and their
impacts felt in everyday life, especially when they are supposedly over and done with (slavery,
for instance) or when their oppressive nature is denied (as in free labor or national security.)”781
For the most part, Cvetkovich argues, “sociocultural approaches to trauma have been
overshadowed by psychoanalytic and psychiatric discourse,” and “more recently, the
development of PTSD as a clinical diagnosis.”782 Cvetkovich, and others like Cathy Caruth,
Marita Sturken, Mark Seltzer, read trauma “instead as a social and cultural discourse that
emerges in response to the demands of grappling with the psychic consequence of historical
events.”783 “Defined culturally rather than clinically,” Cvetkovich writes, “trauma studies
becomes an interdisciplinary field for exploring the public cultures created around traumatic
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events. Trauma becomes a central category along with the intersections of memory and history;
it gives rise to what Marita Sturken and others have called ‘cultural memory.’”784 What has
become trauma studies, especially in response to Caruth’s work, points out trauma’s peculiar
paradoxes emphasizing that “trauma discourse is important:
precisely because it challenges distinctions between the mental and physical, the psychic
and social, and the internal and external as locations or sources of pain. Discourses of
trauma serve as a vehicle for sorting through the relation between these categories rather
than resolving them in a definition. When trauma becomes too exclusively psychologized
or medicalized, its capacity to problematize conceptual schemes, the exploration of which
is one of cultural theory’s contributions to trauma studies, is lost.785
Cvetkovich writes that she takes a “certain distance from Caruth’s universalizing form of
theorizing about trauma” because it tends to both be too abstract and overly focused on
“catastrophic event rather than on everyday trauma.”786 By “consistently stressing questions of
epistemology and trauma as structurally unknowable,” Cvetkovich writes, Caruth787 “flattens out
the specificities of trauma in a given historical and political context,” and Cvetkovich wants to
“remain alert to the historical locations out of which theories of trauma arise.”788 Without
“rejecting the emphasis that Caruth and others place on trauma’s unrepresentability,” Cvetkovich
argues that what she offers is ways to “think about trauma as part of the affective language that
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describes life under capitalism.”789 “I’m interested in how shock and injury are made socially
meaningful,” she writes, “paradigmatic even, within cultural experience. I want to focus on how
traumatic events refract outward to produce all kinds of affective responses and not just clinical
symptoms. Moreover, in contrast to the individualist approaches of clinical psychology, I’m
concerned with trauma as a collective experience that generates collective responses. I am
compelled by historical understandings of trauma as a way of describing how we live, and
especially how we live affectively.”790 Working with the intersections of feminist, critical race,
Marxist, and queer theory, “each of which offers contributions to and problems for theories of
trauma,” Cvetkovich advocates for a “sense of trauma” that is every day, inherited, part of a
“social history of sensation,” and resistant to “pathologizing approaches to trauma” as well as
conceptions of trauma as “catastrophic or extreme”:
from feminism comes an interest in bridging the sometimes missing intersections
between sexual and national traumas, and the sense of trauma as everyday; from critical
race theory, especially African American studies, comes an understanding of trauma as
foundational to national histories and passed down through multiple generations; from
Marxism comes a dialectical approach to the intersection of lived experience and
systemic social structures and to trauma’s place in the social history of sensation; and
from queer theory comes a critique of pathologizing approaches to trauma and an archive
of examples from lesbian public cultures. 791
Here, Cvetkovich offers a wealth of possibilities for thinking about environmental trauma
particularly in her attention to the collective and inherited particularities of trauma. Thinking
about pain and loss along the Gulf Coast I am going to focus particularly on her helpful readings
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of insidious and collective trauma, queer resistances to the pathologization of trauma, and queer
reclamation of traumas’ affects.
Cvetkovich argues that feminist interest in the “contested status of sexual trauma,”
revealed some of the shortcomings of past conceptions of trauma.792 While the experiences of
Vietnam War veterans led to the establishment of post-traumatic stress disorder being added in
the 1980s to the third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, sexual
trauma seemed “to be in danger of invisibility, especially due to the gendered divide between
private and public spheres.”793 Judith Herman’s influential work illuminated that, “not until the
women’s liberation movement of the 1970s was it recognized that the most common posttraumatic stress disorders are those not of men in war but of women in civilian life. The real
conditions of women’s lives are hidden in the sphere of the personal, in private life.”794 “The
hysteria of women and the combat neurosis of men,” Herman writes, “are one. Recognizing the
commonality of affliction may even make it possible at times to transcend the immense Gulf that
separates the public sphere of war and politics—the world of men—and the private sphere of
domestic life—the world of women.”795 Even when it included women’s experiences with
trauma, most of the scholarship in the 1990s and much contemporary trauma work (including
Herman’s) engages a “search for the core symptoms of PTSD,” an essence to trauma, reflecting
the “tendency of clinical psychology to medicalized psychic pain, another exemplary care of
which,” Cvetkovich argues, “is the contemporary zeal for pharmacological treatment of

792

Ibid., 29.

793

Ibid., 30.

794

Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 28.

795

Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 32.

245
depression.”796 Cvetkovich describes her interests in trauma as a rejection first of a “universal
model of trauma because it runs the risk of erasing essential differences between traumatic
experiences, differences of historical context and geopolitical location as well as the specificities
of individual experience that can be lost in a diagnosis that finds the same symptoms
everywhere.”797 Second, Cvetkovich rejects conceptions of separate spheres by “looking instead
to the public dimensions of sexual trauma,” writing with and into the feminist and queer Public
Feelings project that thinks about the ongoing impact of identity politics by looking to places
where the “public/private divide warrants reconceptualization.” 798 It is “no longer useful,” she
writes, “to presume that sexuality, intimacy, affect, and other categories of experience typically
assigned to the private sphere do not also pervade public life.”799
Part of the feminist and queer reconceptualization of public life Cvetkovich champions is
“the focus on trauma as everyday that unravels definitions of the term.”800 She gestures to Laura
Brown’s “crucial formulation of ‘insidious’ trauma to describe the everyday experiences of
sexism that add to the effects of more punctual traumatic experiences, such as rape, forges
connections between trauma and more systemic forms of oppression.”801 The diagnostic
“stipulation that trauma must be ‘an event outside the range of human experience’” Brown
argues, “excludes insidious forms of trauma that are all too often persistent and normalized.”802
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Furthermore, Cvetkovich argues, “insidious or everyday forms of trauma, especially those
emerging from systemic forms of oppression, ultimately demand an understanding of trauma that
moves beyond medicalized constructions of PTSD.” “The challenge of insidious trauma,” she
argues:
or chronic PTSD (although this category may contain it again in the confines
of a diagnosis) is that it resists the melodramatic structure of an easily identifiable origin
of trauma. Once the causes of trauma become more diffuse, so too do the cures, opening
up the need to change social structures more broadly rather than just fix individual
people. Yet as the links between sexual abuse and sexism show, event trauma can play a
prominent role in drawing attention to more insidious forms of trauma . . . experiences
that are connected to trauma but may not necessarily themselves be traumatic—such as
sex acts, immigration, activism, and caretaking.803
Focusing on insidious or collective forms of trauma, Cvetkovich’s work contends, challenges
trauma studies to “participate in the large and interdisciplinary project of producing revisionist
and critical counterhistories.”804 There are “many forgotten histories that have yet to receive full
attention within trauma studies,” she writes, “a necessary agenda for the intersection of trauma
studies and American studies is a fuller examination of racialized histories of genocide,
colonization, slavery, and migration that are part of the violences of modernity, and whose
multigenerational legacies require new vocabularies of trauma.”805 Opening up trauma studies to
intersections with race and ethnic studies necessitates “investigations of the impact of cultural
loss and the suppression of cultural memory in the work of building culture in the present.”806
For American contexts, exploring collective trauma requires “tracking how contemporary
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experiences of racism rest on the foundation of traumatic events such as slavery, lynching, and
harassment.”807 Influential work that examines the “history of slavery within contemporary
culture” as insidious trauma, particularly Cvetkovich recognizes the literature of Toni Morrison
and Octavia Butler as well as the essays of Patricia Williams, demands “models that can explain
the links between trauma and everyday experiences, the intergenerational transmission from past
to present, and the cultural memory of trauma as central to the formation of identities and
politics.”808 “To return to the traumatic history of slavery and African diaspora as an explanatory
context for contemporary racisms and antiracisms is to acknowledge that this history continues
to have a legacy in the present,” Cvetkovich writes, “and to grapple also with an equally
powerful legacy of its forgetting.”809 This “traumatic history,” and its missing archive that is
“systematically undocumented given restrictions on literacy for slaves, and governed
subsequently by racisms that have suppressed subaltern knowledges,” demands “unusual
strategies of representation.”810 Cvetkovich points directly to the influential work of Avery
Gordon on the concept of haunting as one such strategy. Gordon’s haunting as a trauma archive
“offers a compelling account of how the past remains simultaneously hidden and present in both
material practices and the psyche, in both invisible and visible places.”811
Gordon’s Ghostly Matters works to “understand modern forms of dispossession,
exploitation, repression, and their concrete impacts on the people most affected by them and on
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our shared conditions of living” by developing “language for identifying hauntings and for
writing with the ghosts any haunting inevitably throws up.”812 Haunting, Gordon writes,
describes how:
that which appears to be not there is often a seething presence, acting on and often
meddling with taken-for-granted realties, the ghost is just the sign, or the empirical
evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place. The ghost is not simply a
dead or missing person, but a social figure, and investigating it can lead to that dense site
where history and subjectivity make social life. The ghost or the apparition is one form
by which something lost, or barely visible, or seemingly not there to our supposedly welltrained eyes, makes itself known or apparent to us, in its own way, of course. The way of
the ghost is haunting, and haunting is a very particular way of knowing what has
happened or is happening. Being haunted draws us affectively, sometimes against our
will and always a bit magically, into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to
experience, not as cold knowledge, but as a transformative recognition.813
Haunting is “one way in which abusive systems of power make themselves known and their
impacts felt in everyday life.”814 It is not the same as being “exploited, traumatized, or
oppressed, although it usually involves these experiences or is produced by them. What’s
distinctive about haunting is that it is an animated state in which a repressed or unresolved social
violence is making itself known.”815 Gordon uses Raymond Williams’ “structure of feeling,” to
best describe haunting as an “emergent,” social experience articulating “‘presence’ as the tangled
exchange of noisy silences and seething absences” those “‘experiences to which the fixed forms
do not speak at all, which . . . they do not recognize.’”816 Sometimes the appearance of the ghost
is oblique (“a dead women was not at a conference she was supposed to attend”)817 and other
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times they grab with their manifestations (“Beloved’s appearance, the breathing presence of this
beautiful ghost whose sparse talk is like a series of picture books, bears out this theory of
memory as haunting . . . the terrifying intimacies” of antebellum slavery “waiting for you.”)818
Regardless of form, to write about ghosts and to follow where they lead, Gordon argues,
“requires attention to what is not seen, but is nonetheless powerfully real; requires attention to
what appears dead, but is nonetheless powerfully alive, requires attention to what appears to be
in the past, but is nonetheless powerfully present.”819
Much of Gordon’s text is a lush close reading of Toni Morrison’s unfathomably profound
1985 novel Beloved as Morrison’s Beloved is, Gordon writes, one of the most significant
contributions to the understanding of haunting. Inspired by the 1856 American Baptist
newspaper story, “A Visit to the Slave Mother Who Killed Her Child,” on Margaret Garner, the
fleeing “slave mother, who killed her child rather than see it taken back to slavery,” Morrison’s
Beloved “remembers” the “anonymous people called slaves . . . these people who don’t know
they’re in an era of historical interest. They just know they have to get through the day.”820 A
slave woman Sethe, “runs from Kentucky across the frozen Ohio River, giving birth along the
way to a daughter named Denver” and spends twenty-eight days outside Cincinnati “with her
three other children, her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, and the community before her owners
attempt to capture and return her to Sweet Home.” 821 Faced with this prospect, she attempts to
kill all her children and successfully kills one. Beloved then sits with the haunted kin that remain
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at 124 Bluestone Road. In Beloved, “the ghost enters, all fleshy and real,” (Beloved. She my
daughter. She mine. See. She come back to me of her own free will and I don’t have to explain a
thing. I don’t have to explain before because it had to be done quick. Quick. She had to be safe
and I put her where she would be)822 “with wants, and a fierce hunger, and she speaks, barely, of
course, and in pictures and a coded language. This ghost, Beloved, forces a reckoning: she makes
those who have contact with her, who love and need her, confront an event in their past that
loiters in the present. But Beloved, the ghost, is haunted too, and therein lies the challenge
Morrison poses.”823 To follow the ghost where it leads, in Morrison and Gordon’s work, is to
attempt to track not only what comes to be unintelligible but the reasons why we cannot
coherently speak about these exclusions. Beloved spotlights the weight of inheritance, perhaps
obscured by generation, but no less a haunting asking “what is too much? What is too much self
(pride) when you were not supposed to have one? What is too much to remember when there is
yet more? What is too much violence (infanticide) when you are already living with too much
violence (slavery)? What is too much to tell, to pass one, when ‘remembering seem[s] unwise
(Beloved 274), but necessary? The double voice of the ghost will do its work, but it passes itself
on as our haunting burden.”824
Beloved, “the ghostly rememory of Sethe’s Medean action,” is the “classic gothic trope
of the past haunting the present. She is the literal return of the repressed; the uncanny incarnation
of trauma’s trace” in the “physical form of her dead child;” she is a “demonic rememory who
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enables the ‘disremembering’ of a traumatic past and allows the unspeakable to be spoken.”825
But “the work and the power of the story,” Gordon writes, “lie in giving reasons why the reasons
are never quite enough;” why “haunting rather than ‘history’ (or historicism) best captures the
constellation of connections that charges any ‘time of the now’ with the debts of the past and the
expense of the present, why one woman killed her child and another was haunted by the
event.”826 “I started out wanting to write a story about . . . the clipping about Margaret Garner
stuck in my head,” Morrison writes, “I had to deal with this nurturing instinct that expressed
itself in murder.”827 What the ghost “cannot or will not say,” Morrison’s characters:
fill in with their simultaneously grand and subtle projections; from bits and pieces,
fragments and portentous signs, they all make Beloved their beloved. You are mine You
are mine You are mine (Beloved, 217). Yet, what they see or think they see can never
quite grasp what Toni Morrison asks us as readers today to comprehend: that Beloved the
ghost herself barely possesses a story of loss, which structures the very possibility of
enslavement, emancipation, and freedom in which the Reconstructive history of Beloved
traffics. And thus, Beloved the ghost’s double voice speaks not only of Sethe’s dead child
but also of an unnamed African girl lost at sea, not yet become an African-American.828
Haunted by “the debts of the past and the expense of the present,” Morrison’s novel is
“avowedly fiction; it is not written in the traditional autobiographical voice; it is not sponsored
by nor is it testimony vouchsafed by a white authority;” as many of the authorized slave
narratives were via filtering through lay abolitionist readers determining who was allowed to
bear witness and it “begins in 1873; well after Emancipation . . . But it does retell the story of
Margaret Garner . . . claiming its continuous relation to the history (slavery) and form (narrative)
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of the origins, in the most general sense, of African American writing in the United States. As is
retells one story and in this way summons another, it remembers some of what the slave
narrative forgot, creating a palimpsest, a document that has been inscribed several times, where
the remnants of earlier, imperfectly erased scripting is still detectable.”829
For Morrison, Gordon writes, this palimpsest of social memory “is not just history, but
haunting, not just context, but animated wordliness; not just the hard ground of infrastructural
matters, but the shadowy grip of ghostly matters:
the possibility of a collectively animated worldly memory is articulated here
in that extraordinary moment in which you—who never was there in that real place—can
bump into a rememory that belongs to somebody else . . . You have bumped into
somebody else’s memory; you have encountered haunting and the picture of it the ghost
imprints. Not only because this memory that is sociality is out there in the world, playing
havoc with the normal security historical contexts provides, but because it will happen
again; it will be there for you. It is waiting for you. We were expected . . . In order to
manage this ‘remembering which seems unwise,’ it will be necessary to broach carefully
and cautiously the desires of the ghost itself. The ghost’s desires? Yes, because the ghost
is not just the return of the past or the dead. The ghostly matter is that always ‘waiting for
you,’ and its motivations, desires, and interventions are remarkable only for being
current.830
Furthermore, Morrison’s “resolution of the struggle between Sethe and Beloved helps us to see
that haunting as a way of life, or as a method of analysis, or as a type of political consciousness,
must be passed on or through.”831 Morrison “provides a stunning example” Gordon writes:
of how to hospitably and delicately talk to ghosts and through hauntings,
which we must do . . . The ghost not other or alterity as such, ever. It is (like Beloved)
pregnant with unfulfilled possibility, with the something to be done that the wavering
present is demanding. This something to be done is not a return to the past but a
reckoning with its repression in the present, a reckoning with that which we have lost, but
never had . . . A woman walked out of the water thirsty and breathing hard and within the
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gap between more memories than seem tolerable and there being still more, we are
reminded of haunting’s affliction and its yearning for something that must be done.832
Resisting “investment in ontologies of disassociation,” histories of denial, erasure, and
dispossession, Gordon writes that Ghostly Matters was motivated by her “desire to find a method
of knowledge production and a way of writing that could represent the damage and the haunting
of the historical alternatives and thus richly conjure, describe, narrate, and explain the liens, the
costs, the forfeits, and the losses of modern systems of abusive power and their immediacy and
worldly significance.”833 While haunting “is a frightening experience” as it “always registers the
harm inflicted or the loss sustained by social violence done in the past or in the present,”
haunting, unlike trauma, “is distinctive for producing a something-to-be-done.”834 “To be
haunted and to write from that location,” like Morrison and Gordon do, is:
to take on the condition of what you study, is not a methodology or a
consciousness you can simply adopt or adapt as a set of rules or an identity; it produces
its own insights and blindness. Following the ghosts is about making a contact that
changes you and refashions the social relations in which you are located. It is about
putting life back in where only a vague memory or a bare trace was visible to those who
bothered to look. It is sometimes about writing ghost stories, stories that not only repair
representational mistakes, but also strive to understand the conditions under which a
memory was produced in the first place, toward a countermemory, for the future.835
For those of us interested in transformative criticism, Gordon’s work on haunting suggests
radical political change will come about “only when new forms of subjectivity and sociality can
be forged by thinking beyond the limits of what is already comprehensible” and this is possible
only when a “sense of what has been lost or of what we never had can be brought back from
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exile and articulated fully as a form of longing in this world . . . we must seek to revivify our
collective capacity to imagine a future radically other to the one ideologically charted out.”836
There is so much for religion and ecology to explore in Gordon and Cvetkovich’s work
on trauma and haunting. What is vital, I argue, for understanding the affective economies of
devastated landscapes and their marginalization within environmental scholarship is taking heed
of Cvetkovich and Gordon’s warnings that transformation is only possible when we embrace the
ghosts and welcome their ability to refashion what matters in their illumination of forgotten
bodies, places, events, histories, and narratives. New cosmology may not acknowledge the
embodied power of past histories, environmental theory as a whole may not recognize ghostly
matters in its conceptions of mourning, but the desires for what could have been but never was
and the poison of historical violence and its continual iterations that limit what seems possible
still seethe here whether they are acknowledged or not. Any environmental theory that hopes for
transformation for the Gulf Coast will not find it in longing for a return to what it once was,
which was truly a promise for some and horror for others. Nor will we find it in calls to move
past all this violence without interrogating how our environmental thought and practice has
powerfully fueled these forgettings.
Reckoning with the ghosts that abound along the Gulf Coast, I read poet Natasha
Trethewey’s work as a model for environmental scholarship of ways to address ecological
decline without side-stepping social and historical pain and erasure. Trethewey provides ways to
articulate distress over eroding coastlines without ignoring the traumatic encounters of its
inhabitants as well as examples for how to archive all these elements while they are washing
away with the tide. Through memoir, personal letters, poetry, and photographs, Trethewey’s
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Beyond Katrina: Meditation on the Mississippi Gulf Coast unsettles problematic narratives of
recovery by “engaging in the contest of the public memory of Hurricane Katrina within
mainstream representations on a national and local scale.”837 Trethewey particularly resists
discourses that only focus on New Orleans or what might be deemed “successful” recovery
narratives, by “presenting a more complicated and extensive account of recovery along the
Mississippi Gulf Coast—one that will shape our memory of Katrina’s legacy.”838 While
Trethewey’s work bears witness to the “complex structures that surround the politics of
recovery,”839 as well as what histories of wetland development and increasing economic
dependency on casinos has done to the region, Beyond Katrina is primarily a narrative about
haunted kin. It is about how Trethewey and her beloveds negotiate historical and pressing
traumas, erasures, memory, and rememory along a rapidly changing landscape.
Trethewey and her family are connected to North Gulfport, Mississippi, a historically
African-American community settled along the Gulf after emancipation that “remained
unincorporated until 1994,” and faced the threats of lack of infrastructure for most of its history
including frequent flooding and polluted water.840 Mirroring the palimpsest of social memory in
Morrison and Gordon’s ghostly matters, Trethewey weaves together the memories of her
grandparents who have lived to see the incredible changes on the coast along with her and her
brother Joe’s childhood memories and more contemporary narratives witnessing to events in a
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devastated landscape. “With the destruction of the landscape lies the possibility that this local
history will be lost,” is being lost, which “matters because despite desegregation, the fact that
North Gulfport remained marginal to the city as a whole until 1994 implies that race and class
ruptures continue to be a significant part of the story of the coast, and consequently, part of the
story of Hurricane Katrina.”841 Following the “explosion of casino building, the cost of living
dramatically increased, making life more difficult for the working-classes”842 and ensuring that
some stories of recovery from the storm, narratives of minority communities’ attachments to this
coastline, are lost, subverted, and exiled.
After Katrina, caring for exiled family and returning to visit those who remain,
Trethewey is bombarded by memories: hers, her beloveds’, and unnamed voices that pull at her
for address. Visiting her grandmother who is ninety-one and asking what she remembers, “my
grandmother conflates” Hurricane’s Camille and Katrina, she writes, “a woman who has spent
most of her life in the same place, she knows she lives in Atlanta now, where I do, because she
had to evacuate after Katrina, but she thinks she was at home during landfall, not lying on a cot
in a classroom at the public school up the road from her house. Examined by a doctor after
evacuating Gulfport, she was disoriented. She hadn’t eaten for weeks, even though the shelter
provided MREs . . . the doctor spoke of trauma and depression, prescribed medication.”843 “She
recalls how very young I was during Camille and how my parents moved my crib from room to
room all night trying to avoid water pouring in through the roof. When I say, ‘no, Nana—
Katrina:
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she looks at me, her eyes glassy with confusion, her lips pressed hard together, her brow
deeply furrowed, as she tries to piece together the events of the previous two years. She
has layered on the old story of Camille the new story of Katrina. Between the two, there
is the suggestion of both a narrative and a metanarrative—the way she both remembers
and forgets, the erasures, and bow intricately intertwined memory and forgetting always
are. This too is a story about a story—how it will be inscribed on the physical landscape
as well as on the landscape of our cultural memory. I wonder at the competing narratives:
What will be remembered, what forgotten? What dominant narrative is now emerging?844
Like Gordon describes with haunting, “those singular and yet repetitive instances when home
becomes unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world lose direction, when things are animated,
when the over and done with comes alive, when the blind field comes into view, when your own
or another’s shadow shines brightly,”845 Trethewey tries to get her bearings while facing a
rapidly changing landscape and communities shaped by trauma. “People carry with them the
blueprints of memory for a place,” she writes:
it is not uncommon to hear directions given in terms of landmarks that are no longer
there: ‘turn right at the corner where the fruit stand used to be,’ or ‘across the street from
the lot where Miss Mary used to live.’ There are no recognizable landmarks along the
coast anymore, no way to get my bearings, no way to feel at home, familiar with the
landscape. In time, the landmarks of destruction and rebuilding will overlap and intersect
the memory of what was there—narrative and meta-narrative—the pentimento of the
former landscape shown only through the shifting memories of the people who carry it
with them.846
The landscape and its memories hold Trethewey and her beloveds in-between slipping away and
emerging narratives. All along the coast, “evidence of rebuilding marks the wild, devastated
landscape,” she writes, “a little more than a year before, much debris still littered the ground:
crumbled buildings, great piles of concrete and rebar twisted into strange shapes, bridges lifting a
path to nowhere. Now new condominium developments rise about the shoreline . . . here and
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there are signs of what’s still to come: posters reading ‘South Beach,’ and ‘Beachfront living
only better.’”847 But the reality of what “rebuilding” means for the displaced and dispossessed,
the stories that are forgotten about longing for what was lost but never really existed, is the
trauma archive Trethewey wants to trace.
What Trethewey offers, “the something to be done that the wavering present is
demanding,”848 is a love letter, liturgy, dirge to the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Trethewey says she’s
“surprised now that so much of my thinking comes to me in the language of ceremony. But then,
when I look up the word liturgy, I find that in the original Greek it meant, simply, one’s public
duty . . . I am not a religious woman. This is my liturgy to the Mississippi Gulf Coast:
To the displaced, living in trailers along the coast,
beside the highway,
in vacant lots and open fields; to everyone who stayed
on the coast,
who came back—or cannot—to the coast;
To those who died on the coast.
This is a memory of the coast: to each his own
recollections, her reclamations, their
restorations, the return of the coast.
This is a time capsule for the coast: words of the people
—don’t forget us—
the sound of wind, waves, the silence of graves,
the muffled voice of history, bulldozed and buried
under sand poured on the eroding coast,
the concrete slabs of rebuilding the coast.
This is a love letter to the Gulf Coast, a praise song, a dirge,
invocation and benediction, a requiem for the Gulf Coast.
This cannot rebuild the coast; it is an indictment,
a complaint,
my logos—argument and discourse—with the coast.
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This is my nostos—my pilgrimage to the coast, my memory,
my reckoning—
native daughter: I am the Gulf Coast.849
While Trethewey knows she cannot rebuild the coast, she offers a resistance to what is being
inscribed on the landscape both in construction and national memory, by sitting with the ghosts
and speaking about what has been made invisible (a needed sourness—in complaint, in
indictment) witnessing to the memories of beloveds who lived on this coastline for decades who
were displaced from their homes and systematically denied recovery and return.
Pushing us to think more deeply about intimacy and attachment in a devastated
landscape, Trethewey’s kinship of remainders witnesses to long histories of environmental and
social injustice particularly through one ghostly figure, a beloved who should be there but is not,
her brother Joe. Joe, who like many of the other residents that were not eligible for the
government funds that helped corporations and wealthier residents rebuild, was arrested and
imprisoned for transporting cocaine to fund the taxes to hold onto the now vacant land he
inherited:
there was still the possibility of a life he imagined—prosperous, stable,
perhaps even emotionally rewarding, as it had been when he was first renovating those
houses. And it must have been in sight, reflected in the images of the ‘good life’ plastered
on casino billboards up and down Interstate 10 and down Highway 49 toward the beach:
attractive people, in elegant clothes, laughing into cocktail glasses poised above plates of
beautiful, abundant food. The casinos were among the first to rebuild and recover, and
they broadcast their message of affluence above the heads of people struggling to
reconstruct their lives from remnants.850
Trethewey’s trauma archive (ghost stories and environmental mourning) weaves in letters from
Joe in prison, her despair and numbness at his circumstances, and ultimately witnessing to Joe’s
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story not being an extraordinary account but one of many in the uneven struggle for survival
along the coast. Braiding in a narrative like Joe’s along with histories of eroding wetlands and
impending storms, I argue Trethewey demands that we regard these landscapes with complexity,
resisting separating out one element as an environmental fix. Ghostly matters along the coast
illuminate that these populations have troubled but deep attachments to these landscapes and
their communities. Their trauma calls out for address, could be a wellspring of and for
environmental knowledge, but is buried by “rebuilding” in the same inequalities and violent
erasures that seethed before. The kinship of remainders Trethewey brilliantly traces are the
pained explorations of attachments to everything rapidly slipping away and the bodies,
communities, and habitats that remain to puzzle through and negotiate these changes.
Trethewey’s narratives should encourage us to continually ask: recovery and restoration for
whom? To what ends? At what cost? My conception of kinship remainders helps us see what
recovery looks like when we pay attention to what is seething outside the frame. The queer
connections of life to object and place, those displaced by environmental crisis, reframe a notion
of kinship around remainders and the haunting of those who cannot return. Kinship remainders
are the bodies, objects, and lives of those who remain and carry these inheritances in their
affinities and attachments.

Unspeakable Muck and Queer Melancholy
Reshaping our theory around kinship remainders on the Gulf Coast requires we leave
behind awe, wonder, and reverence as normative affective attachments and wrestle with bad
feelings. Drawing from queer theory’s critiques of affective normativity, particularly Leo
Bersani, Michael Warner, and Biddy Martin, Cvetkovich contends that part of the critique of
universal narratives “‘requires that we also keep alive not only transgressive desires but also
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emotional attachments, pleasures, fascinations, and curiosities that do not necessarily produce,
reflect, or line up neatly with political ideologies or oppositional movements.’”851 For example,
as Eve Sedgwick and others have noted, the “reclamation of shame constitutes an alternative to
the model of gay pride, carving out new possibilities for claiming queer, gay, and lesbian
identities that don’t involve a repudiation of the affects brought into being by homophobia.”852 In
her work to depathologize trauma, Cvetkovich attaches to these queer reclamations to “open up
possibilities for understanding traumatic feelings not as a medical problem in search of a cure but
as felt experiences that can be mobilized in a range of directions, including the construction of
cultures and publics.”853 By not presuming “in advance a particular affective experience
associated with trauma,” but rather considering trauma as a “category that embraces a range of
affects, including not just loss and mourning but also anger, shame, humor, sentimentality, and
more,” Cvetkovich opens up ways to examine “historical and social experience in affective
terms” through developing “queer approaches to trauma” that “can appreciate the creative ways
in which people respond to it.”854 “Catalyzed in part by the AIDS crisis,” she writes, “queer
scholars have also investigated the nexus of mourning and melancholy” producing
“understandings of collective affective formations that break through the presumptively
privatized nature of affective experience” and offering “reconsiderations of melancholy as a form
of mourning that should not be pathologized.”855 Public recognition of traumatic experience has
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often only been “achieved through cultural struggle,” which is one way Cvetkovich argues that
we can view 1980s AIDS activism, as “the demand for such recognition.”856 That “battle has
involved combating” not only oppression and homophobia but negotiations with the “persistence
of mourning,” particularly how mourning and melancholy become critical parts of activism.857
Particularly in Eng and Muñoz’s work, explorations of melancholy articulate how affective
experience is shaped by race, sex, and gender. Muñoz writes “about melancholy in works by
African American gay men as a ‘depathologized structure of feeling,’ suggesting that
ambivalences of disidentification, far from disabling cultural production, are a rich resource.”858
Cvetkovich highlights Douglas Crimp’s (1989) essay “Mourning and Militancy,” as canonical
for trauma archive research in his argument that “militancy cannot ease every psychic burden
and that the persistence of mourning, if not also melancholy, must be reckoned with in the
context of activism.”859 Crimp’s essay articulates how insidious trauma invades the everyday and
how trauma’s “effects are mediated through forms of oppression such as homophobia,”860 by
claiming safe sex within persistent homophobia itself constitutes a loss: “alongside the dismal
toll of death, what many of us have lost is a culture of sexual possibility . . . now our untamed
impulses are either proscribed once again or shielded from us by latex . . . for many men of the
Stonewall generation, who have also been the gay population thus far hardest hit by AIDS, safe
sex may seem less like defiance than resignation, less like accomplished mourning than

856

Ibid., 160.

857

Ibid., 162.

858

Ibid., 161.

859

Ibid., 162.

860

Ibid., 163.

263
melancholia.”861 Gay men living with the everyday specter of AIDS must negotiate trauma that’s
unspeakable, ungrievable, and rendered ghostly. Crimp writes:
through the turmoil imposed by illness and death, the rest of society offers
little support or even acknowledgment. On the contrary, we are blamed, belittled,
excluded, derided. We are discriminated against, lose our housing and jobs, and are
denied medical and life insurance. Every public agency whose job it is to combat the
epidemic has been slow to act, failed entirely, or been deliberately counterproductive. We
have therefore had to provide our won centers for support, care, and education and even
to fund and conduct our won treatment research. We have had to rebuild our devastated
community and culture, reconstruct our sexual relationships, reinvent our sexual pleasure.
Despite great achievements in so short a time and under such adversity, the dominant
media still pictures us only as wasting deathbed victims; we have therefore had to wage a
war of representation, too. Frustration, anger, rage, and outrage, anxiety, fear, and terror,
shame and guilt, sadness and despair—it is not surprising that we feel these things; what
is surprising is that we often don’t. For those who feel only a deadening numbness or
constant depression, militant rage may well be unimaginable, as again it might be for
those who are paralyzed with fear, filled with remorse, or overcome with guilt. To decry
these responses—our own form of moralism—is to deny the extent of the violence we
have all endured; even more importantly, it is to deny a fundamental fact of psychic life:
violence is also self-inflicted.862
Crimp articulates that the war on representation, how minor communities respond to normativity
and disinheritance, can themselves result in deep loses by positioning those out-of- step desires,
affects, and kin deemed unruly outside the frame thus purging the community of “‘fringe’ gay
groups,’—drag queens, radical fairies, pederasts, bull dykes, and other assorted scum.”863
Furthermore, Crimp “emphasizes the ways in which putatively normal practices of mourning are
foreclosed for gay men—because they are faced with the prospect of their own deaths, because
gay identities are erased at funerals organized by families, because they have been at too many
funerals.”864 Crimp, too, seems to be asking, what is too much? What is too much self (pride)
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when you were not supposed to have one? What is too much to remember when there is yet
more? What is too much violence when you are already living with too much violence? For
religion and ecology, this scholarship in queer, feminist, and critical race responses to trauma
and mourning should make us: hesitant about universal environmental narratives, resistant to
limiting our affective engagements by following these models that recognize those bodies,
identities, places, and creatures rendered ghostly by our environmental hopes, and cautious about
which subjects and affects we deem “appropriate” to fuel environmental change.
Thinking with the ghosts (the collateral damage, the acceptable losses, those bodies that
have been living out complex and precarious relationships with their environments for some
time) by embracing affects eschewed by universal environmental narratives like new cosmology,
Jennifer James and Catriona Sandilands bring the melancholic affinities of queer trauma archives
into environmental thinking through considering ecomelancholia for our troubled times.
Sandilands and James join Cvetkovich, Butler, Muñoz, and Eng in wishing to “rethink Freud’s
definition of melancholia as an inherently debilitating, pathological condition, who choose to
read persistent mourning as missives from politically aggrieved and emotionally bereaved
communities.”865 For Freud, James argues, “mourning is a necessary but temporary process of
grieving which, in his words, ‘spontaneously’ ends after an unspecified period of time . . . Once
the ego has successfully ‘renounced everything that has been lost,’ the mourner can ‘once more
[be] free to replace the lost objects by fresh ones equally or still more precious . . . In proper
mourning, grieving occurs, then dissipates after the object is relinquished” but for the
“melancholic subject, however, mourning is seemingly unending. Undone by the experience of
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loss, incomplete, the ego’s libidinal energy scouts for new love objects for the ego before it has
fully restored itself.”866 If we “take the ‘love object’ as the natural world,” James writes,
“ecomelancholia can be thought of as the inability or unwillingness to ‘stop mourning’
ecological loss and losses associated with ‘the land’ in a present where loss continues.”867
“Ecomelancholia disavows mourning’s ‘renewable’ economy and the attendant theory that
scarcity mitigates loss,” James argues, “ the recovery of lost love objects disappearing lands,
species, finite natural resources, ways of life—would prove impossible in many instances. There
will be no ‘fresh’ objects to replace the natural world, and none ‘more precious.’”868 To read
“African American literature ecocritically,” James writes, to explore black environmental
imaginaries, “is to encounter black loss,” “black collective trauma,” and the systematic denial of
black communities from articulating their own complex affective relationships with the morethan-human world.869 While these losses continue unrecognized, both in our more-than-human
relationships and marginalized negotiations with grief, it “will fall to the ecomelancholics,” she
writes, “those ‘cursed with long memory,’ to remind us of the disastrous consequences of
forgetting.”870 “How do we navigate the place of black grief,” James asks, “especially if we are
black women for whom that affect poses professional risks? My answer (at least today) is that we
accept the unleashing of historical mourning as part of what we do, as a natural consequence of
black historical looking.”871 Ecomelancholia’s “historical and memorial disposition defends
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against mourning’s call to prematurely forget. It responds to the cumulative losses of nature,
land, resources, and to traumas tied to those losses, such as death, deracination, and
dispossession; it is activated by ongoing and interrelated social and political violence, including
the catastrophes of war, genocide, and poverty.”872
Working in queer ecologies, interdisciplinary scholarship that considers the joint
construction of sexuality and nature by further unsettling nature-culture divides, Catriona
Mortimer-Sandilands and others like Bruce Erickson, Giovanna Di Chiro, and Katie Hogan
consider “environmentally inflected moral regulation,” and other ways “in which historical and
contemporary formations of natural space have been organized by changing understandings and
agendas related to sexuality.”873 Scholarship in queer ecologies asks:
what does it mean that ideas, spaces, and practices designated as ‘nature’ are often so
vigorously defended against queers in a society in which that very nature is increasingly
degraded and exploited? What do queer interrogations of science, politics, and desire then
offer to environmental understanding? And how might a clearer attention to issues of
nature and environment—as discourse, as space, as ideal, as practice, as relationship, as
potential—inform and enrich queer theory, lgbtq politics, and research into sexuality and
society?874
Recognizing the “absence of a societal and personal story of loss and grief in which to place
environmental understanding,” Mortimer-Sandilands draws from the “political potential of a
queer rewriting of loss and melancholia” in memoirs tracing “intimate and world-changing
relationships with AIDS and death.”875 Mortimer-Sandilands emphasizes that if we do not yet

872

James, “Eco-Melancholia,” 167.

873

Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erikson, “Introduction: A Genealogy of
Queer Ecologies,” 6-12.
874

Mortimer-Sandilands and Erickson, “Introduction,” 5.

875

Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands, “Melancholy Natures, Queer Ecologies,” 334.

267
have social recognition of immense ecological loss, particularly in those places and communities
far from center, nor cultural expressions to mourn together, at what point is it clear, “that the
subject will not,” she argues, “simply, ‘substitute’ one object for another.”876 Melancholia
suggests a “present that is not only haunted but constituted by the past— literally built of ruins
and rejections.”877 In a context in which certain lives are considered ungrievable, ecomelancholia
as resistance “represents a holding-on to loss in defiance” of “imperatives to forget, move on,
and transfer attention to a new relationship.”878 Mortimer-Sandilands offers “queer ecological
activists a language in which to resist a commodification of nature that removes the specificity of
nature, including the possibility of grieving for individual elements and instances of nature.”879
What might it mean “to consider the preservation of a public record of environmental loss,” she
writes, “an ‘archive of ecological trauma’—made up of the kinds of art, literature, film, ritual,
performance, and other memorials and interrogations that have characterized so many cultural
responses to AIDS—as part of an environmental ethics or politics?”880 Furthermore, instead of
“fetishizing the about-to-be-absences of a more ‘pristine’ nature,”881 Mortimer-Sandilands
advocates for the value of devastated landscapes by asking us to dwell with what has been lost
and examine how trauma and loss can become a part of everyday environmental relationships.
“What would it mean to consider seriously the environmental present,” she asks, “as a pile of
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environmental wreckage, constituted and haunted by multiple, personal, and deeply traumatic
losses? . . . In short, what might it look like to take seriously the fact that nature is currently
ungrievable, and that the melancholy natures with which we are surrounded are a desperate
attempt to hold onto something that we don’t even know how to talk about grieving?”882
Cultivating an ecomelancholia that is sensitive to social inequalities, I argue, would
require more thinking about the timescapes of environmental degradation— the sedimented
complexities that shape our encounters and intimacies. It must resist the passive habits of white
environmentalism that require ignoring intensifying devastation and its historical and ongoing
effects on non-white bodies as part of loving the earth again. We must orient ourselves not
toward one evolutionary narrative, one grand story, but the multiplicity of ignored or forgotten
archives carried by the bodies and habitats of kinship remainders. Importantly, we must also
shoulder the complicated emotions environmental activists will face within precarious futures—a
willingness to sit with unpleasant emotions and an openness to creative responses to the kinds of
trauma and pain that impact trouble-kin. Concluding this chapter, I look at two images from Kara
Walker’s After the Deluge that experiment with time, material, and embodiment to further help
us to think through uncomfortable emotions at the intersections of racial and environmental
trauma along the Gulf Coast. Walker’s evocative images and prose serve, as I read them, as an
ecomelancholic archive883—a preservation of the complex affective encounters avoided by
universal narratives like new cosmology.
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Kara Walker’s (1969-) work is provocative in all the affective ways that word resonates.
Whether critics find her projects ultimately helpful or harmful, what they are is stimulating,
unsettling, disconcerting, shocking. They illicit visceral response. Best known for her cut paper
silhouettes that often depict graphic violence, sexual assault, and degradation, Gwendolyn
DuBois Shaw writes that Walker’s “use of silhouettes and profiles to image race and ‘otherness’
. . . confronts and addresses the ongoing battle to counteract negative images of the African
American body in Western visual culture and in the United States in particular.”884 Walker taps
into “both the latent and the virulent racist icons of the visual and textual past,” Shaw argues, “in
order to make her audience ‘see the unspeakable.’”885 Furthermore, Shaw writes, “the disturbing
and often melancholic tone of Walker’s art reflects, and offers up for critique, the problem of the
broader culture’s inability to come to terms with the past.”886 Like Morrison and Gordon’s
trauma archives, Walker’s work sits with ghostly matters to listen for “a discourse made up of
the horrific accounts of physical, mental, and sexual abuse that were left unspoken by former
slaves as they related their narratives, the nasty and unfathomable bits of detritus that have been
left out of familiar histories of American race relations.”887 This “unclaimed discourse of the
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unspeakable continues to impact the ability of many European Americans and many African
Americans to confront the terrible impression that the legacy of slavery continues to have on our
individual and collective psyches,” Shaw contends, and Walker’s work picks at the “deeply
embedded gothic culture of denial and repression at the core of contemporary society.”888
The provocative cut paper form Walker uses in many of her pieces forces the viewer to
wrestle with unsettling ambiguities. The silhouettes trace black cut-outs but are not necessarily
black bodies, they are open for interpretation, eliciting a squirming discomfort from the viewer
about what is and is not projected onto the images. Through her research “into the history of
silhouettes and race in American visual culture,” Shaw argues that the “artistic practice of Kara
Walker is important not only for the ruckus that it stirred up, but also for the profound way that it
redraws issues of race through the nostalgic and deceptively innocent form of the silhouette.”889
Walker subverts and rewrites “the white voice of the nineteenth-century sentimental novel, the
mediated voice of the slave narrative, and the twentieth-century historical romance novel, as well
as assorted libertine pornography of the previous two centuries,” through these silhouettes.890
“By rendering all of her characters black ciphers,” Shaw argues, Walker “is able to incarnate the
‘master, mistress, overseer, pickaninny, and buck,’ and elucidate the way power relations and the
sexual exchange of raced and gendered bodies occurs within our varied cultural fantasies of race
and representation.”891
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Of course, work this evocative faces detractions and sincere critiques about whether
Walker entrenches troubling representations further into American imaginaries, but I am
compelled by the power of Walker’s work and its insistence that we cannot confront the present
without conjuring up the past. Echoing J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Shaw argues that
Walker’s work ultimately raises the question of “what it meant for a nation’s collective identity
that certain Americans embraced slavery’s culture of torture and death.”892 Crevecoeur’s 18th
century writings lamented “the state of a youthful self-styled southern gentry that was already
decayed from its core, as gangrenous and putrescent as the bodies of the African slaves that it
tortured to maintain its own dominance.”893 Crevecoeur’s question “of what such malfeasance
meant for a collective American consciousness” still lies “unanswered in the beginning of the
twenty-first” century and Walker’s pieces address that gaping need for address.894 Using
nineteenth-and twentieth-century source material “to visualized unspeakable experiences and to
produce psychologically disruptive, gothic silhouette ‘pageants,’” Walker’s “paper silhouettes,
prints, and drawings:
have shown themselves to be the shadows of similar sightless ‘specters,’
monstrous ghosts haunting the American imago. Her images present themselves to the
contemporary spectator as challenges to the politeness of middle-class and liberal society.
The abject state of the work cannot be dismissed as merely the product of their creator’s
self-loathing, social contempt, and subversive vision; rather it is linked to a pervasive
culture of subsumed abjection . . . Their power lies in the way they make people feel
uncomfortable by visualizing their sublimated fears and desires . . . Regardless of
whether it is the guilt of having benefited from racism or of having been a victim of it, or
of having harbored interracial, homosexual, bestial, sadomasochistic, or pederastic sexual
desire, it is the guilt of never having owned up to any of it that will bother spectators as
they experience Walker’s work. ‘It is not what you’ve done to me that menaces you,’
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declared James Baldwin during a taped discussion with writer Frank Shatz about slavery
and abolitionists. ‘It’s what you’ve done to you that menaces you.’895
After the Deluge is what Walker calls a “visual essay,” a short text and a collection of
Walker’s own works and some of other artists into a “rumination on a fear of the deep and the
problem of the shallow—skin deep.”896 Walker writes she “created this book because I was tired
of seeing news images of (Black) people suffering presented as though it were a fresh, new
thrilling subject.”897 “The book is the result of thinking like a Black Woman,” she writes,
“perhaps absurdedly so, because to be ‘Black’ in the context of the book means broad sweeps of
types of representation: stereotypical, archetypal, Negro, African, the color of nighttime, the
color of cut paper, the feeling of engulfment, the sense of humor, the style of outrage.”898 For
After the Deluge, “the story that has interested me is the story of Muck,” Walker writes:
at this book’s inception the narrative of Hurricane Katrina has shifted
precariously away from the hyperreal horror show presented to the outside world as live
coverage of a frightened and helpless populace (relayed by equally frightened and
helpless reporters) to a more assimilable legend. Lately, the narrative of the disaster has
turned to ‘security failures,’ or ‘the question of race and poverty,’ or ‘rebirth.’ I’ve heard
harrowing anecdotes of survival and humorous tales of rancid refrigerators. And always
at the end of these tales, reported on the news, in newspapers, and by word of mouth,
always there is a puddle—a murky, unnavigable space that is overcrowded with
intangibles: shame, remorse, vanity, morbidity, silence.899
Staying with the Muck, the visual essay that flows out is a collection of her own pieces along
with some nineteenth century art and more contemporary images that I read as positioning
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Katrina as an event,900 as per Ahmed, with a particular background and the visual essay details
the “conditions of emergence,” for a disaster that Walker writes is misguidedly positioned as
“new.”901 The collection overflows with fluids: ocean waves, river flows, blood pools, breastmilk
drips, oil spills. The fluid cannot be contained despite its unspeakability. “We tell stories of
events to allude to the unspeakable,” Walker writes:
rumors and jokes fill in the uncomfortable, antisocial gaps. Vulnerability,
failure, panic tell of themselves through careful observation of things like body language
and eye contact. I’ve seen music, dance, and Mardi Gras celebrations activate damaged,
closed-off psychic spaces; they provide hope. But what role can the visual arts play in
reexamining one of America’s greatest social failures? ‘Not much’ is the pessimistic
conclusion I came to, followed by a close examination of a line of thinking familiar to
Blacks, as expressed to my grandmother: ‘All you have to do in this world is stay Black
and die.’ This phrase sums up multilayered experiences of suppression, resentment, and
rage. I have asked the objects in this book to do one more thing. Instead of sitting very
still, ‘staying Black,’ and waiting to die, I have asked each one to take a step beyond its
own borders to connect a series of thoughts together related to fluidity and the failure of
containment.902
What fails to remain contained is not just the flood waters of Katrina but the Muck. The Muck is
what Gordon might call the “seething absence” of an unspeakable presence that “investment in
ontologies of disassociation” renders ghostly.903 Or what Christina Sharpe calls “monstrous
intimacies,” those “subjectivities constituted from transatlantic slavery onward and connected,
then as now, by the everyday mundane horrors that aren’t acknowledged to be horrors . . .
slavery’s inherited and reproduced spaces of shame, confinement, intimacy, desire, violence, and
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terror.”904 “This book is not simply about New Orleans or Katrina or waterborne disaster,”
Walker writes:
it is an attempt to understand the subconscious narratives at work when we talk about
such an event . . . Black life, urban and rural Southern life, is often related as if it were an
entity with a shadowy beginning and a potentially heroic future, but with a soul that is
crippled by racist psychosis. One theme in my artwork is the idea that a Black subject in
the present tense is a container for specific pathologies from the past and is continually
growing and feeding off those maladies. Racist pathology is the Muck, aforementioned.
In this book’s analogy, murky, toxic waters become the amniotic fluid of a potentially
new and difficult birth, flushing out of a coherent and stubborn body long-held fears and
suspicions.905
The Muck, seething, and monstrous intimacies are the binding inheritances, not consanguineous
lineage or evolutionary inheritance, that only advocating for a kinship of remainders can begin to
help us understand.
Many of the images in the collection call out for an environmental reading but two
images I find particularly moving. The first is one of the opening images of After the Deluge, a
familiar one to those that write about Katrina, an AP image taken by Bill Haber. The full-page
color photo shows a large black woman in a white tank top slowly moving through chest-high
water.906 She carries a small bag, assumedly filled with whatever she could leave with, and a
pack of bottled water. In full sun, around her the ripples in the water are a rainbow sheen— the
chest-high flooding full of oil and other toxic substances from the multiple hazardous breaches in
the storms wake. The image was and is jarring for many reasons the least of which is the painful
juxtaposition of the toxic floods and bottled water. The title for the quilted collection, After the
Deluge, stitches it into the context of biblical flooding. Reading this image, queer ecocriticism
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scholar Michael P. Bibler finds that “the undrinkable toxic soup” and its oil-slick sheen “in
which the woman swims” collapses “Noah, disaster and promise . . . into a single frame” and
“relocated from the sky to the water itself, the toxic rainbow becomes a symbol of the
‘potentially new and difficult birth’ . . . Walker’s discussion of muck’s fertile possibilities
repaints this colorful sludge as a potential source of transformation, maybe even salvation, in and
of itself.”907 Salvation for whom, of course, is an open question. Bibler reads the image as “the
promise of new life” for the woman in the “flood itself, rather than something far away in the
sky,” her “salvation” lying in her “ability to negotiate the muck, to keep swimming.”908 I am
more inclined to read the inclusion of this image and its fertile possibilities as directed toward the
viewer. Whatever promise that could be made that would birth something new would be a
promise to attend to the Muck. Whatever we make in the future carries her and the waters with
us as a birthing of oddkin— a melancholic kinship of remainders that doesn’t forget. Reading it
in connection with Walker’s commitment to staying-with the trouble suggests a way to think of
queer love for mutated landscapes as a wading through the muck-that-binds bodies, beings, and
habitats together in complex futures; no longer invested in disassociation but wedded in its
intimacies.
The second image is one of Walker’s untitled silhouettes from 1996 that is included
toward the end of the collection.909 It depicts a barefooted woman in an apron holding up a
creature that is half-girl, half-alligator to the gaze of small more elegantly dressed male figure
that stands to the right sweeping off his top hat in some form of address. Guided by Giorgio
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Agamben, Holly Cade Brown reads this image as a “blurred human-animal hybrid” indicating
that “the politics of distinction between the human and the animal that Agamben describes have
historically been utilized and exploited in order to exclude and marginalize racialized subjects;”
the “indelicate manner in which the female figure holds the monstrous child, indicates that the
child is being held up in order to be inspected by a fully human form” and, judged inadequate,
rendered disposable.910 Any number of interpretations can be drawn from this image and
Brown’s is compelling. However, the placement of the image toward the conclusion of the visual
essay (After the Deluge is importantly sandwiched between these two images of rainbow
promises and oddkin birthings) leads me to connect it to a birthing from toxicity. We can think of
the gator-girl as the fruits of the tangled histories and toxic sediments Walker wades us through.
Holding her up by a braid for inspection replaces the swinging strange fruit of southern trees
with a different kind of strangeness—a mutation via the rot of slow violence, the embodied
implications of histories of toxicity and racialized violence in the swampy south that are rendered
ghostly by environmental theory.911 Again, I read the image less as commentary on the
disposition of the female figure and more as call to viewer, what do we make of all this now?
Take a look at what you’ve done. Whatever our interpretation, there is an intimacy here: a
kinship of those left behind seeping into each other, a seething unleashed that unsettles our
conceptions of intimacy and reciprocity. Can we create an environmental theory that would reach
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out and take up that gatorbaby and cradle her to our breast? What could religion and ecology
accomplish by claiming her as beloved kin?
For kinship to be provocative for the future, for devastated landscapes and precarious
others, what kind of kinship do we want to cultivate? The kinship of remainders I have traced
here (those who remain in devastated environments, who remain with trouble-kin, who are the
remainders outside of normative kinship’s embrace) model how to do kinship rather than just be
kin. They project kinship as an active process of remembering and forward desire, the desire to
be-long into the future even for the disinherited. Staying with the trouble—the ghosts, the muck,
the monstrous—these stories tell us about intimacy and attachment by resisting universal
narratives like new cosmology’s to articulate how complex emotional relationships really are,
how trauma and grief can be motivating for environmental thinking, and how affinity and
attachment mean different things here—not easy reciprocity but a twisting braid that is often
horrifying but nonetheless intimate. These intimacies push us to ask, how do we reckon with
what religion and ecology has rendered ghostly? We must cultivate “the willingness to follow
ghosts, neither to memorialize nor to slay,” Gordon writes, but to “follow where they lead, in the
present, head turned backwards and forwards at the same time. To be haunted in the name of the
will to heal is to allow the ghost to help you imagine what was lost that never even existed,
really. . . If you let it, the ghost can lead you toward what has been missing, which is sometimes
everything.”912
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Chapter Seven
Queer Love for Devastated Landscapes

Late summer 2017, it is flooding in Texas. Harvey came to my city, Houston, and
reshaped how I feel about it. Moving up the Texas coast, Harvey chewed up and spit out the
coastline then sat for a spell saturating the Bayou city with an unfathomable amount of rain. We
evacuated shoving two kids, my mother, four dogs, and two guinea pigs into the car and drove
practically blind deeper into Houston on a disturbingly abandoned freeway because all other
roads were already underwater. I grabbed my laptop, books, and some framed pictures on the
way out but forgot dry pants. County dump trucks came to evacuate one of my sisters and her
children. My other sister, a teacher in a rural district, joined other teachers in pickup trucks
moving house-to-house checking on students and helping to clear away dead livestock.
Returning after some of the flood water receded, we did the agonizing wait of seeing how high
the Brazos river would crest. We stood on the levee separating the wet from the dry turning our
neighborhood into an island while all the other homes across the street started filling up and
gratitude started feeling like a shameful twist in my guts. Conversations with strangers and
friends start with identifying whether you were part of the wet or the dry, and then move to
describing panicked evacuations, frustrating waits on FEMA funds, and an uncomfortable
gratitude (we know we should be thankful) for what remains. Late summer 2017, Irma and Maria
destroyed the islands and California and Montana caught on fire. Recovering from 2017, many
of us are (understandably) more intimate with apocalyptic thinking. It is difficult to find media
about the storms that does not use “apocalyptic” to try and describe the damage.
What has not changed, except for perhaps my sense of urgency, is what I want to
advocate for here at The End which is resistance to our apocalyptic habits through crafting
futures with disaster. Continuing the work of the previous chapter on developing a new sense of
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what kinship might be, concluding I want to think on futurity for trouble-kin. What future is
there for damaged habitats, disabled, ill, and mutating bodies? Why stay with devastated
landscapes when those who claim common sense have moved-on? How might we resist both
Edenic pasts and apocalyptic futures by staying with the trouble of environmental disaster?913
Concluding, I consider hopes for flourishing in troubled times by cultivating desires to be-long
for abject human and nonhuman bodies both within our theory and our environments. Further
engaging Carolyn Finney’s argument that our problematic relationships with the natural
environment are intimately linked to our problematic relationships with each other, I contend the
lack of engagement with the human and nonhuman creatures and habitats changed by
devastation is the result of environmental theory’s fundamental discomfort with desire and
futurity for ill, disabled, and abject bodies.
Another response to the trouble of creatively addressing environmental degradation is
working through the compulsory able-bodied and able-mindedness within new cosmology’s
conceptions of kinship, within most steams of environmental thought, while illuminating how it
contributes to aversion to damaged creatures, ecosystems, and communities. The discomfort,
disgust, and paternalism scholars like Alison Kafer, Stacy Alaimo, Mel Chen, Kelly Fritsch, and
Sarah Jaquette Ray spotlight as habitually directed toward porous disabled and ill bodies
affectively maps onto ill and disabled creatures, environments, and the human communities that
experience them intimately. Tracing a conversation between scholarship in crip and queer theory
on cultivating futures that embrace abject bodies—imagining disability, desire, and intimacy
differently—I conclude by offering alternative mappings of affinity and futurity through
challenging religion and ecology to push beyond a reliance on simplistic readings of biological
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kinship to explore: what is desired in “nature”? And, what does “nature” desire? Furthermore,
what does it mean to desire nature when this “nature” is devastated?
Understandably, environmental thinking within religion and ecology can tend toward
apocalyptic thinking.914 Moderately comfortable with apocalyptic narratives in American religiocultural landscapes, religion scholarship on environmental concerns often uses apocalyptic tones
to convey urgency and “wake-up” scholarship. Though, resonating with the hesitancy in Timothy
Morton (2010, 2013) Lisa Sideris (2013, 2015), Catherine Keller (1996), and Whitney Bauman’s
(2014, 2015) work on ecoapocalyptic themes, I similarly question what apocalypticism
accomplishes, occludes, and protects.915 Keller and Bauman recognize that apocalyptic narratives
“can be a source of violence towards human and earth ‘others’” particularly those “norm of the
center—dark bodies, poor bodies, multiply abled bodies, queer bodies, and animal bodies,”
which are considered “acceptable losses in disasters” like BP and climate change fueled
storms.916 Futurity for bodies beyond grieving, those bodies occluded by apocalyptic fantasies,
are my concerns here “at the end” of this project. Building on the attention to quotidian
encounters in previous chapters, I inquire about those creatures and vital materialities absented
by speculative futurities that erase multiplicities of environmental encounter.
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Apocalyptic Futures
Haraway argues that staying with the trouble resists two frequent responses to the
“horrors” of the “Anthropocene”—the geological epoch characterized by tremendous human
transformation of the planet.917 The first, is a “comic faith in technofixes” or
“technoapocalypses;” “whether secular or religious: technology will somehow come to the
rescue of its naughty but very clever children, or what amounts to the same thing, God will come
to the rescue of his disobedient but ever hopeful children” however destructive this rescue may
prove to be.918 The second response, a perhaps more destructive bitter cynicism Haraway argues,
is the “position that the game is over, it’s too late, there’s no sense trying to make anything any
better, or at least no sense having any active trust in each other in working and playing for a
resurgent world.”919 While this attitude makes sense, she says, in our current environmental
distress, the futurisms in both of these common responses ignore the tangle of our material and
social realities and can be discouraging to potential odd-couplings, working together in
surprising combinations for change.
As I have outlined, in areas of ecological collapse habitat and species erasure are
quotidian realities offering religious ecotheory numerous affective quandaries. Renewed or
continued existence for diverse naturecultures is precarious so hopes for a return to wholeness
are painfully inappropriate and hopes for the future are complex. In these times, understandably,
public sentiment and environmental thinking within religion and ecology can tend toward
apocalyptic affects. However, apocalyptic affects can obscure the fact that some bodies and
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communities are habitually regarded as environmentally disposable, their losses rarely registered
as loss, and in times of crisis most often abandoned. While we cannot avoid apocalyptic thinking
in a culture saturated by it, apocalyptic tendencies should give us pause as Haraway and Marilyn
Strathern suggest, “it matters what matters we use to think other matters with . . . it matters what
stories make worlds, what worlds make stories.”920
While some ecoapocalypticism wrestles directly with Jewish and Christian texts, what is
more pervasive within what Catherine Keller calls our “apocalyptic imaginary,” is a “wider
matrix of unconscious tendencies, an apocalypse habit,” that simmers under a “colloquial idiom”
just “spectacular enough to bring to the surface the totalizing threat which lurks just beneath
mass consciousness.”921 This “apocalypse pattern,” she writes, “always adjacent to suffering,
rests upon an either/or morality: a proclivity to think and feel in polarities of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’;
to identify with the good and to purge the evil from oneself and one’s world once and for all,
demanding undivided unity before ‘the enemy’” and “expect some cataclysmic showdown in
which, despite tremendous collateral damage (the destruction of the world as we know it), good
must triumph in the near future with the help of some transcendent power and live forever after
in a fundamentally new world.”922 The apocalypse pattern, Keller argues, is “neither good nor
evil, sometimes very good and sometimes very evil” with some feminist and critical race
theorists drawing-out revolutionary counter-readings of the apocalyptic script but most habitual
tracings following a tendency “to get active, to get enraged, and then to give up, surrendering to
the lull of the comforts and conveniences extracted from the tribulations of the rest of the
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planet.” 923 “We think that we must ‘save the earth,’” Keller writes, but “who can carry this? In
other words, to the extent that we get uncritically hooked on apocalypse—not merely the
situation but the habit— we contribute to it.”924 This habit, “whatever the anti-imperialist merits
of the original metaphors may be,” is destructive, “and perhaps first of all self-destructive.”925
“We wish for messianic solutions,” Keller writes, “and end up doing nothing, for we get locked
into a particularly apocalyptic either/or logic—if we can’t save the world, then to hell with it.
Either salvation or damnation.”926
“Because disaster tales are intertwined” with “critical processes of meaning-making,”
Julia Watts Belser writes, “the stories we tell about disaster are never ethically neutral.”927 In the
more sinister forms of our apocalypse habit, Belser argues, “the stories we tell about crisis and
catastrophe often intensify structural violence, augmenting existing dynamics of racism, sexism,
classism, and ableism.” The apocalypse habit resonates in many ways with Ahmed’s
phenomenological reading of whiteness as a bad habit, tendencies that we socially inherit that
“allow some bodies to take up space by restricting the mobility of others.”928 White able-bodies
might not think to ask: whose nature is lost? What kind of nature is in peril? But this inherited
obfuscation carries histories of investments made over time that shape spaces and encounters. As
I have outlined, our inherited American protestant environmental imaginary allows for only a
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particular conception of nature, one that comes at the expense of marginalized bodies, to be both
reified and continually in peril. This form of nature, through simultaneous influences of
eugenics, primitivism, and muscular Christianities, has been systematically and affectively
denied to so many bodies (black, brown, immigrant, queer, disabled) and so unable to address
damage, disablement, and difference that it is, as Tim Morton argues, a nature that never existed
in the first place. “Ecoapocalypse is always for someone,” Morton writes, “it presupposes an
audience. What kinds of sadistic ‘you asked for it’ fantasies does it promote.”929 While
apocalyptic can affectively capture so many of the feelings sticking to these contexts, the
anticipation, fear, and the uncertainty in the aftermath, our apocalyptic habits direct attention
away from entrenched inequality, the slow violence at play in the impact of these storms, the
continual and compounding precarity shaping so many human and nonhuman encounters. It sidesteps the thick ongoingness of environmental degradation. Should we abandon Louisiana? The
Gulf Coast? The challenge now to is to become capable of responses that illuminate all the ways
we already have and collectively resists moving on—come hell and high water.

Disability, Illness, and Environment
Thus far I have considered affinity and attachment within communities shaped by long
histories of environmental racism, trauma, and dispossession. Here, I want to think more on the
material changes shaping this kinship of remainders particularly environmental illness and
disability. Attempting to think fecundity for all, what do we make of futurity for the eyeless
shrimp, clawless crabs, fish with oozing sores, undocumented and imprisoned clean-up crews,
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bodies breathing toxic air and wading through toxic waste, bodies that are becoming somethingother that make us uncomfortable? “We carry our most intimate view of nature,” Sharon Betcher
argues, “within our pictures of health.”930 In a culture with a “monopolizing preoccupation” with
health, striving for it, “seems so inherently natural that religious communities, including ecospiritual movements, appear unconscious of the politics” or the image of nature involved.931
Disability and environmental illnesses often surface in religious ecotheory as “failed health”—
compelling traces of the toll chemical pesticides, landfills, poor air quality, and other toxins have
on our “unevenly polluted biosphere.”932 Julia Watts Belser suggests that disability and illness
function in these contexts as both “a tangible, corporeal demonstration of harm done and a potent
goad that might yet compel a reluctant populace to self-interested action on behalf of the
biosphere.”933 Caring for nonhuman nature is preached as for our own good—ensuring a happy,
healthy species. However, critical disability studies questions the “implications of these
evocations of disability” as “cultural trope(s)” that use disability “to signify human suffering, to
evoke pity, and to embody tragedy, limitation, dejection, and loss.”934 This reliance on the
“tragic cripple” trope leads Betcher to ask, “can disabilities be within ecological discourse
something more than a metaphorical and statistical scare tactic to catalyze persons’
environmental best practice?”935 Since ill and disabled bodies never appear in new cosmology

930

Sharon Betcher, “The Picture of Healthy: ‘Nature’ at the Intersection of Disability,
Religion and Ecology” Worldviews 19 (2015): 13.
931

Betcher, “The Picture of Healthy,” 11.

932

Julia Watts Belser, “Religion, Disability, and the Environment” Worldviews 19

(2015): 2.
933

Belser, “Religion, Disability, and the Environment,” 2.

934

Belser, 3.

935

Betcher, 11.

286
narratives, and are rarely invited into broader conversations in religion and ecology, our field has
not cultivated a response to Betcher’s lament.
Functioning as one response936 to this question; however, and helpful for thinking about
affinity and attachment with bodies and environments impacted by environmental degradation, is
working to challenge environmental conceptualizations of nature that tend to “assume that
everyone accesses nature in the same way” enforcing that it is “this presumption that colors
environmental political visions.”937 Alison Kafer’s Feminist, Queer, Crip asks “whose
experiences of nature are taken as the norm within environmental discourses,” and “what do
these discourses assume about nature, the body/mind, and the relationship between humans and
nature?”938 Within these boundaries, “nonnormative approaches to nature and the limitations of
the body are erased” and “able-bodiedness becomes a prerequisite for imagining environmental
futures” thus binding environmental theory to a “very particular kind of body.”939 This body
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might have meaningful, spiritual, transformative experiences in nature, but this body is also in
control of these encounters—who, when, and how much it engages, when and where to pull-in
close, and when to disengage. Disabilities, however, challenge (sometimes visibly) the
“dominant assumption that bodies are neatly bounded powerhouses of capacity. Disabled bodies
belie conventional conceptions of the body as secure, enclosed, and sovereign.”940 The “disabled
body is not alone in this respect,” Belser writes, “stigmas of permeability and contagion,” like we
see in the rhetoric advocating abandonment of New Orleans and its residents after Katrina, shape
“prevailing discourses of race and class-marked bodies, just as they characterize negative
conceptions of feminine and queer corporealities. Yet disability,” can display “the vulnerability
of the human body in a particularly concrete way, forcing an acknowledgement that human being
is radically affected as flesh meets world. Dominant culture recognizes—and recoils from—the
trans-corporeality of the disabled body.”941
Of course, it is not just new cosmology and other forms of contemporary environmental
thought that are committed to able-bodied environmental imaginaries. Eco-crip scholars remind
us that our inherited American environmental imaginary linking nature with spiritual redemption,
moral improvement, and affective renewal also relies on able-bodiedness. Disabled and ill
bodies, like female, queer, black, and brown bodies, are not inheritors of the American Protestant
environmental imagination as a line of investment. The white, affluent, male ideal that can leave
the crowded city and explore restorative nature is also what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls
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the “normate”942 body, or what Sarah Jaquette Ray terms the “wilderness body ideal.”943 Ray’s
article, “Risking Bodies in the Wild: The ‘Corporeal Unconscious’ of American Adventure
Culture,” addresses the “extent to which environmentalism,” the wilderness movement as an
essential part, “and the ideal of American identity developed” together “in opposition to a
fundamental category of ‘otherness’—disability.”944
Reading the same time period as Evan Berry, Ray argues the “corporeal unconscious,”
that characterizes U.S. environmentalism “prizes the ‘fit’ body—able, muscular, young, and
male.”945 “Extending Progressive Era links between the body, social hygiene, and the wilderness
encounter,” through this fit body environmental thought simultaneously solidified “social notions
of purity and fitness” and gave meaning to the disabled American body as socially, politically
and culturally unfit, unproductive, and unrecruitable.946 Ray argues there is a “material,
constitutive relationship between disability and American environmental thought and practice”
as environmental thoughts’ genesis in the wilderness movement imbued the “fit body with values
of independence, self-reliance, genetic superiority, and willpower,” and then provided wilderness
as the setting to “rehearse these values” by living out their salvific potential.947 Through coding
“certain bodies as (already) morally good and pure,” unfit bodies (those racialized, female, poor,
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and disabled bodies) in their unrecruitability became not just a threat to American identity but to
“Nature itself”948 in their incongruity with ideal visions of reciprocal or harmonious relationships
between humans and nature. This environmental inheritance continues to reverberate both in
contemporary investments in nature as an adventure sport paradise, the white male pitting
himself against nature and surviving, and the absence of multiplicities of nature encounters. The
“disabled body,” Ray writes, “is simultaneously the most absent and the most necessary for
reifying white bourgeois identity” as the “disabled body is necessary to give risk and adventure
any meaning, and yet the disabled body must remain invisible. The double bind of risk culture
becomes evident because risk in fact threatens disablement.”949
The reverberations of this environmental inheritance that are most detrimental for
devastated landscapes are investments in maintaining the invisibility of disabled bodies. Still,
even in this cultural moment, disabled representation in nature encounters is incredibly rare and
academic conversations on disability, illness, and the environment are nascent. In religion and
ecology, they continue to be almost wholly absent. While “tales of communities in crisis
commonly depoliticize disaster” and obscure “the political significance of structural inequalities
that render people with disabilities more at risk in disaster,” in truth “the disabled body,” Julia
Watts Belser argues, is inscribed socially and environmentally with a “narrative of ‘natural’
vulnerabilities and inevitable suffering” that facilitates their abandonment.950 These well-worn
routes that contribute to the invisibility of disabled bodies and their environmental experiences
only feed into the realities of what we saw unfold in Katrina, Rita, and Harvey which is disabled
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populations were particularly hard-hit by these storms. In Louisiana there was no disaster
planning for people with disabilities.951 There was no plan for evacuating those that needed
mobility assistance. There were no translation services for those with sensory disabilities. There
was no registry to locate residents that were unable to reach safety without assistance. The poor,
ill, disabled, and elderly were most likely to die during Katrina and people with disabilities were
left to drown in their mobility devices in their homes, in second-story apartments, sitting in the
heat in wheelchairs on the highway, in nursing homes and hospitals without power and staff.952
Complicating this discussion, like the problematic histories facing black and female
bodies and environmental thinking, is disability studies’ flight from social presumptions of
people with disabilities as more proximate to nature/nonhuman animals. The strained
relationship between disability and animality traces back to Darwin’s nineteenth-century
“paradigm-shifting theory of evolution” that “identified feebleminded and racialized peoples as
key evidence of human animal origins.”953 Consequently, while there is work in disability studies
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on how “built environments954 privilege some bodies and minds over others” through focusing
on accessibility and representation, there is less scholarship on the “specific ways toxic
environments engender chronic illness and disability, especially for marginalized populations, or
the ways environmental illnesses, often chronic and invisible, disrupt dominant paradigms for
recognizing and representing ‘disability.’”955 These concerns have merit as I can easily see, like
my conversations on trauma and environment, work that considers how environments can be
disabling (or can debilitate further) being used to dismiss people with disabilities as without
future, purpose, or hope in a rapidly changing environment. I understand hesitancy with
investing in environmental thought from voices in disability studies that argue not all people with
disabilities desire “fixing” or normative conceptions of health, especially since the true
impediments are access and representation not difference, because most narratives discussing
disability and environmental decline champion only normative conceptions of health.
One source of these tensions, Kelly Fritsch argues, is the “material-discursive production
of disability” that intimately links “forms of neoliberal biocapitalism” together with
“consequences for how we think toxicity and disability together.”956 As I have mentioned, the
U.S. has “sorely lacking standards and laws regulating chemical production and distribution,”
and the risk of environmental exposure “can debilitate certain populations more than others,” the
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production of disability in America shapes disability as “an individually economically
quantifiable toxic condition.”957 Contemporary panic about the dangers of exposing fetuses and
children to toxins in the environment, Fritsch and Mel Chen argue, resonate only when white
children and white legacies are at risk while “black children are ‘assumed to be toxic’”958 and
without kinship lineages that require financial investments. While, as Chen, Alaimo, and Fritsch
demonstrate, we live in increasingly toxically-threatening planet (with politics not inherent
difference determining levels of exposure) “discourses representing disability as the failure of the
body to meet some normative standards” have not disappeared; “people still want a ‘healthy
baby’ to such an extent that disability deeply disturbs this desire.”959 Kafer, in a crip reading of
Haraway’s feminist cyborg figure, argues this compulsory reproduction of able-bodies is driven
by “ideologies of wholeness,”960 that are so pervasive that speaking into this context and calling
for futures that desire disability is disturbingly improper in its rejection of normative kinship
networks and the cause of American futurity.
These are sticky dialogues. I think they are worth having; however, because crip
materialities offer incredibly valuable insights for environmental ethics. Considering precarious
futures, it is critical that we wrestle with the realities that people with disabilities (disabled
bodies, encounters, and imaginaries) continue to be absented in our theory and policy and this
lack of representation, like missing nonessentialized black environmental identities, contributes
to people with illnesses and disabilities being last in consideration for rescue, policy
interventions, restoration, and rebuilding efforts post-disaster. Furthermore, considering new
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cosmology’s ethical argument for the future, the erasure of disabled bodies and toxic
environments can be understood as not incidental to these strains of religious ecotheory but
fundamental in order to maintain new cosmology’s affective investments. Disabled bodies, with
complex encounters and material needs, with potentially ambivalent feelings about a nature
constructed either in their absence or as evidence of their inhumanity, and with potentially
visible testaments to the realities of our porosity and the impacts of toxic immersion, unsettle so
many of the ontological and ethical commitments new cosmology tightly clutches. Primarily, I
argue the side-stepping of environmental degradation and the complete lack of attention to
people with disabilities is because the presence of ill and disabled bodies and habitats resists the
speculative futures new cosmology invests in—"hopeful” (in its narrowest conception) futures of
reciprocal healing for human and nonhuman others if humans choose to invest in evolutionary
kinships. It is doubtful devastated landscapes and people with illnesses and disabilities can be
part of these futures so the question remains, how do we explore “wanted, unwanted, and even
unknowable intimacies with our environments,” in ways that unsettle the desirability of normate
lives and attend to “the nuances of disabled lives as viable alternatives?”961 Resisting these
erasures, I argue we need alternative futures, disability futures, within religion and ecology that
desire embodied difference in our shared precarity.

Desiring Eco-Crip Futurity
Providing an excellent model for this precarious embrace, Kafer’s Feminist, Queer, Crip
appeals to methodological alliances between queer and crip theory, particularly pulling from
queer kinship and temporality, to articulate “crip time,” by wrestling with the “ways in which
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‘future’ has been deployed in the service of compulsory able-bodiedness and ablemindedness.”962 Kafer critiques two problematic framings of crip futurity that are also relevant
for thinking about futurity for devastated landscapes. First, Kafer highlights that futurity for
bodies with disabilities is often “framed in curative terms, a time frame that casts disabled people
(as) out of time, or as obstacles to the arc of progress.”963 Within this frame of “curative time”
the “only appropriate disabled mind/body is one cured or moving toward cure.”964 Curative time
cannot allow the persistence of bodies with disabilities because they break this hopeful arc.
Consequently, crip theory must “engage in the process of articulating other temporalities, other
approaches to futurity beyond curative ones.”965 I have detailed how Edenic pasts and
apocalyptic futures do devastated landscapes no favors and how through their sheer absence new
cosmology and religion and ecology invest in compulsory able-bodiedness/able-mindedness by
similarly projecting futures without the persistence of disabled bodies. Thus, religion and
ecology is in the similar position of needing to articulate other temporalities for devastated
environments cast out of time if it hopes to be relevant for the future.
Second, in critique of Lee Edelman’s shaping of queer futurity, Kafer argues crip theory
must be wary of rejecting futurity outright. Edelman highlights the compulsory heterosexuality
in American politics that is centered around consanguineous kinships and the figure of the child
as its inevitable telos.966 Provocatively, Edelman argues queers would be better off refusing the
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future altogether. Resonating with Edelman, Kafer agrees the figure of the child is certainly used
to “buttress able-bodied/able-minded heteronormativity,” especially through prenatal testing and
selective abortion.967 Furthermore, Kafer finds commonality with Edelman’s argument that
compulsory heterosexuality leads to an “ethics of endless deferral,” where focus on a better
future requires diverting “our attention from the here and now” and the need for political
interventions for queer communities.968 The framing of disability mirrors compulsory
heterosexuality, Kafer contends, with this “firm focus on the future” often “expressed in terms of
cure and rehabilitation, and is thereby bound up in normalizing approaches to the mind/body”
rather than dedicated to investments in the “needs and experiences of disabled people in the
present.”969 Within deferred futurity, queerness and disability “cannot appear as anything other
than failure” in their inability to conform to particular kinship parameters so it is easy, Kafer
contends, to see clearly “how futurity has been the cause of much violence against disabled
people, such that ‘fuck the future’ can seem the only viable crip response.”970
Yet, where she departs from Edelman, Kafer argues it is “these very histories ultimately”
that “make such refusal untenable.”971 “I do not think the only response to no future,” she writes,
“—or rather, to futures that depend upon no futures for crips—is a refusal of the future
altogether. Indeed, ‘fucking the future,’ at least in Edelman’s terms, takes on a different valence
for those who are not supported in their desires to project themselves (and their children) into the
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future in the first place.”972 Kafer sides with Heather Love and José Muñoz who contend the
child of compulsory heterosexuality’s sovereign futurity, that Edelman describes, is ultimately a
white child. Furthermore, the “always already whiteness” of the future child “is a whiteness
framed by and understood through regimes of health and hygiene”973 suturing stigmas of
permeability and contagion to undesirable kinship lineages. “Queer kids, kids of color, street
kids—all of the kids cast out of reproductive futurism—have been and continue to be framed as
sick, as pathological, as contagious” conflating race, class, and disability.974 Instead of
abandoning futurity, Kafer calls for consideration of real complex lives, “critical maps of the
practices and ideologies that effectively cast disabled people out of time and out of our futures,”
and careful attention to the ways “incidents of illness and disability” are “inextricably bound, and
differentially bound, to race/class/gender/nation.”975
Wholesale abandonment of futures for disasterscapes, as Haraway and Keller highlight, is
a tempting option. It is a habit that many environmentalists are determined not to break.
Avoidance and erasure, however, has done little to actually solve the progression of
environmental degradation and its uneven impacts on the poor. Desiring nature solely as
wholeness or reciprocity, Haraway drawing from Gayatri Spivak argues, continues to position
nature as an impossibility— “as that which we cannot not desire. Excruciatingly conscious of
nature’s discursive constitution as ‘other’ in the histories of colonialism, racism, sexism, and
class domination of many kinds, we nonetheless find in this problematic, ethno-specific, long-
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lived, and mobile concept something we cannot do without, but can never ‘have.’ We must find
another relationship to nature besides reification and possession.”976 Refusing futurity for
devastated landscapes does not do much justice to those bodies, identities, communities, and
habitats that have always been denied the embrace of nature and American futurity. Questions
like those Kafer, Love, and Muñoz ask—why do some children have futures and others do not,
who gets to decide what constitutes hope (which embodiments are worth dreaming), why are
some bodies allowed to desire the future (be desirable futures) and others not— seem much more
productive than our apocalypse habit.
Resisting temporal frameworks that depoliticize disability and position people with
disabilities as without futures, Kafer advocates for a political/relational model of disability that
focuses instead on the “political experience of disablement” and sees disability as a “potential
site for collective reimagining” for the future.977 Disability, she argues, exists not only in
“relation to able-bodiedness/able-mindedness, such that disabled and abled form a constitutive
binary,” but also “disability is experienced in and through relationships; it does not occur in
isolation.”978 These relationships include friends, family, attendant care, objects and spaces,
procedure and policy. Her concern, she writes, is with framing disability:
not as a category inherent in certain minds and bodies but as what historian Joan W. Scott
calls a ‘collective affinity.’ Drawing on the cyborg theory of Donna Haraway, Scott
describes collective affinities as ‘play[ing] on identifications that have been attributed to
individuals by their societies, and that have served to exclude them or subordinate them.’
Collective affinities in terms of disability could encompass everyone from people with
learning disabilities to those with chronic illness, from people with mobility impairments
to those with HIV/AIDS, from people with sensory impairments to those with mental
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illness. People within each of these categories can all be discussed in terms of disability
politics, not because of any essential similarities among them, but because all have been
labeled as disabled or sick and have faced discrimination as a result.979
These, what Kafer terms “crip affinities,” resonate with work in queer theory that recognizes
terms like “queer” are fluid sites of collective contestation, and the “experience of illness and
disability,” she writes, can be understood in “Jasbir Puar’s framework, as an assemblage, where
‘[c]ategories—race, gender, sexuality [and, I would add, disability]—are considered as events,
actions, and encounters between bodies, rather than as simply entities and attributes of
subjects.’”980
Crip affinities offer “alternative ways of understanding ourselves in relation to the
environment, understandings which can then generate” new possibilities for “intellectual
connections and activist coalitions”981 by demonstrating how very much different groups
negotiating the intersections of social exclusions and environmental decline have to say to one
another. Like Kimberle Crenshaw articulates with intersectionality, crip affinities offer ways to
spotlight how forms of power intersect and interlock.982 The stigmas of permeability and
contagion that affectively position disabled bodies as undesirable, without future,
environmentally threatening, or inconsequential, are shared by sexual minorities and black
communities resisting entrenched uses of “nature” to proscribe gender, sexual identities,
practices, affinities, attachments, kinships, and alternative futures. Following the long histories I
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outlined of pressing social exclusions into America’s very landscapes, crip affinities can help us
further puzzle through devastated landscapes—eyeless shrimp, clawless crabs, fish with sores,
eroding coastlines, oil-slick habitats, superfund seepage, lost-histories, abandoned black,
disabled, and elderly humans—as complex assemblages made up of the diverse inheritors of
toxic investments.
Kafer argues how one “understands disability in the present determines how one
imagines disability in the future: one’s assumptions about the experience of disability create
one’s conception of a better future.”983 “I desire crip futures,” she writes:
futures that embrace disabled people, futures that imagine disability differently, futures
that support multiple ways of being. I use this language of desire deliberately. I know
how my heart can catch when I see a body that moves oddly or bears strange scars. I
know how my body shifts, leans forward, when I hear someone speak with atypical
pauses or phrasing, or when talk turns to illness and disability. Part of what I am
describing is a lust born of recognition, a lust to see bodies like my own or like the bodies
of friends and lovers, as well as a hope that the other finds such recognition in me.
Perhaps most important to this examination of disability futures, it is a desire born largely
of absence. We lack such futures in this present, and my desires are practically
inconceivable in the public sphere. There is no recognition that one could desire
disability, no move to imagine what such desire could look like.984
Kafer’s desires here, again, resonate with Mel Chen’s conception of queerness as improper
affiliation. Recognizing that desire always overflows the contours meant to contain it, Kafer,
Chen, and other queer ecologists recognize cultivating impropriety in kin-care may be our
hopeful future.985 It seems to be, as Kafer suggests, that without reconsidering our current
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imaginings of disability that religion and ecology would not be able to speak to relationships
with damaged environments and creatures in any meaningful way. What sorts of different futures
might we imagine, what conceptual and activist openings might be possible, if we consider the
embodied experiences of illness and disabilities as we experience ill and disabled ecosystems?
What might it mean to religious ecotheory if we not only carved out space for but desired queer
eco-crip affinities— “bodies with limited, off, or queer movements and orientations”986— and
asked what these bodies desire for the future, how their encounters, intimacies, and attachments
reshape what can be said about hope? Finding our way out of the problem of foreclosed futures
for devastated landscapes begins with relocating kinship love away from evolutionary
inheritances that ignore our toxic immersions, and towards relocating future desire within
kinships of remainders, collective affinities between queer, black, and disabled ways of being,
and a desire for being-long (in all its different forms) for everyone.

What the Water Gave Me
I began with detailing how creatures impacted by BP demanded a reshaping in my
environmental thinking—how I lacked the conceptual tools to puzzle through my feelings. I end
with the personal and attachment to turtles. During the strange waiting period (uncanny hurricane
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time) between the Harvey rain waters receding and the river levels rising, standing in long lines
at the grocery trying to think of what to get out of what was left to sit out being an island for a
while, I became obsessed with rescuing the displaced turtles (Texas river cooters and western
painted turtles) confusedly waddling away from all the overfull swamps, ponds, and fountains
into traffic. Not one to make a spectacle of myself nor even very fond of turtles (their slimy
mossy-ness and heft makes them particularly difficult to transport in hot traffic) I, nevertheless,
found myself frantically searching for them while we drove to check on friends and borrow
medical supplies for my son. I’d yell for my spouse to stop driving and hop out hips-churning in
humidity-stuck clothes to grab them and take them back to the water. I know nothing about
turtles. I never had a particular affinity for them before, but I found myself thinking about them
all the time. I knew as my anxiety increased each time I saw one smashed by cars, and in-spite of
my awareness that as soon as the Brazos floods came they would all wash out into unsafe places
again, that this obsession is and is not about wanting to protect the turtles. I did not want to be
displaced into a shelter despite its professed safety and I wanted to be home to ride out whatever
was coming. I had not prepped my children for a shelter. I had nowhere near enough medical
supplies prepared. I felt so stupid for not preparing better. How much preparation is enough? I
wanted to take those turtles to their homes too, despite how irrational jumping into traffic
became. I watch for them still, more than a year later scanning curbs and intersections, and I
have a place to take the injured ones. A queer biophilic encounter perhaps—a noticing, a
connection, not through their beauty (though they certainly are beautiful) but through a mass of
fear, anxiety, frustration, and despair. I do not know if moving the turtles gives me hope. Mostly,
like any environmental thought in our contemporary moment, it feels too little too late, not
enough, almost embarrassing in its smallness. Sitting with the squirmy discomfort about how
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best to live, love, and hope in our labor of forming response-abilities; however, is ours to
undertake.
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